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Many governments have set up Trust Funds (TFs) at 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to channel 
public finance for climate change mitigation and 
 adaptation purposes . Especially at the World Bank 
Group (WBG), climate change-related TFs have 
 proliferated; of 161 identified TFs, 105 are still active 
and account for about 12 % of all TFs that the WBG 
administers (excluding purely administrative internal 
TFs) . If one combines TFs that cater for the same 
program, still 100 different  programs can be identified 
(of which 65 are currently active) . At the other MDBs, 
only a few dozen climate change-related TFs exist (Fig-
ure I) . This study assesses the landscape of these TFs at 
the WBG, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank (IADB) as of 30 June 2019 
and provides recommendations how they could be 
 reformed or consolidated . 












Quantitative assessment of data on climate change- 
related TFs proved surprisingly difficult as the data 
shared by MDBs were incomplete and sometimes 
 contained inconsistencies with publicly available infor-
mation including data on contributions and disburse-
ments . Our qualitative assessment is based on over 40 
interviews with MDBs’ staff, German government 
 officials and implementers of TF supported activities . 
We differentiate between Financial Intermediary Funds 
(FIFs) which serve to collect donor contributions and 
redistribute funds to accredited agencies, and multi-/
single donor TFs . Most of the 12 FIFs are official 
 financial institutions under the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
 administered by MDBs . The FIFs are much larger than 
the other TFs (Figure II) and involve much larger num-
bers of donors .
Executive Summary
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Figure II: Cumulative volume of active and closed funds allocated to FIFs and TFs at the various MDBs 
(1988–2019, in billion United States Dollar, USD)
Through a multi-layer procedure, we define ten 
 thematic clusters in order to classify the TFs . Three 
clusters relate to carbon funds in the context of inter-
national market mechanisms, with the first cluster 
 including funds to pioneer the Kyoto Mechanisms  
in the early 2000s, the second one focusing on bulk 
 purchase of credits by industrialized countries to com-
ply with their Kyoto targets, and the third one on 
 operationalizing the new mechanisms under the Paris 
Agreement (PA) . Four clusters cover mitigation – 
 renewable energy, energy efficiency, forestry and 
 multiple types of mitigation . Two clusters address 
 disaster prevention and response and other forms of 
adaptation . One very large cluster covers mixed miti-
gation and adaptation activities . The large size of the 
latter is explained by the presence of very large FIFs 
that tackle both mitigation and adaptation .




















  Executive Summary
The number of TFs increased rapidly between 2000 
and 2009, with a slowdown of growth afterwards . If 
no new TFs are added in the future, the number of 
TFs would stabilize at about 50 % of current levels in 
the second half of the 2020s, as most MDB TFs are 
time-bound . 
We see a potential for consolidation of those FIFs that 
are not UNFCCC institutions . Also, a large amount  
of fragmentation exists within the TF portfolio at the 
WBG . The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
is special inasmuch it has an umbrella approach for its 
TFs that could serve as a model for other MDBs . Three 
case studies looked at the consolidation potential for 
WBG TFs on disaster risk, bulk purchase of Kyoto 
credits and development of innovative approaches to 
market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement . For 
the disaster-related funds, an umbrella approach is al-
ready applied and seems to function well . For the bulk 
purchase, many parallel funds with exactly the same 
purpose existed due to governments’ hesitance to co-
operate on an issue where national sovereignty was 
seen as crucial . In the context of the innovative ap-
proaches, several TFs had strongly differing thematic 
approaches and only a relatively small subset was prone 
to consolidation .
Umbrella TFs – like PROGREEN for forests – or a 
setting in which individual TFs are replaced by fund-
ing windows within a single TF for a given topic can 
reduce transaction costs on the side of the MDB as 
well as recipients, and also encourage communication 
and cooperation among members of individual sub-
funds . However, the optimization of the institutional 
setting is a complex endeavor that requires more than a 
simple reduction in the number of TFs . As a first step, 
we suggest that responsibility for all TFs within one 
MDB is allocated to a central group of staff/unit, 
which would allow to identify suitable TFs to which 
new funding could be attached and reduce current 
 incentives to create new TFs rather than considering 
existing options . MDBs should introduce regulation 
requiring operational teams to share their fundraising 
plans, so that MDB management could mitigate un-
coordinated fundraising . We also propose an incentive-
compatible fee structure for donors including differen-
tiated fees depending on the strictness of earmarking, 
contribution size, and number of donors; and linking 
of fees to disbursements, with possible differentiation 
by the level of results achieved . In order to overcome 
the current lack of transparency, each MDB should set 
up a well-structured website presenting the different 
TFs, including a search function for different fields of 
activity . 
On the donor side, we propose to enhance coordina-
tion by using replenishments, Steering Committee 
meetings, and informal channels to promote coordina-
tion and to reduce overlap in the mandates . Donors 
with highly fragmented portfolios should unilaterally 
consolidate their TF portfolios on the basis of periodic 
portfolio reviews in order to close dormant accounts, 
merge TFs and/or transfer them into existing umbrel-
las . A simple approach is to push for Multi-Donor 






In order to reach the goal of the Paris Agreement (PA) 
to the UNFCCC to hold the increase in the global av-
erage temperature well below 2 °C above pre-industrial 
levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature 
 increase to 1 .5 °C above pre-industrial levels as well as 
to adapt to climate change, significant amounts of 
 international climate finance, i . e . financial flows from 
industrialized to developing countries are necessary .  
At the Copenhagen Conference of 2009, developed 
countries have committed to mobilize USD 100 billion 
per year in climate finance by 2020 . This target has 
been reconfirmed by the Paris Conference in 2015 .
There are many channels through which public climate 
finance can be provided, especially through MDBs . 
Collectively, the African Development Bank (AfDB), 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), the IADB, and 
the WBG committed USD 237 billion in public 
 climate finance over the past eight years (Figure 1) .1
Figure 1. Reported MDB climate finance commitments in 2011–18


















































































This includes both upfront financing including equity, 
grants, loans, guarantees and ex-post payments, e . g . 
through the purchasing of carbon credits under inter-
national market mechanisms for climate change miti-
gation . Almost three quarters of total climate finance 
in 2018 were committed through investment loans, 
while the purchasing of carbon credits (result-based 
 financing) represented only 6 % (EBRD 2019) . 
1 Note that climate finance reporting by MDBs is different from reporting under the UNFCCC .
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TFs have been a key instrument to channel public cli-
mate finance through MDBs . They can engage in miti-
gation or adaptation project implementation or ancil-
lary activities such as policy advice, technical support 
and capacity building in a variety of sectors . Some TFs 
have MDTFs, while others are based on contributions 
by SDTFs . So-called “carbon funds” have played an 
important role in MDB-led carbon market-related ini-
tiatives (or “carbon finance”) . For example, early initia-
tives such as the WBG’s Prototype Carbon Fund 
(PCF) launched in 2000 and the Netherlands-EBRD 
Carbon Fund launched in 2003 aimed at pioneering 
carbon markets by creating the initial demand for car-
bon credits and pilot the design of the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms, i . e . the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) . Several of 
these initiatives had a specific geographical focus de-
pending on MDBs’ regions of operation . For example, 
the EIB/EBRD Multilateral Carbon Credit Fund 
(MCCF) focused on Central Europe and Central Asia, 
the ADB’s Asia Pacific Carbon Fund (APCF) on the 
Asia-Pacific region, the IADB’s MicroCarbon Develop-
ment Fund on CDM Programs of Activities (PoAs) in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) .
Examples for TFs addressing mitigation outside carbon 
finance include the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), 
the largest funds outside of the operating entities of 
the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC . While the 
CIFs address the whole range of mitigation activities, 
other mitigation TFs focus on specific sectors . For ex-
ample, the EBRD’s Sustainable Energy Financing Fa-
cilities (SEFF) support the development of renewable 
energy-related mitigation projects in Central Europe, 
Central Asia and Northern Africa by providing techni-
cal assistance (TA) and on-lending of EBRD loans . 
Several funds such as the Brazilian Rain Forest (BRF) 
Trust Fund focus on avoidance of deforestation – Re-
ducing emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation (REDD+) . 
The field of adaptation has seen a dynamic evolution . 
Many of the approaches now used in climate adapta-
tion were previously developed in the field of disaster 
risk management . A key example of a TF in the field of 
disaster risk reduction (DRR) is the Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) .
Today, TFs at MDBs, particularly at the WBG2, are 
numerous, with several funds with similar objectives 
inside the same MDB . Based on data provided by the 
WBG, this study identified 161 WBG TFs and 100 
programs that are climate-related3 . Of these, 105 TFs 
and 65 programs are currently active, 54 TFs and 35 
programs are not active, while the status of two TFs  
is unknown . As 12 % of all active WBG TFs4 are 
 climate-change related, the proliferation of TFs is 
 particularly strong in this thematic area . This leads  
to overlaps in the operation of these TFs, creating 
 additional bureaucratic structures and costs that could 
be avoided with a better coordination among them . 
MDBs and donors are aware of this issue . The WBG is 
now in its fourth phase of undergoing reform on TFs 
and in the second round of exploring possibilities for 
umbrella TFs . Responding to donor perceptions of 
portfolio fragmentation and lack of alignment – also 
voiced by Germany – the WBG management has 
made several propositions in the first stage, such as 
Umbrella Facilities . Member states had different opin-
ions on these facilities but were overall supportive of 
them . 
2  The WBG includes the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Asso-
ciation (IDA)), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) and IFC . Most TFs are hosted by the World Bank . In Section 3, where we discuss the role of the WBG in FIFs, it would be more 
appropriate to talk about the IBRD instead of the WBG, as IFC does not provide services to FIFs . For consistency, we prefer using WBG 
throughout the report but remind readers that the specific WBG institutions involved in TF management may differ across different TFs . 
IFC has few climate-related TFs that we discuss in a separate sub-section .
3 Some TFs are different accounts of the same program . Please see Section 2 for details .




1.2. Key concepts and definitions
Given that there is no universally accepted terminol-
ogy related to TFs and climate change, we build our 
analysis on definitions provided by relevant 
international institutions but adjust those when this 
appears appropriate in the context of our study (see 
 Table 2 below, adjustments in blue) .
Table 2. Relevant definitions 
Term Definition
Trust Funds (TFs) Independent legal entity and investment vehicle to help mobilizing, blending, and 
overseeing the collection and allocation of financial resources (United Nations 
 Development Programme, UNDP, 2018). Some TFs may focus on delivering benefits 
related to the mitigation of or adaptation to climate change. TFs may be recipient 
executed (Recipient-executed Trust Fund – RETFs) or MDB executed (Bank-executed 
Trust Funds – BETFs) or both (“Hybrid TFs”).
Climate Finance Climate finance refers to local, national or transnational financing – drawn from 
public, private and alternative sources of financing – that seeks to support mitiga-
tion and adaptation actions that will address climate change (UNFCCC 2018).
Carbon Finance Carbon finance as a subcomponent of climate finance is a generic term used for the 
revenue streams that can be generated by the sale of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emis-
sion reduction credits (Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) 2017, 2018) under inter-
national carbon markets.
Carbon Funds TFs that engage in carbon finance.
Financial Intermediary 
Funds (FIFs)
FIFs are financial arrangements that typically leverage a variety of public and 
 private resources in support of international initiatives, enabling the international 
community to provide a direct and coordinated response to global priorities. FIFs 
are a distinct subset of TFs and have usually supported programs focused on the 
provision of global public goods (WB 2018a), such as responses to climate change. 
FIFs often involve complex financing and governance arrangements and aim to raise 
funds from multiple sources, both public and private. For the WBG, they imply new 
roles other than that of an implementing agency, such as trustee (financial man-




MDBs are supranational institutions set up by sovereign states, which are their 
shareholders. They have the common task of fostering economic and social progress 
in developing countries by financing projects, supporting investment and generating 
capital for the benefit of all global citizens. MDBs also play a major role on the 
 international capital markets, where they raise the large volume of funds required 
to finance their loans (EIB 2018).
Regional Development 
Banks (RDBs)
RDBs are MDBs that provide financial and technical assistance for development in 
countries within their regions. Finance is allocated through low-interest loans and 
grants for a range of development sectors. The term Regional Development Bank 
(RDB) usually refers to four institutions: AfDB, ADB, EBRD, and IADB (Ottenhoff 
2011).
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1.3. Objectives
The main purpose of the study is to provide an analysis 
of climate change-related TFs at MDBs, their chal-
lenges and the way they could be improved in order to 
contribute to the current TF reform at the WBG and 
achieve strategic, effective and efficient deployment of 
climate finance . It focuses on four MDBs – WBG, 
ADB, AfDB, and IADB .
The study:
• Provides an overview of the MDB landscape of 
 climate change-related TFs .
• Shows potential for reform/consolidation of  
these TFs .
• Gives recommendations for further engagement 
with the MDBs’ climate change-related TFs .
1.4. Methodology
The methodology of the study includes three pillars: 
document review, data analysis, and interviews .
Document review: The study is based on a thorough 
desk review of relevant documents and websites by the 
WBG, other MDBs and other relevant institutions 
(e . g . Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), UNFCCC, think tanks), as 
well as peer-reviewed scholarly publications . 
Database analysis: The team requested access to the 
internal MDB databases on climate-related funding 
(including but not limited to TFs) . An initial request 
for data was submitted to the WBG in December 
2018, followed by requests to the other MDBs in April 
2019 . Table 3 describes the information from the 
MDBs’ quantitative databases that the team was able 
to obtain and use . The period of analysis begins for 
each MDB in the year for which TF data are available 
and ends for all MDBs on 30 June 2019 (see also 
Notes to Table 5) .
Table 3. Data types received from MDBs







“Main trustees”: general information at the level of the TF such as start year, end year, legal instrument, geographic reach,  
thematic focus, execution modality, and total contributions.
“Contribution data”: individual donor contributions along with the fiscal year of receipt.
“Disbursement data”: all individual activities supported by a given TF including information on recipient country, sectors, 
themes, purposes, and disbursed amounts. 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) provided a qualitative narrative of which of its TFs have climate-relevant activities.
We did not receive annual contribution data from the WBG but drew this data from AidFlows (AidFlows 2019). 
No disaggregated data for WBG carbon funds was available due to data privacy arrangements governing these specific TFs.
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Available data enabled us to undertake a mapping of 
all climate-related TFs at all analyzed MDBs and to 
obtain information on the overall amount of climate-
related funding allocated through TFs . As detailed in-
formation on donor contributions were available only 
for two MDBs (WBG and ADB) and the 12 FIFs, our 
donor comparisons are somewhat biased as they neces-
sarily omit two (smaller) MDBs (AfDB and IADB) . 
Finally, our coverage of activity-level data is rather 
patchy, as only the WBG (specifically the IBRD) 
shared this data and only for activities executed by 
 recipients . We were thus unable to analyze which cli-
mate-related TFs support the analytical work of WBG 
staff . As the costs for managing TFs are also billed to 
BETFs, we were unable to estimate the cost-effective-
ness of TF contributions .5
Interviews: The findings from the desk review were 
complemented with targeted expert interviews from 
three main groups of stakeholders with different points 
of view and insights about how the TFs work and 
where they can be improved: bilateral donor agencies, 
MDBs, and recipient country activity implementers 
(please refer to Annex 2 for the approach to interviews 
and Annex 3 for the list of interviewees) .
• Bilateral donor agencies represented by the German 
institutions in charge of climate-related TFs at 
MDBs . 
• MDBs represented by professionals working in the 
MDBs and for different TFs within the same MDB 
with the main focus on the WBG . Interviews were 
chosen based on the short list of TFs for deeper 
analysis (see Section 4) . 
• TF activity implementers in recipient countries and 
other experts represented by consultants in charge of 
the implementation of a TF activity in a recipient 
country . Interviewees were chosen to represent dif-
ferent types of organizations (public and private) 
and different regions . 
Case studies: To better understand the potential for 
TF consolidation, we also examined a selection of TFs 
in some more detail drawing on document analysis 
and interviews with stakeholders in the German gov-
ernment and the MDBs with a focus on the WBG . 
Case studies were selected using a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches (see Section 
4 .2 for details) .
The remainder of the study proceeds as follows . Sec-
tion 2 presents a landscape of a broad range of TFs 
linked to climate change mitigation and adaptation 
identified through the data provided by MDBs as well 
as suggested mapping of TFs into thematic “clusters” . 
Section 3 assesses the climate change-related TFs at the 
different MDBs . Section 4 analyses a sample sub-set of 
representative TFs from three “clusters” in more detail 
and discusses the potential for their reform and/or 
consolidation . Section 5 provides key recommenda-
tions and suggestions for reform . Section 6 concludes .
5  While RDBs seem not to have BETF-related data, the WBG was unable to share them due to confidentiality agreements with donors  
(specifically for carbon funds) and did not offer insight into its internal cost structures (see the World Bank’s Access to Information Policy: 
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This section systematizes the various trust funds in cli-
mate finance – first applying an institutional perspec-
tive, which focuses on funding instruments and 
subsequently a thematic perspective, leading to clusters 
of TFs with a common theme .
2.1.  The institutional place of trust funds in the  
international climate finance architecture
The international climate finance architecture is rather 
complex (Hoffmann 2011; Keohane and Victor 2011; 
Abbott 2012) . It includes the following funding chan-
nels (see also Becault and Marx 2016) which include 
TFs to various extent:
• Bilateral aid: donor governments directly support-
ing climate change-related activities in recipient 
countries .
• Multilateral aid to finance core resources of inter-
national organizations (IOs) with a mandate in cli-
mate change: these IOs include UN funds and pro-
grams like the UN Environment Program (UNEP), 
MDBs that fund concessional lending projects, but 
also treaty secretariats of Multilateral Environmen-
tal Agreements (MEAs) . The latter operate special 
purpose TFs to support climate-related activities . 
• Multilateral aid passed through FIFs (Reinsberg et 
al . 2015): these FIFs collect donor contributions 
and redistribute funds to a number of pre-admitted 
agencies . With regard to climate change, there are 
12 FIFs; the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
provides a well-known example (Bayer et al . 2013; 
Thompson and Graham 2015; Michaelowa et al . 
2018), more recently the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) has become the biggest of all climate 
change-related funds in terms of annual contribu-
tions (as of FY2017) . The majority of these funds 
are official financial institutions under the UNFC-
CC whose administration is delegated to MDBs .6 
FIFs lack implementation capacities and therefore 
re-delegate funds to implementing IOs, such as the 
United Nations (UN) and the MDBs, but, in some 
cases, also national implementers (through a fund-
ing mode called “direct access”) .
• Bi- or multilateral aid directly or indirectly chan-
neled through TFs: IOs may host and control TFs 
within their own administrative structures .7
The present study focuses on TFs, given their overall 
relevance in the sector, their tremendous growth over 
the past decade, and the associated problems that have 
arisen from this growth, specifically fragmentation of 
climate finance and related transaction costs . Figure 4 
highlights where the two different types of TFs (FIFs 
and other trust funds) are situated within the institu-
tional environment of international climate finance .
6 MDBs are uniquely positioned for such role as they can offer trustee services given their well-established fiduciary frameworks .
7  As we learned during our exchanges with MDB staff, respective terminology varies across MDBs . For example, the ADB (and AfDB) do not 
consider its implementing accounts under FIFs as “trust funds” and thus do not report on them separately . This practice is different at the 
WBG and IADB, which maintain TF accounts for these cases but which are disbursement-only accounts, while official donor contributions 
are recorded at the level of FIFs . For consistency reasons, we therefore do not report MDB TFs that are mere implementing accounts for FIFs .
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Figure 4. The multi-layer architecture of trust funds
Notes:
Bilateral donors (first level) may provide funding to FIFs and/or MDB TFs. FIFs (second level) may channel funding to MDB 
TFs or directly to recipient countries and/or sectoral activities. MDBs (third level) may act as implementers to FIFs and/or 
hosts to MDB TFs that channel funds to recipient countries and/or sectoral activities. We disregard non-MDB implementers of 
FIFs in this figure.
As per the terms of reference, the study focuses on four 
MDBs – the WBG, ADB, AfDB, and IADB – as hosts 
of MDB TFs, implementers of FIFs, and – in the case 
of the WBG – as FIF trustee and hosts of secretariat .8 
The EBRD and EIB are not included in the detailed 
analysis and only a cursory review is therefore included 
in the Annex 5 and Annex 6 respectively . For the pur-
pose of the study, the term “MDB TFs” refers to cli-
mate change-related TFs hosted by MDB excluding 
FIFs, unless stated otherwise .
The initial list of climate-related TFs at the MDBs was 
obtained by key word search on TF titles in the MDB 
annual reports and was further completed by the ex-
pert knowledge of consultants and Deutsche Gesell-
schaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) . The 
primary search was based on the following key words: 
climate; mitigation; green; ozone; carbon; emissions; 
environment; forest; clean technology; Kyoto; adapta-
tion . Based on this analysis, the MDBs provided data 
for a subset of the TFs identified by us . In particular, 
data on carbon funds and funds of the IFC were not 
provided completely, as they are subject to their own 
disclosure policies . Therefore, these funds are included 
in the analysis but with a lesser quantitative detail . 
In a second step, we then applied a pre-defined set of 
criteria to identify relevant TFs from this initial list . 
For the purpose of this study, we define a TF as any 
 financial facility supported by extra-budgetary donor con-
tributions that supports specific (climate-related) purposes 
(Droesse 2011) . In particular, a TF is included in our 












8  For each FIF managed by an MDB, there are several TF accounts with the same name as the FIF for disbursement purposes . We therefore 
assign all TFs (including the FIFs) with the same title to the same program and consider the program level for analysis where appropriate, 
because interpreting the TFs of implementing IOs under the same FIF as separate TFs would be misleading .
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• The TF receives its own external donor funding or 
is at least meant to do so (in other words – it does 
not just receive money as implementer, allocated to 
it from a higher-level TF)
• The TF is not an administrative account, interim 
fund, holding fund, or fee account (as these are all 
held internally by the host agency and do not re-
ceive donor funding)
• The definition includes facilities encompassing dif-
ferent sub-funds as long as the facility can receive 
own external donor funding
• The definition includes successive phases of TFs as 
separate TFs, no matter whether there was a sub-
stantive change in the activities foreseen
Applying these criteria led us to identify 216 climate-
related TFs . The WBG is by far the most important 
host of TFs, with 161 TFs (of which 105 active) whose 
primary purpose is related to climate change . The oth-
er MDBs have fewer climate-related TFs, notably 22 
TFs (21 active) at ADB, six (three active) at AfDB and 
15 (14 active) at IADB . These numbers all exclude any 
FIF-related TFs (the 12 climate-related FIFs are a 
separate category) . The full list of TFs considered in 
this study is presented in Annex 1 . 
MDB TFs sometimes form part of the same program . 
This is often for administrative reasons but also due to 
the time-bound nature of the TF instrument, which 
implies that a long-standing program may have several 
TFs corresponding to different funding phases . Anoth-
er reason for the proliferation of TF accounts pertains 
to legal requirements by some donors which prevent 
them from commingling funds with other donors, 
which in turn requires the setup of a SDTF . To provide 
a more realistic picture of the ongoing activities, we 
therefore also report TF numbers at the program level 
where possible . To this end, we grouped the 161 WBG 
TFs into 100 programs using the names of the TFs, 
looking at annual reports, websites and taking into 
 account outcomes from the interviews .9 The other 
MDBs have fewer programs – ADB (19 programs), 
AfDB (6 programs), and IADB (15 programs) – but 
also fewer funds per program (in the case of AfDB and 
IADB the programs actually include only a single 
 account) . In terms of the size, the FIFs correspond to 
 almost 80 % of all climate TFs volume, while among 
the MDB TFs, the WBG plays the leading role fol-
lowed by ADB, IADB and AfDB (Table 5) .
Table 5. Overview of climate-related FIFs and MDB TFs (active and closed)
Institution Number of TFs Number of programs Size (million USD)
FIFs 12 12 33 777
WBG 161 100 6 358
ADB 22 19 1 216
IADB 15 15 726
AfDB 6 6 316
Total 216 152 42 393
Notes:
Numbers reflect complete records but are over different time periods, subject to data availability: FIFs (1991–2019),  
WBG TFs (1988–2019), ADB TFs (2001–2019), IADB TFs (1998–2019), AfDB TFs (2008–2019). 
9  The numbers related to programs should therefore be only interpreted as indicative as this study could not systematically analyze each  
of the 161 TFs .
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2.2. Identification of thematic clusters
From a thematic perspective, we categorize all climate-
related TFs at all MDBs (including FIFs) based on an 
inductive approach . To obtain clusters, we scrutinized 
each TF to identify its primary purpose . These topic 
clusters allowed us to study hitherto unidentified inter-
linkages of climate-related activities across MDBs .
We identified four common content-related dimen-
sions (corresponding to the columns “Relevance”, 
“Broad theme”, “Institution focus”, and “Narrow 
theme” in Annex 1) . We describe the different dimen-
sions below including the related classification of TFs 
that we will provide .
The first dimension addresses the relevance of the TF 
in addressing climate change:
• High relevance: TFs with direct focus on climate 
change (e . g . carbon funds, whose goal is to support 
development of international market mechanisms 
for climate change mitigation and to generate 
 emission credits that can be used under such mecha-
nisms, or general climate change mitigation or 
 adaptation funds linked to public climate finance 
provision, e . g . in the context of the GEF or the 
GCF) . These TFs are labelled green in Annex 1 .
• Medium relevance: TFs with indirect focus on 
 climate change (e . g . renewable energy or energy 
 efficiency funds, whose goal is to replace carbon-
intensive economic activity with low-emission 
 alternatives; these funds may generate co-benefits  
in other areas) . These TFs are labelled yellow in 
 Annex 1 .
The second dimension distinguishes the focus area of 
TFs regarding the type of climate change-related inter-
vention:
• Mitigation: TFs which seek to prevent climate 
change through reduction or avoidance of green-
house gas emissions (e . g . Biocarbon Technical 
 Assistance TF)
• Adaptation: TFs which seek to address/mitigate the 
impact of climate change (e . g . Pacific Catastrophe 
Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative MDTF)
• Climate Change (CC) general: TFs that address 
both mitigation and adaptation (e . g . GEF)
The third dimension refers to specific mechanisms 
and institutions of international climate policy: 
• UNFCCC: TFs which serve as financial institution 
under the UNFCCC (e . g . GCF)
• BI/MULTI: MDB TFs (not FIFs) excluding carbon 
funds
• CIFs: FIFs which promote financing for activities 
with high potential to scale up (i . e . Strategic Cli-
mate Fund (SCF), Clean Technology Fund (CTF))
• Carbon Finance (carbon funds): TFs with focus on 
international market mechanisms for greenhouse 
gas mitigation (e . g . PCF) 
The fourth dimension distinguishes 14 focus areas 
 derived inductively from TF titles including awareness 
raising; carbon finance; carbon capture and storage; 
climate data provision; de-risking; energy efficiency; 
forestry; institutional support; disaster risk manage-
ment; policy support; renewable energy; resilience; 
transport; and multiple .
Table 6 presents the overview of the number and size 
of TFs across the four dimensions introduced above 
 including percentages of the total . It is worth noting 
the large concentration of funding volumes in a small 
number of TFs, particularly in those representing the 
UNFCCC financial mechanisms and the CIFs .
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Table 6. Number and size of TFs across four dimensions
Label Number of TFs Share (number) Size of TFs (million USD) Share (size)
Dimension 1 – Relevance for addressing climate change
Green (high) 109 50 % 39 825 94 %
Yellow (medium) 107 50 % 2 2568 6 %
Dimension 2 – Broad focus area
CC general 45 21 % 26 751 63 %
Mitigation 124 57 % 12 137 29 %
Adaptation 47 22 % 3 505 8 %
Dimension 3 – Institutional focus
UNFCCC 12 6 % 24 751 58 %
CIF 7 3 % 9 805 23 %
BI/MULTI 157 73 % 4 484 11 %
Carbon Finance (CF) 40 19 % 3 353 8 %
Dimension 4 – Narrow focus area
Multiple 62 29 % 34 996 83 %
Carbon finance 37 17 % 3 005 7 %
Forestry 25 12 % 2 167 5 %
Disaster risk 
 management
30 14 % 896 2 %
Renewable Energy 25 12 % 307 1 %
De-risking 4 2 % 261 1 %
Policy support 11 4 % 215 1 %
Resilience 2 1 % 188 0 %
CCS 2 1 % 118 0 %
Energy efficiency 11 5 % 82 0 %
Institutional support 1 0 % 68 0 %
Climate data 
 provision
2 1 % 55 0 %
Awareness raising 2 1 % 18 0 %
Transport 2 1 % 18 0 %
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Our next step was to develop mutually exclusive topic 
clusters with the goal to assign each TF to a unique 
cluster . We identified ten pertinent clusters, consider-
ing primarily their focus area but also their institution-
al role in the climate finance architecture . For example, 
while all carbon funds can be associated with a mitiga-
tion-based approach, they occupy a specific role in the 
overall regime and their sheer number further justifies 
establishment of a separate cluster . Carbon funds can 
in turn be divided into three sub-groups, based on 
their historically evolving roles in relation to climate-
related international agreements: 1) pioneering the 
Kyoto mechanisms, 2) buying cheap Kyoto credits for 
compliance, 3) testing new approaches beyond Kyoto 
mechanisms .
These ten exclusive “clusters” of TFs are schematically 
presented in Figure 7 below .
Figure 7. Thematic clusters of climate-related trust funds in MDBs (active and closed)
Notes:
The numbers indicate the number of TFs and number of programs in each cluster. 
• ADAPTATION_DISASTER (20 programs, 38 TFs): 
primary focus on disaster prevention and  response;
• ADAPTATION_MULTIPLE (8 programs, 9 TFs): 
 primary focus on adaptation activities other than 
disaster, e . g . water management
• CARBON_1 (14 programs, 28 TFs):  
pioneering carbon funds mainly set up to test  
and operationalize Kyoto market mechanisms in 
early 2000s;
• CARBON_2 (9 programs, 15 TFs):  
carbon funds mainly focused on bulk purchase of 
carbon  credits for Kyoto compliance purposes;
• CARBON_A6 (6 programs, 6 TFs):  
funds that are relevant for the operationalization of 
new market mechanisms under Article 6 of the PA;
• MITIGATION_RE (23 programs, 25 TFs):  
funds primarily focused on renewable energy;
• MITIGATION_EE (8 programs, 11 TFs):  
funds primarily focused on energy efficiency;
• MITIGATION_FOREST (11 programs, 14 TFs):  
funds primarily focused on forestry activities;
• MITIGATION_MULTIPLE (18 programs, 23 TFs): 
funds focused on multiple mitigation activities,  
e . g . renewable energy and energy efficiency; 
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• CC_MIXED (38 programs, 47 TFs):  
funds that combine different mitigation and  
adaptation  activities .
To give justice to the range of climate-related activities 
over the past decade, the above numbers also include 
TFs that are already closed as of 30 June 2019 . In sub-
sequent analyses, we will also provide snapshot views 
that only include TFs that were active as of 30 June 
2019 .
2.3. Overview of thematic clusters
Table 8 summarizes how the various TFs are distribut-
ed across the ten clusters, with CC_MIXED, followed 
by CARBON_1, and ADAPTATION_DISASTER 
being clusters with the largest number of TFs . This 
picture changes if we were to use funding volumes, 
where CC_MIXED accounts for about two thirds of 
all contributions . This is mainly because most FIFs, 
which are far bigger than MDB TFs, belong to this 
topic cluster . Table 8 also shows that the WBG is 
dominant in all areas of TF-related action on climate 
change . In addition, it is the only MDB that has been 
operating TFs in CARBON_2 and MITIGATION_
EE . Aside three ADB TFs, the WBG is also the leading 
provider of TFs in MITIGATION_RE, with 25 TFs . 
Conversely, the areas in which all MDBs (and FIFs) 
are active include CC_MIXED, CARBON_1, and 
MITIGATION_MULTIPLE .
Table 8. Distribution of TFs across topic clusters (active and closed)


















CC_MIXED 47 5 24 8 1 9 26 723 63 %
MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
23 1 14 6 1 1 6 607 16 %
CARBON_1 28 1 24 1 1 1 2 470 6 %
ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE
9 3 4 0 2 0 2 247 5 %
CARBON_2 15 0 15 0 0 0 1 759 4 %
ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
38 1 32 4 0 1 1 258 3 %
CARBON_A6 6 1 2 3 0 0 574 1 %
MITIGATION_
FOREST
14 0 10 0 1 3 472 1 %
MITIGATION_RE 25 0 25 0 0 0 201 0 %
MITIGATION_EE 11 0 11 0 0 0 82 0 %
TOTAL 216 12 161 22 6 15 42 393 100 %
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Table 9 shows the top three TF programs in each clus-
ter in terms of cumulative contributions . Here again 
we consider all TFs – active or not – and cumulative 
contributions since existence (FY1988-2018) . 
In  ADAPTATION_DISASTER, the most significant 
program is the GFDRR, a USD 700 million umbrella 
program (see Section 4 .3 .2 for details) . The second in 
the list is Urban Climate Change Resilience Trust 
Fund (UCCRTF) – an ADB MDTF to assist fast-
growing cities in eight priority countries in Asia to 
 reduce the risks poor and vulnerable people face from 
floods, storms, or droughts, by helping to better plan 
and design infrastructure to invest against these im-
pacts . The TF supports climate change integration into 
city planning, implementation of both infrastructure 
projects and institutional interventions (USD 149 mil-
lion) . The third largest TF in this cluster is the WBG’s 
now closed Multi Donor Trust Fund for Bangladesh 
Climate Change Resilience Fund (BCCRF) . In AD-
APTATION_MULTIPLE, the most important pro-
grams are three FIFs, the Least Developed Countries 
Fund (LDCF), the Adaptation Fund (AF), and the 
Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) . 
Among the funds in CARBON_1, the top 3 TFs are 
all hosted by the WB; two of them belong to the For-
est Carbon Partnership Fund (FCPF), and the third 
one is the Bio-Carbon Fund (BioCF) . The sizes of car-
bon funds for bulk purchase of credits, belonging to 
CARBON_2 (see Section 4 .3 .1 for details) and newer-
generation TFs in CARBON_A6 (see Section 4 .3 .3 for 
details), are significant, and again – at the exception of 
the ADB-managed Future Carbon Fund (FCF) – all 
TFs are WBG-hosted . 
Turning to non-carbon mitigation clusters, MITIGA-
TION_EE is the smallest of all clusters, again with 
only WBG TFs, as is the case in MITIGATION_RE 
with the Climate Innovation Multi Donor Trust Fund 
(CIMDTF), the Clean Energy Investment Framework 
MDTF (CEIF) and the EU/WB Access to Sustainable 
Energy Philippines (ASEP) . MITIGATION_FOREST 
has been an area where earlier funding phased out so 
that the only significant active TF is the Liberia Forest 
Landscape Single-Donor Trust Fund (LFL) with USD 
56 million . The three largest funds in MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE comprise one FIF with the Clean Tech-
nology Fund (CTF), as well as the WBG’s Energy Sec-
tor Management Assistance Program (ESMAP) and 
ADB’s Clean Energy Fund (CEF) . 
CC_MIXED is the most sizeable category, given it is 
populated by large FIFs that mobilize tremendous 
amounts of funding – GEF, GCF and SCF (see Sec-
tion 3 .1 for details) .
Table 9. Top three programs in each topic cluster across all host institutions.
Host institution Program name Number of TFs Program status Total cumulative contributions  
(1988 –2018) (USD million)
ADAPTATION_DISASTER
WBG GFDRR 17 Active 701.9
ADB UCCRTF 1 Active 149.4
WBG BCCRF 1 Closed 130.3
ADAPTATION_MULTIPLE
FIFs LDCF 1 Active 1 314.2
FIFs AF 4 Active 538.3
FIFs SCCF 1 Active 351.2
CARBON_1
WBG FCPF-CF 2 Active 793.5
WBG BioCF 4 Active 375.4
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Host institution Program name Number of TFs Program status Total cumulative contributions  
(1988 –2018) (USD million)
WBG FCPF-RF 2 Active 343.5
CARBON_2
WBG UCF 2 Active 888.2
WBG SpCF 2 Active 274.9
WBG NL-CDM 2 Active 169.3
CARBON_A6
WBG TCAF 1 Active 212.2
ADB FCF 1 Active 115.0
WBG PMR 1 Active 103.4
MITIGATION_EE
WBG EEYCP 1 Active 48.8
WBG GGFRP 2 Active 32.8
WBG ESMAP* 1 Closed 0.3
MITIGATION_RE
WBG CIMDTF 1 Active 68.0
WBG CEIF 1 Closed 40.2
WBG ASEP 1 Active 33.0
MITIGATION_FOREST
AfDB CBFF 1 Closed 170.0
WBG BRF 4 Closed 69.6
WBG LFL 1 Active 55.8
MITIGATION_MULTIPLE
FIFs CTF 6 Active 5 712.9
WBG ESMAP 2 Active 308.9
ADB CEF 1 Active 122.0
CC_MIXED
FIFs GEF 1 Active 15 804.0
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Host institution Program name Number of TFs Program status Total cumulative contributions  
(1988 –2018) (USD million)
FIFs GCF 1 Active 6 718.3
FIFs SCF 1 Active 2 954.4
Notes:
A program may appear in several topic clusters and may then refer to different TFs. This is because the assignment to 
clusters is unique only at the TF level. For instance, ESMAP as a program contains three TFs covering two different topic 
clusters. Information on cumulative contributions is available for different time spans across MDBs (see subsequent chap-
ters for details); therefore, the period 1988–2018 is the broadest possible coverage period. We would like to stress that 
some TFs report different numbers in distinct publications, here we use the numbers communicated to us by the MDBs. 
Abbreviations that previously did not appear: FCPF-CF (Carbon Fund of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility), FCPF-RF 
(Readiness Fund of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility), UCF (Umbrella Carbon Facility), SpCF (Spanish Carbon Fund),  
NL-CDM (IBRD/Netherlands Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Facility), TCAF (Transformative Carbon Asset Facility), PMR 
(Partnership for Market Readiness), EEYCP (Trust Fund for Energy Efficiency and Youth Corps Program), GGFRP (Global Gas 
Flaring Reduction Partnership), CBFF (Congo Basin Forest Fund), and BRF (Brazilian Rain Forest). 
Finally, we look at the temporal evolution of the entire 
climate-related TF portfolio across all ten topic clus-
ters . Based on information provided by the four 
MDBs, we not only know the number of currently ac-
tive TFs (or related programs), but also how this num-
ber will evolve in the near future assuming that no new 
TFs are set up . Figure 10 plots the number of TFs ac-
tive in each fiscal year indicated and across all FIFs and 
MDB TFs from FY 2000 onward . The figure is similar 
when using TF programs as underlying unit of analy-
sis . We find that the number of TFs has been steadily 
increasing until 2017 . Based on projected end dates, 
the number of currently existing funds will decline 
until 2025 . This figure, however, does not include the 
potential inflow of new TFs from 2017 onwards, 
which cannot be predicted . It thus overestimates the 
actual reduction of TF numbers . Specifically, adapta-
tion funding for disaster prevention, but also carbon 
funds will be closed in the next years . Overall, this in-
dicates that TFs are time-bound instruments to chan-
nel climate finance . It is also evident that if donors had 
stopped all funding to TFs as of 2017, the perceived 
challenge of proliferating funds would be reduced, as 
there would only be about 45 TFs on climate change 
by 2030, a third of the historical high .
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Figure 10. Number of active TFs in different fiscal years
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This section presents key characteristics of all climate-
related TFs including FIFs and MDB TFs . As MDBs 
report on TFs in different ways, the analysis proceeds 
separately for different MDBs but we are able to draw 
cross-MDB comparisons using common thematic clus-
ters of climate TFs . Due to missing data, summary sta-
tistics are based on varying numbers of observations .
3.1. Overview of thematic clusters
3.1.1. Overview of FIFs
FIFs are highly customized arrangements that often 
come into existence following high-level political deci-
sions (e . g . Group of Seven (G7) / Group of Eight (G8) 
or Group of 20 (G20) summits and UNFCCC Con-
ference of the Parties (COPs) to tackle sector-specific 
global challenges . As independently governed entities, 
FIFs provide a platform for multi-actor collaboration 
in support of global public goods . FIFs indeed are a 
popular choice for “partnership programs” – platforms 
for coordinated decision-making and large-scale 
implementation across a significant number of imple-
menting entities (WB 2019a) . This is especially rele-
vant in the area of climate change, which requires con-
certed collective action at the global level . Certain FIFs 
are listed as official financial institutions under the 
UNFCCC, specifically all FIFs under the GEF, while 
others are facilities and not UNFCCC institutions . 
 Table 11 below presents the 12 FIFs related to climate 
change along with their key characteristics .
Table 11. Climate change-related FIFs















1 TF069001 1991 17 122.0 3 782.5 CC_MIXED
Special Climate 
Change Fund (SCCF)





















0 TF069012 2009 2 954.4 1 884.3 CC_MIXED
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1 TF069013 2009 538.3 324.1 ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE
Guyana REDD+ 
 Investment Fund 
(GRIF)
0 TF069017 2010 206.6 3.6 CARBON_1
Green Climate Fund 
(GCF)
1 TF069022 2012 6 718.3 6 255.3 CC_MIXED
Pilot Auction Facili-
ty (PAF) for Meth-
ane and Climate 
Change Mitigation
0 TF069026 2014 77.8 50.6 CARBON_A6
Climate Risk and 
Early Warning 
 Systems (CREWS)
0 TF069031 2016 28.0 11.8 ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
Sources:
All information is drawn from the database of main trustees (WB 2019b). 
* This database did not include information on the NPIF, which was taken from the FIF database (WB 2019c) and from  
WB (2019f) instead. Since 2014, the NPIF is closed for new contributions but disburses its remaining fund balance. While 
GEF contribution data before FY 1999 is unavailable, see for cumulative contributions WB (2019d) and for funds balance 
 data WB (2019e).
As Table 11 shows, half of all FIFs pursue multiple 
purposes related to climate change (CC_MIXED) . 
Three FIFs support multiple adaptation purposes, and 
one FIF each supports mixed mitigation (MITIGA-
TION_MULTIPLE), disaster prevention and response 
(ADAPTATION_DISASTER), innovative carbon 
 finance (CARBON_1) and carbon markets under the 
PA (CARBON_A6) . There are no dedicated FIFs for 
mitigation with an exclusive focus on renewable ener-
gy, energy efficiency, or forestry (except the carbon 
funds focused on forestry) . In terms of funding 
volumes, the distribution is more unequal, with the 
bulk of funding going to the five FIFs in CC_MIXED 
(76 %), followed by multiple-purpose mitigation FIFs 
(17 %), and adaptation FIFs (7 %), while the small 
 remainder is associated to the carbon clusters . Overall, 
at the end of FY19, climate change-related FIFs account 
for 34 % of all FIFs’ cumulative funding (WB 2019d, 
99) . Their total fund balance represents around 65 % 
of the FIFs’ funds held in trust (based on table 11 and 
WB 2019d, 100) .
3.1.2. Governance of FIFs
FIFs are different from standard TFs in that they in-
volve the WBG – as the only global MDB, with signif-
icant convening power and robust fiduciary frame-
works – in additional roles (WB 2019a, 1) (see 
footnote 2):
• As trustee, the WBG is tasked with financial man-
agement of FIF resources; this role is always provid-
ed by the Development Finance Vice Presidency 
(DFI), separate from the sector units that imple-
ment the funds .
• Sometimes as host of the secretariat, the WBG 
provides legal personality and a range of other ena-
bling program management functions, such as calls 
for proposals to identify suitable projects for imple-
mentation . 
• The WBG – as all other MDBs – can be an imple-
menting agency, specifically through the respec-
tive Global Practice (for a Bank-executed global 
 activity) or regional Vice Presidency (for a recipient-
executed activity) .
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In practice, these roles can be combined in different 
ways, reflecting different levels of involvement by the 
WBG . First, the WBG may provide only trustee ser-
vices, while other IOs implement the funds according 
to their own operational rules and procedures . How-
ever, there is no climate-related FIF in which the WBG 
only serves as trustee . Second, the WBG may be both 
trustee and implementing IO (e . g . GCF) . In most  cases, 
it also hosts the secretariat (i . e . the only three FIFs with 
an external secretariat are the GCF, GRIF, and CREWS) . 
Table 12 below provides an overview of the various gov-
ernance functions of the WBG in all climate-related FIFs .
Table 12. WBG functions in climate-related FIFs
Fund name # Trustee Secretariat Implementing agency
GEF funds
GEF TF069001 1 1 1
LDCF TF069004 1 1 1
SCCF TF069002 1 1 1
NPIF TF069019 1 1 1
CBIT TF069032 1 1 1
AF TF069013 1 0* 1
CIFs
CTF TF069011 1 1 1
SCF TF069012 1 1 1
GRIF TF069017 1 0 1
GCF TF069022 1 0 1
PAF TF069026 1 1 0
CREWS TF069031 0 0** 1
Notes:
Yes=1, No=0. Additional governance roles refer to the formal representation of WBG entities in the FIF governing bodies.  
In all FIFs except GRIF, the WBG (through DFI) is observer by virtue of its trustee role. In some FIFs in which it is an 
 implementing IO, it is a non-voting member (i. e. SCCF, CTF, SCF, and CREWS), whereas in others it is an implementing IO 
with  observer status (i. e. GEF, LDCF, NPIF, and CBIT). 
* The secretariat services for the AF are provided by the GEF. They are legally independent. While all GEF secretariat staff 
have contracts with the WBG, institutionally they are considered functionally independent.
** World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) hosts the CREWS secretariat, to which a WBG employee is seconded. 
Source: WB (2019a, Annex I)
3.1.3. FIF portfolio
The FIF portfolio is highly diverse and the detailed 
governance modalities extend beyond the aforemen-
tioned general options . For example, FIF governing 
bodies always direct funding directly to implementing 
entities, without the WBG as trustee or the WBG as 
host to the FIF secretariat having direct supervision . In 
such case, each implementing IO applies its own op-
erational procedures . This implies higher responsibility 
for donors in financial oversight and risk management 
(WB 2019a, 6) . 
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As a whole, FIFs have become more sizeable, while 
their overall number has further increased . Figure 13 
shows the top 5 FIFs in terms of total donor contribu-
tions over FY 2009–18 . While the GEF is the largest 
fund (with about USD 6 .9 billion), the GCF is no less 
important (USD 6 .5 billion), followed by the two 
funds making up the CIFs (jointly about USD 8 .6 bil-
lion) and the LDCF (USD 1 .1 billion) . The figure also 
shows differences across FIFs in terms of engagement 
by the top 5 donors – France, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom (UK), and the United States – and 
the share of funding that is contributed by other 
 official donors . Top donors in all FIFs are presented  
in Annex 4 .































































Figure 14 provides evidence that FIFs typically are 
highly multilateral platforms . Using the number of 
participating donors as a proxy for multilateralism, the 
most inclusive FIFs are the GCF (39 donors), the GEF 
(34 donors), and the LDCF (23 donors), while the 
 remaining FIFs involve less than 15 donors . The GRIF, 
with just one donor, is a historical exception: it was 
created as a single-donor FIF with a Norwegian contri-
bution (USD 250 million) for performance-based pay-
ments for avoided deforestation in Guyana (WB 
2019a, 51) .
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A defining feature of FIFs is that they allow for several 
implementation partners .10 To examine the patterns of 
delegation in FIF implementation, we analyzed dis-
bursement data of all FIFs from FY 2009 to FY 2018 . 
Figure 15 plots the aggregate project funding commit-
ments to five MDBs by all relevant FIFs, showing that 
the WBG absorbs most of the funding (about USD 4 
billion), and that this funding comes primarily from 
the GEF (USD 2 .2 billion), but also from the CTF 
(USD 1 .16 billion) and the SCF (USD 527 million) . 
To some extent, this is unsurprising because GEF, 
CTF, GCF and SCF are also the largest FIFs overall . 
The second-largest MDB benefiting from FIFs is the 
ADB (USD 840 million in FY 2009–18) followed by 
EBRD (USD 680 million), IADB (USD 650 million), 
and AfDB (USD 600 million) . Note that CBIT has 
not supported any MDB during FY 2009–18 and is 
thus omitted from the graph . PAF is recorded with  
no disbursements because it does not provide MDB 
 finance in the classical sense but stimulates private sec-
tor financing for emission abatement through reverse-
auction purchasing of carbon credits . To date, the PAF 
has conducted three auctions (two targeting methane 
abatement projects and one for nitric acid abatement 
projects) (WB 2019a, 52) .
10  Other modalities are possible to achieve the same purpose – such as a “transfer-out agreement” – but FIFs are the most  institutionalized 
modality for partnership facilities with several implementers (WB 2019a) .
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Comparing project volumes across FIFs, we find clear 
patterns of division of labor among implementing 
MDBs (see Figure 16) . While funding seems relatively 
evenly distributed across MDBs in the CTF, the WB 
dominates project funding in the GEF, the SCCF, and 
to a lesser extent the SCF, while even accounting for all 
MDB-implemented projects (that were committed 
during FY 2009–18) for the AF and CREWS . Con-
versely, the AfDB is a similarly relevant implementer  
as the WB in the LDCF, which reflects the substantive 
orientation of this fund and the prevalence of Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) in Africa . As of end of 
FY 2018, the EBRD was awarded the lion share of 
funding under the GCF, with the remainder being 
committed to the ADB . The WBG had not received 
funding from the GCF by this time, although more 
 recent data from the GCF website (as of 30 June 2019) 
indicates that the WB is now third (after EBRD and 
UNDP) in value and second in number of approved 
GCF projects .
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This graph only considers MDB implementers, thus ignoring other IOs such as the United Nations and implementers under  
“direct access.” Numbers correspond to the value of implemented projects in FY 2009 –18 (in USD million).
We further analyzed the characteristics of climate-relat-
ed FIFs . In fact, all FIFs except NPIF operate without 
eligibility restrictions for specific income groups, fragil-
ity status, and funding concessionality (WB, 2019c) . 
FIFs are highly flexible in that they do not only pro-
vide grant resources, but also loans (i . e . CTF, SCF, 
GCF, GEF), guarantees (i . e . CTF, SCF, and GEF),  
and equity (i . e . SCF, GCF, and GEF) . The PAF 
deploys an auction model that does not fit any of these 
categories . This complexity is mirrored on the contri-
bution side: Aside from official donor grants, which 
are the main source of funding for all FIFs, other 
sources of funding entail loans, capital (i . e . CTF, SCF, 
GCF), and certified emission reductions (i . e . AF)  
(WB 2019a, 39) .
3.1.4. FIF landscape
In sum, FIFs have become sizeable platforms to chan-
nel public climate finance across the multilateral 
 system . While their growth and increasing diversity 
 potentially help address important gaps in the climate 
finance architecture – complementing the activities of 
MDBs at country level – these trends have also caused 
concerns, specifically at the WBG, which is in a more 
exposed position due to its significance as implement-
ing IO but also its additional roles as FIF trustee and 
host of FIF secretariats that could be seen as leading to 
a conflict of interest . From a perspective of some WBG 
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interviewees, FIFs entail several challenges, both indi-
vidually and at the portfolio level . 
First, given that their number has increased from three 
active FIFs in FY 2008 to 12 in FY 2018, FIFs may be 
seen as a source of aid fragmentation, adding complex-
ity for clients and implementing entities, and “divert-
ing time and money dedicated to governance and ad-
ministration” (WB 2019a, 7) . At the same time, FIFs, 
and not least the GCF, were created with a view to ag-
gregate donor efforts . The counterfactual scenario 
without new FIFs would therefore arguably have seen 
an even higher number of new aid initiatives . Second, 
FIFs are also at risk of being less aligned with core 
WBG mandates . This is because at the operational lev-
el, FIFs focus on global thematic priorities, while core 
WBG activities are decided at the country level (Reins-
berg, 2017b) . Furthermore, there are also limited de-
facto opportunities of the WBG Executive Board – 
once it has approved a new FIF – to influence FIF 
operations on the ground (WB 2019a, 9) . Third, the 
WBG also faces reputational risk in that its brand 
name may be associated with FIFs despite these being 
independently governed . This is particularly true where 
the WBG only provides limited trustee services, with-
out possibilities of oversight through hosting the FIF 
secretariat . Fourth, the WBG is particularly skeptical 
toward direct-access funding, given the associated need 
for due diligence, which often does not outweigh the 
potential gains in effectiveness (WB 2019a, 17) . 
Nevertheless, several interviewees highlighted that hav-
ing multiple FIFs may not be a major issue and may 
actually be useful as FIFs have very different purposes 
and are complementing each other . 
For example, the Adaptation Fund (AF) was set up  
in 2007 to respond to the lack of adaptation finance 
available internationally . AF provided for three key 
 innovative features:
• Funding through the share of proceeds from car-
bon credits, which worked well until prices col-
lapsed in 2012 (these revenues used to be in the or-
der of USD 100 million per year in the best days 
and crashed to only USD 5 million in the last 
years) . 
• First fund to allow direct access by countries that 
take ownership for project development throughout 
the project cycle . This model was emulated after-
wards by GEF and GCF .
• The board consists of 2/3 developing country repre-
sentatives, which is important due to the adaptation 
topic relevance for them .
AF is financing relatively small adaptation projects of 
less than USD 10 million . These are pilot investments 
that are meant to be replicable through other sources . 
For example, ten GCF adaptation projects build on AF 
projects . AF invests in pilots and if it works well, GCF 
can scale up (GCF projects are around USD 40–50 
million) . AF does not intend to move to larger projects 
as there is a continued demand for small demonstra-
tion projects . GCF then adds value for scaling up also 
by employing additional instruments, e . g . guarantees 
and equity, to foster transformational projects at larger 
scale . The case of AF demonstrates that some FIFs  
may perform a very specific function complementing 
 others .
Under the GEF there are several TFs: GEF, SCCF, 
LDCF, CBIT, and NPIF . GEF is very different from 
traditional TFs as it is mandated by the UN process 
focused on supporting the implementation of UN 
conventions including the UNFCCC and the PA and 
helping recipient countries achieve these objectives . 
GEF was set up as a mechanism specifically designed 
to channel funds from developed countries to assist de-
veloping countries in addressing environmental chal-
lenges in the times when there were few such mecha-
nisms .
The CIFs were established in 2008 by the WBG with 
surprising speed in the run-up to the Copenhagen 
Conference, not linked to a mandate by the UNFC-
CC . The CIFs comprise two funds: the Clean Technol-
ogy Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund 
(SCF), each individually raising funds with external 
donors . The CIFs were established to “provide a new 
business model to address gaps in the climate finance 
architecture and provide new and additional financing 
to complement existing bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms . CTF and SCF also aim to promote inter-
national cooperation on climate change, to foster the 
environmental and social co-benefits of sustainable de-
velopment, and to promote learning-by-doing .” (Itad 
2019) . Some interviewees highlighted that one of the 
objectives of the CIFs was to shift internal resources of 
MDBs to climate-related investments by providing in-
centives to MDBs and client countries . The CIFs are 
therefore a mechanism dedicated to providing support 
to developing countries through MDBs while 
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transforming the MDBs themselves . According to one 
interviewee some of the WBG’s major shifts on climate 
change can be attributed to the CIFs . CIFs also helped 
shift the agenda internationally through the convening 
power of MDBs . 
Interestingly, the two CIFs have a sunset clause which 
has not yet been triggered . For the CTF it is specified 
as follows: “Recognizing that the establishment of the 
trust fund is not to prejudice the on-going UNFCCC 
deliberations regarding the future of the climate change 
regime, including its financial architecture, the CTF 
will take necessary steps to conclude its operations 
once a new financial architecture is effective . Specifi-
cally, the Trustee will not enter into any new agree-
ment with donors for contributions to the trust fund 
once the agreement is effective . The Trust Fund Com-
mittee will decide the date on which it will cease mak-
ing allocations from the outstanding balance of the 
Trust Fund” (Bhuiyan et al . 2014) . The SCF contains 
an equivalent provision . Given that with the opera-
tionalization of the GCF the conditions for invoking 
the sunset clause seem to be fulfilled, the future of 
CIFs depends on how donors interpret the situation . 
CIF trust fund committees decided to postpone dis-
cussions on the sunset clause for an indefinite period 
of time .
Currently, the existing FIFs seem to be sufficient to 
channel funds and no new FIFs have therefore been 
created . According to the WBG interviewees, nine new 
FIF proposals in the past two years led to the creation 
of sub-programs under existing FIFs and new initia-
tives that are not TFs instead of the creation of new 
FIFs . For example, the Global Energy Storage Program 
(GESP), created under the CTF to promote battery 
storage, did not require the creation of new governance 
or TF agreements . The battery storage program was set 
up as a new phase of the Dedicated Private Sector Pro-
gram (DPSP IV), created in the CTF in 2013–14 .
In our view, the FIFs based on UNFCCC institutions 
cannot be consolidated, while for future non-UNFC-
CC FIFs consolidation should be attempted as far as 
possible along thematic lines .
3.2. World Bank Group
The WBG includes five institutions: the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 
the International Development Association (IDA), the 
IFC, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) . Most TFs reviewed 
below belong to IBRD/IDA (i . e . the World Bank) 
while only 21 TFs belong to IFC11 . MIGA and ICSID 
have no climate change TFs .
3.2.1. Overview of WBG climate TFs
Over the past two decades, concessional funding to 
 address climate change via TFs – both indirectly from 
pass-through multilateral institutions and directly 
from TFs at IOs – has become increasingly important 
(Reinsberg et al . 2015) . The WBG was among the first 
to venture into climate-related activities, following in-
creased attention to environmental issues, in part due 
to pressure from major shareholders and environmen-
tal non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Nielson 
and Tierney 2003; Gutner 2005; Weaver 2008) . It 
started developing its climate portfolio through FIFs in 
the early 1990s starting with the GEF in 1993 . It also 
started to mobilize finance from individual industrial-
ized countries and through consultancy activities and 
institutionalized its climate-related work by creating 
the Carbon Finance Unit under the former Environ-
mentally and Socially Sustainable Development 
(ESSD) Vice Presidency . In 1999 it set up the first true 
multi-donor carbon fund in form of the PCF which 
was followed by a flurry of further topic-specific multi 
11  The IFC climate change TFs are listed in Annex 1 among the WBG TFs . Data reported in this section excludes IFC TFs as these were not 
provided due to confidentiality reasons .
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and single donor TFs (MDTFs / SDTFs) after the 
take-off of the CDM from 2004 onwards (Michaelowa 
and Michaelowa 2011) . 
The WBG’s experience with the GEF also led the UN-
FCCC Secretariat to allocate the administration of the 
emerging family of UNFCCC financial institutions as 
FIFs to the WBG after 2002, with the AF in 2006 and 
culminating in the GCF in 2010 . The CIFs were es-
tablished in 2008 . 
Total contributions to climate-related TFs excluding 
FIFs at the WBG took off in the mid-2000s to reach 
an average of USD 450 million between FY 2007 and 
FY 2017 (see Figure 17) . This still is comparatively 
small given the total size of IDA operations (about 
USD 8 billion in contributions per year on average 
over the same period) . However, this total TF amount 
excludes contributions to FIFs (as these are technically 
received at the FIF level), as well as the WBG-imple-
mented projects under such FIFs (which are technical-
ly disbursements, not contributions) . The figure is 
therefore best interpreted as the additional funding 
from donor governments to WBG TFs over and above 
the contributions from the 12 FIFs that are imple-
mented by the WBG .























































From a historical perspective, the most important do-
nors to WBG TFs on climate change in FY 2009–17 
(Figure 18) were the United Kingdom (USD 700 mil-
lion), Norway (USD 600 million), the Netherlands 
and Germany (both around USD 500 million), fol-
lowed by Spain and Sweden (both about USD 200 
million) .12
12  When considering historical contributions to trust funds over FY 1999–2017, Spain leads the ranking with about USD 765 million,  
but the following ranks are unaffected .
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3.2.2. WBG climate TF portfolio
We now present a snapshot of the WBG TF portfolio 
on climate change as of 30 June 2019 . In other words, 
we exclude TFs that were already closed by that date . 
This gives us a more accurate picture of the currently 
existing climate-related activities of the WBG and re-
lated TF features . The diversity of WBG activities on 
climate change – in part due to the entrepreneurship 
undertaken by its staff in the past – is reflected in the 
distribution of WBG TFs into the ten topic clusters . 
In total the WBG has 161 TFs along with 100 pro-
grams . Of these, there are 92 active TFs, along with 55 
TF active programs . 
While the WBG is the only MDB with TFs active in 
all clusters, it also focuses its activities on three clusters: 
CARBON_1 (22 TFs, 8 programs), CC_MIXED (16 
TFs, 11 programs), and ADAPTATION_DISASTER 
(21 TFs, 9 programs) . The next set of clusters has few-
er than 10 TFs, including CARBON_2 (9 TFs, 7 pro-
grams), and MITIGATION_MULTIPLE (9 TFs, 6 
programs) . The remaining five clusters each have at 
most 5 TFs . 
These differences are even more pronounced when 
considering funding volumes of active WBG TFs 
( Figure 19) . Here the carbon funds together represent 
cumulative contributions of almost USD 4 billion, 
whereas the total fund size in ADAPTATION_DIS-
ASTER reaches almost USD 800 million . MITIGA-
TION_MULTIPLE has around USD 500 million, 
and MITIGATION_FOREST about USD 180 mil-
lion . The remaining clusters have funding volumes 
 below USD 150 million each .
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Figure 19. Distribution of active WBG TFs into topic clusters by volume (million USD)


















We now identify the top trust-funded programs in 
each cluster, combining different TFs belonging to the 
same thematic initiative . Table 20 shows the top five 
programs (or fewer, if there are fewer) of WBG TFs in 
each thematic cluster, along with information on the 
number of active TFs in the program, the cumulative 
contributions (since existence) to the TFs that are ac-
tive, the fund balance (as of 30 June 2019), the num-
ber of donors, whether Germany is engaged, and if so, 
with which amount and percentage of contributions . 
For ADAPTATION_DISASTER, the GFDRR is the 
single largest initiative, with USD 750 cumulative mil-
lion in contributions (USD 643 million in active TFs) 
and 19 donors . GFDRR is primarily a disaster risk 
management fund, but due to this focus it is highly 
relevant for adaptation . Other programs in this cluster 
have contributions of USD 50 million or less . Within 
ADAPTATION_MULTIPLE, only one genuine 
WBG program exists: the Integrated Land and Water 
Management for Adaptation to Climate Variability 
and Change (ILWAC) (USD 10 million, one donor) . 
The other two programs in this category would be the 
implementing accounts under two FIFs, the AF and 
the CREWS, but which are omitted here . 
The lead facility in CARBON_1 is the FCPF, which 
operates two funds, the Carbon Fund and the Readi-
ness Fund . These TFs also attract the most donors  
(8 and 13 respectively) . Other important programs 
 include the BioCF, the BioCF+, and the PCF . In 
CARBON_2, the UCF is the dominant program, hav-
ing received USD 888 million from two donors . In ad-
dition, there are the SpCF, Italian Carbon Fund (ICF), 
Carbon Fund of the Carbon Partnership Facility 
(CPF-CF), and Danish Carbon Fund (DCF), all with 
fewer donors . In the relatively new CARBON_A6 
group, the TCAF is the largest program (USD 212 
million, 5 donors), followed by PMR (USD 103 mil-
lion, 12 donors) .
Turning to mitigation clusters, two groups have less 
than five programs, notably MITIGATION_EE, with 
the EEYCP (USD 49 million, one donor) and the 
GGFRP (USD 7 million, 5 donors); and MITIGA-
TION_RE, with CIMDTF (USD 68 million, 4 do-
nors), Access to Sustainable Energy Philippines (ASEP) 
(USD 33 million), Asia Sustainable and Alternative 
Energy Program (ASTAE) (USD 24 million, 3 do-
nors), and Bangladesh Rural Electrification and Re-
newable Energy Development (RERED) (USD 7 mil-
lion, one donor) . MITIGATION_FOREST has five 
programs with active TFs, notably Central African 
Forest Initiative Implementation Trust Fund (CAFI) 
(USD 113 million, 4 TFs), LFL (USD 56 million, one 
donor), Multi Donor Trust Fund for Program for For-
ests (PROFOR) (USD 51 million, 7 donors), Indone-
sia Sustainable Landscape Management (ID-SLM) 
(USD 33 million, 2 donors), Brazil Cerrado Climate 
Change Mitigation Single-Donor Trust (BCCC) (USD 
16 million, one donor) . MITIGATION_MULTIPLE 
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includes more than five programs, but the lead pro-
gram is ESMAP (USD 309 million, 12 donors) . This 
is followed by Korea Green Growth TF (GG-KOR) 
(USD 88 million, a Korean SDTF), Carbon Capture 
and Storage Trust Fund (USD 47 million, 2 donors), 
the Private-Public Infrastructure Advisory Facility – 
Climate Change (PPIAF-CC) (USD 12 million, 3 do-
nors), and Ho Chi Minh City Green Transport Devel-
opment (HCM) (USD 12 million, one donor) .
Finally, the category CC_MIXED entails 11 programs 
overall, with the five biggest ones being the Nationally 
Determined Contributions Support Facility (NDC-
SF) TF supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) 
(USD 61 million), Africa Nordic Development Fund 
(ANDF) (USD 38 million), Communication for Cli-
mate Change (CCC) (USD 18 million, 2 donors), 
Maldives Climate Change Multi-Donor Trust Fund 
(MCC) (USD 15 million, one donor), and Promoting 
Africa’s Green and Climate Resilient Development 
(GCRD) (USD 14 million) . 



























GFDRR 12 643 113 19 1 164 25.5
CCRIF 2 51 12 2 1 29 0.0
TURP 1 38 0 1 0
DPP 1 14 3 – 0
GIIF 1 12 – – 1 N.d. N.d.
ADAPTATION_MULTIPLE
ILWAC 1 10 0 1 0
CARBON_1
FCPF-CF 2 794 760 8 1 321 40.5
BioCF 7 375 239 6 0
FCPF-RF 2 344 50 13 1 106 31.0
PCF 5 210 22 6 0
BioCF+ 7 139 30 1 1 41 29.7
CARBON_2
UCF 2 888 33 2 0
SpCF 3 275 16 1 0
ICF 2 163 18 1 0
CPF-CF 1 109 56 4 0
DCF 2 91 17 1 0
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TCAF 2 212 195 5 1 4 1.9
PMR 1 103 15 12 1 13 12.8
MITIGATION_EE
EEYCP 1 49 2 1 0
GGFRP 1 7 2 5 0
MITIGATION_RE
CIMDTF 1 68 1 4 0
ASEP 1 33 0 – 0
ASTAE 1 24 0 3 0
RERED 2 7 1 1 0
MITIGATION_FOREST
CAFI 4 113 11 – 0
LFL 1 56 9 1 0
PROFOR 1 51 1 7 1 2 3.1
ID-SLM 1 33 5 2 0
BCCC 1 16 0 1 0
MITIGATION_MULTIPLE
ESMAP 2 309 94 12 1 19 6.0
GG-KOR 2 87 3 1 0
CCS-TF 1 47 39 2 0
PPIAF-CC 2 12 2 3 0
HCM 1 12 6 1 0
CC_MIXED
NDC-SF 2 61 15 1 1 61 100.0
ANDF 2 38 0 – 0
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18, in USD 
million)
%
CCC 2 18 2 2 1 1 4.6
MCC 1 15 0 1 0
GCRD 1 14 3 – 0
Notes: 
The table excludes WBG-implemented FIF project accounts, and TFs without contribution information. Abbreviations that 
previously did not appear: CCRIF stands for Central American and Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Program, TURP 
stands for Tanzania Urban Resilience Program, DPP is the Disaster Protection Program, GIIF is the Global Index Insurance 
Facility, GG-KOR is the Corea Green Growth Single-Donor Trust Fund.
In terms of recipients, the WBG TF portfolio on cli-
mate change is highly diverse . Figure 21 identifies the 
top ten recipients of all active WBG TFs on climate 
change in FY 2009-18 . The figure includes TFs in 
which the WBG is the implementing IO under a FIF 
account, given that these are disbursing accounts . The 
largest single beneficiary type is “multiple countries” 
(USD 192 million, 283 projects), which tends to 
 reflect the transnational nature of environmental 
problems . The most important single countries are 
Brazil (USD 116 million, 91 projects) and India (USD 
104 million, 77 projects), after which funding volumes 
drop markedly and cover a wider range of countries in 
South East Asia, Latin America, and Africa . “Global 
activities” that are not allocable to any geographic 
 region make up a considerable funding share, too 
(USD 43 million, 74 projects) .
Figure 21. Funding shares of top ten recipients of WBG TF disbursements (2009-18, in million USD), 
 including FIFs 
Notes:
“Others” refers to the combined amount of all individual countries with disbursement shares below that of Kenya. “Multiple” 
includes several countries, which typically refers to regional projects. “Global” refers to activities at global scale that cannot 
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Comparing WBG TFs to FIFs based on some key fea-
tures available from the database of main TFs (WB, 
2019c) we note, that WBG TFs are smaller . The cu-
mulative signed contributions of the average WBG 
TFs is USD 62 million, with a fund balance of USD 
17 million as of 30 June 2019 . In contrast, FIFs, reach 
an average cumulative signed contribution of USD 
1796 million and an average fund balance is USD 
1037 million, 30 respectively 60 times bigger . This 
suggests that FIFs – despite having existed for the same 
time than WBG TFs – are a separate “league” . FIFs are 
larger because they tend to have more donors, even 
though the proportion of MDTFs in WBG TFs has 
increased over time . Whereas the total fund balance of 
the climate change-related FIFs accounts for 65 % of 
all FIFs’ funds in trust, the respective share for the TFs 
is 16 % at the end of FY19 (based on WB 2019b and 
WB 2019d, 33) . 
According to Table 22, nearly two-thirds of the active 
WBG TFs are ( legal) MDTFs, but all FIFs are 
MDTFs . Also, more than three-quarters of the active 
WBG TFs have global scope . Only few TFs are free-
standing, whereby the donor(s) directly support an in-
dividual activity . WBG TFs are now overwhelmingly 
programmatic TFs, in which the WBG first receives 
donor funding for broadly defined purposes before al-
locating such funding to concrete projects under an 
internal allocation mechanism .  Donor influence in 
such TFs is limited to strategic guidance in a steering 
committee that meets periodically, for example once a 
year . 
Turning to the disbursement side, we first distinguish 
two types of execution modalities . Table 22 shows that 
roughly one-third are BETFs, which support the eco-
nomic and sector work and technical assistance carried 
out by WBG staff . The remainder are hybrid TFs, 
which – in addition to BETFs – contain recipient-exe-
cuted TF grants for activities that the recipient govern-
ment supervises at the country level . Ultimately, the 
distinction between RETF and BETF can only be 
made at the activity level, but the WBG was unable to 
share activity-level BETF data, which is why we only 
know the number of pure BETFs . Nonetheless, we 
have information on eligibility criteria for specific 
groups of client countries . In particular, only a tiny 
number of climate-related WBG TF support is formal-
ly restricted to fragile states . In practice, however, these 
states might benefit more than these numbers suggest 
because a fund without eligibility restriction can en-
gage everywhere . In the same vein, over 80 % of the 
TFs are not earmarked for specific income groups . 
Among the remainder, only seven TFs exclusively focus 
on IBRD-only borrowers and five on IDA-only coun-
tries, and three TFs support “blended” countries . 
Table 22. Characteristics of active WBG TFs 
Criterion Number of TFs Volume of TFs*  
(million USD)
Number of donors (legal instrument)
SDTFs 29 32 % 763.7 13 %
MDTFs 63 68 % 5 002.2 87 %
Program use
programmatic 83 90 % 5 599.0 97 %
free-standing 9 10 % 166.9 3 %
Geography
non-global 27 29 % 526.5 9 %




0 0 % 0.0 0 %
46
  Analysis of climate-related trust funds at the MDBs
Criterion Number of TFs Volume of TFs*  
(million USD)
Bank-executed only 33 36 % 1 618.0 28 %
hybrid 59 64 % 4 147.9 72 %
Special country status
non-fragile 87 95 % 5 627.4 98 %
fragile 5 5 % 138.5 2 %
Country eligibility
IBRD-only 7 8 % 154.0 3 %
IDA-only 5 5 % 116.1 2 %
blended 3 3 % 26.3 0 %
none 77 84 % 5 469.5 95 %
Notes: 
* Size of TFs, total cumulative contributions 
3.2.3. Fee structure
A recurrent topic of debate is the fee structure of TFs . 
Historically, TFs started off as highly customized ar-
rangements in which the WBG and the donor(s) nego-
tiated fees for every new agreement . The WBG has 
 increasingly standardized its TF fee structures over the 
past few years, with the goal of reducing transaction 
costs while attempting to recover the full operational 
cost of WBG TFs (IEG 2011) . The WBG is currently 
reviewing its cost recovery policy, but internal discus-
sions are at an early stage .
Between the 2007 TF reform and 2016, when the cur-
rent cost recovery policy was set in place, most WBG 
(IBRD/IDA)-administered TFs have fallen under one 
of two fee arrangements: (1) a “standard” fee model for 
“small” co-financing TFs and pure BETFs consisting 
of a 5 % fee on any contribution and a one-off setup 
fee of USD 35,000; and (2) a “customized” fee model 
for all other TFs which combines a 2 % management 
fee and a contribution to the estimated cost of the 
WBG units that implement the TF activities, which 
can be charged up to either a fixed amount or a per-
centage of the fund size, as specified in the administra-
tive agreement . 
From 2016 onward, under the new (standardized) cost 
recovery policy, TF fees are no longer charged at TF 
setup but charged as the TF implements its activities . 
For RETFs, the WBG (IBRD/IDA) charges a fee on 
cumulative amounts committed to grant recipients 
(WB 2018a, p . xvi) . Fee percentages decrease as com-
mitted amounts increase according to a staggered fee 
schedule .13 For BETFs, the WBG charges the so-called 
“indirect share”, which is currently set at 17 % of 
WBG personnel costs for staff and consultants at the 
disbursement stage . 
As the climate TF portfolio entails funds which were 
established before 2016, a rather complex picture of 
fee models emerges . In principle, TFs may entail the 
following fee components . One component is a one-
off setup fee (USD 35,000) . It applied to small co- 
financing TFs and pure BETFs under the “standard 
agreement” . The second component is a fee on contri-
butions to cover TF management costs . This fee could 
either be fixed (a defined amount of currency – not 
used by any climate-related TF that is currently active), 
or variable (a fixed percentage that is deduced from 
any contribution) . Variable fees differ across TFs, 
which is the result of their substantive mandates and 
13  5 % on the first USD 50 million, 4 % on the next USD 450 million, 3 % on the next USD 500 million, and 2 % on any further amount . 
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historical factors . Under the standard agreement, the 
variable fee was 5 %, distributed between the TF man-
aging unit and the implementing unit . Under custom-
ized agreements, fees consisted of a flat fee for the TF 
managing unit (typically 2 %, but our data also include 
cases with 1 %, 5 %, and 5 .5 %) and a contribution to 
the operational cost of implementing units, up to ei-
ther a fixed currency amount or a percentage of imple-
menting costs . 
Due to confidentiality issues, we did not obtain data 
on the detailed fee structures for all relevant TFs . 
Therefore, we cannot calculate effective fee rates across 
all TFs . Yet, for TFs managed by the Carbon Finance 
unit, we were able to obtain detailed data on the inter-
nal fee income distribution . This is only a small subset 
of the climate-related WBG TFs, but it is the most im-
portant set of TFs subject to the customized fee arrange-
ment, where most of the variation in fees is located . 
Figure 23 shows the distribution of fee usage structures 
for carbon funds, excluding fee accounts and prepaid 
accounts that only hold donor contributions pending 
transfer to regular TF accounts . The latter two types of 
TF accounts do not impose fees . The largest volumes 
of funds with available data are subject to fee model A 
(i . e . all expenses charged to the TF, subject to restric-
tions imposed by legal agreements), although an equal 
number of TFs applies fee model D (i . e . fee goes to 
central units; managing unit charges directly to the 
TF14; 14 TFs) . Only one TF was found in each of the 
following categories: B (i . e . fee goes to central units; 
managing unit may not charge directly to the TF), C 
(i . e . fee is 1 % of commitment and 2 % of contribu-
tion), and E (like D, but only up to 4 % chargeable by 
managing unit) . Lastly, two TFs exist in category F 
(like D, but only up to 3 % chargeable by managing 
unit) .





1 TF, 204,6 2 TF, 109,7 14 TF, 2026,2
1 TF, 38,5
Model F: Fee to central units; managing 
unit charges directly to TF up to 3%
Model E: Fee to central units; managing 
unit charges directly to TF up to 4%
Model D: Fee to central units; managing 
unit charges directly to TF
Model B: Fee to central units; managing 
may not charge to TF
Model A: All expenses charged to TF




Percentages in pie chart refer to TF sizes in USD. Number of TFs given textually.
14  Model D is different from the models E and F because there is no ceiling on managing-unit charges – model D thus is the most generous  
in terms of eligible costs among D, E, and F .
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3.2.4. Governance
Excluding IFC and MIGA TFs (further discussed be-
low), we see that climate-related TFs are predominant-
ly managed by the Sustainable Development Vice Pres-
idency (GGS) (Figure 24); it hosts 65 TFs representing 
cumulative contributions of over USD 5 billion . GGS 
is followed by GGI (Infrastructure and Public-Private 
Partnerships) with 13 TFs and USD 507 million in 
cumulative contributions . A small number of TFs is 
managed by regional Vice Presidencies, for example 
the Indonesia Sustainable Landscape Management 
MDTF, hosted by East Asia and Pacific Vice Presiden-
cy (EAP), and thematic global practices, for instance 
Energy Vice Presidency (GGE) (Energy) . Another im-
portant WB department is the Development Finance 
Vice Presidency (DFI), which holds the corporate ac-
counts associated with climate FIFs, which are admin-
istrative TFs, for instance to receive implementation 
fees (and thus not included here) .
Figure 24. Host departments of all active WBG TFs on climate change
65












ECR corresponds to External and Corporate Relations Vice Presidency, GEFEO is the GEF Evaluation Office, GEFVP stands for 
GEF Vice Presidency.
3.2.5. International Finance Corporation 
The IFC Advisory Services portfolio – funded by IFC 
TFs, own contributions, and advisory clients – totaled 
USD 1 .5 billion as of 30 June 2018 . FY18 program 
expenditures with clients were USD 273 million, with 
a strong focus in strategic priority areas of IDA (57 %), 
fragile and conflict situations (19 %) and climate 
change (27 %) . (IFC 2018, pp . 65, 79) IFC thus sup-
ports the strategic focus of the WBG as a whole, help-
ing address challenges such as infrastructure needs, 
 urbanization, and climate change, specifically in mid-
dle-income countries (IFC 2018) .
IFC operates about 195 TFs, whose total lifetime con-
tributions were about USD 2 .5 billion and the fund 
balance as of 30 June 2018 was about USD 500 mil-
lion . IFC TFs support advisory services and certain 
IFC investment programs in the form of blended 
 finance . 
For IFC, climate change is one of the key strategic pri-
orities for its investments and advisory activities . The 
climate change theme is broad and can be tackled from 
different angles, either as part of a dedicated climate 
trust fund or integrated into industry or region 
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 focused trust fund . We identified 21 climate change-
related TFs at IFC, of which a total of 13 were active 
by the end of FY19 (listed among the WBG TFs in 
Annex 1) . German contributions to IFC TFs are lim-
ited, focusing on the European Union (EU) neighbor-
hood and the Compact with Africa . As of April 30, 
2019, there were six active IFC TFs funded by 
Germany, of which only one – the Energy Efficiency 
Support Program for Ukraine (EE4U MDTF) 
(TF073063) – is fully focused on climate change . 
The EE4U MDTF helps Ukraine to renovate the 
Ukrainian housing stock with a view to increase energy 
efficiency, lessen the dependence on energy imports, 
and reduce carbon dioxide (CO
2
) emissions .
3.3. Asian Development Bank
ADB has established TFs and concluded financing 
agreements with financing partners to support its strat-
egies on poverty reduction, social development, and 
climate change . In addition to hosting its own TFs, 
ADB implements climate-related activities under the 
GEF, including the LDCF and SCCF, the GCF, and 
the two CIFs, which it manages jointly with other CIF 
implementing MDBs (Droesse 2011, p . 326) . ADB 
has launched various initiatives to address key environ-
mental problems in its region and to combat climate 
change globally . Table 25 below provides an overview 
of all climate-related ADB TFs (22 of which 21 are 
active) along with key characteristics . Germany con-
tributes to three of these TFs – the Article 6 Support 
Facility (A6SF, see section 4 .3 .3 for details), Cities 
 Development Initiative for Asia Trust Fund (CDIA 
TF), and the Asia-Pacific Climate Finance Fund 
(ACliFF). The latter is an MDTF, but Germany re-
mains the only contributor so far . ACliFF was estab-
lished in 2017 to support the development and imple-
mentation of innovative financial risk management 
products that can help unlock capital for climate 
 investments and improve resilience to the impact of 
 climate change .
Table 25. Climate-related ADB TFs (2001–2019)




















Article 6 Support 
Facility (A6SF)
2018 1 1 4.0 1.5 2 CARBON_A6
Asia Pacific Carbon 
Fund (APCF)




2017 1 1 33.3 33.3 1 CC_MIXED
Asia Pacific  
Disaster Response 
Fund (APDRF)
2009 1 0 60.0 – ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
Asian Clean Energy 
Fund (ACEF)





2007 1 1 – – MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
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Fund for the Private 
Sector in Asia(CFPS) 
2013 1 0 227.3 1 CC_MIXED
Carbon Capture and 
Storage Fund (CCSF)
2009 1 1 70.9 2 MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
Clean Energy  
Fund (CEF)
2007 1 1 122.0 5 MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
Canadian Cooperation 
Fund for  Climate 
Change (CCC)
2001 1 0 3.5 1 CC_MIXED
Canadian Climate 
Fund for the  
Private Sector in 
Asia II (CFPS2)
2017 1 0 149.5 1 CC-MIXED
Cities Development 
Initiative for Asia 
Trust Fund (CDIATF)
2017 1 1 6.3 2.2 3 CC_MIXED
Climate Change  
Fund (CCF)
2008 1 1 74.0 ADB CC_MIXED
Danish Cooperation 
Fund for Renewable 
Energy and Energy 
Efficiency in Rural 
Areas (DREEERA)
2001 1 0 3.6 1 MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
Danish Cooperation 
Fund for Renewable 
Energy and Energy 
Efficiency in Rural 
Areas (DREEERA2)
2006 1 0 3.5 1 MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
Future Carbon  
Fund (FCF)
2008 1 1 115.0 4* CARBON_A6
High Level  
Technology Fund 
(HLTF)




2013 1 0 9.0 1 ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
Ireland Trust Fund 
for Building Climate 
Change and Disaster 
Resilience in Small 
Island Developing 
States (BCCDR)
2019 1 0 13.5 1 ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
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Japan Fund for the 
Joint Crediting 
Mechanism (JFJCM)









2009 1 1 21.5 1 CC_MIXED
Notes:
Cumulative contributions reflect the 2001-19 period. *The FCF also has two non-sovereign donors, ENECO and POSCO.  
UCCRTF also has the Rockefeller Foundation as donor. 
ADB has been playing an important role in mobilizing 
carbon finance through carbon funds under its Carbon 
Market Program designed to incentivize investments in 
GHG reduction activities in Asia and the Pacific . In 
the area of carbon finance, ADB hosted the Carbon 
Market Initiative – an innovative financing scheme to 
support the development of clean energy, energy effi-
ciency, and GHG abatement in Asia and the Pacific 
that were eligible under the CDM of the Kyoto Proto-
col . The (now closed) Asia Pacific Carbon Fund was 
established in 2006 as an ADB TF to pre-purchase car-
bon credits generated prior to 2013 from high quality 
CDM projects in its developing member countries in 
Asia and the Pacific . The Future Carbon Fund (FCF), 
established by ADB in 2008, supports GHG emission 
reduction efforts in Asia and the Pacific by providing 
carbon finance through the pre-purchase of carbon 
credits from 2013 to 2020 . This fund will assume 
greater significance under the prevailing transitory 
phase for the international carbon markets . It thus 
 offers an opportunity to take long-term action on 
 climate change (Droesse 2011, p . 326) . In 2018, the 
ADB established the Article 6 Support Facility (A6SF) 
which will provide technical, capacity building and 
policy development support to ADB’s Developing 
Member Countries (DMCs) to help them to identify, 
develop and pilot mitigation actions under the frame-
work of Article 6 of the PA . 
The most important mechanism in the area of mitiga-
tion-related activities is the Clean Energy Financing 
Partnership Facility (CEFPF). Established in 2007, 
its aims have been to improve energy security and 
mitigate climate change through increased use of clean 
energy . The CEFPF provides for framework agree-
ments to be concluded with partners for co-financing, 
knowledge and risk-sharing (through credit enhance-
ments or performance guarantees), and other forms of 
assistance, for instance to pilot innovative mechanisms 
to further develop clean energy solutions (Droesse 
2011, p . 323) . CEFPF comprises four clean energy 
trust funds: (1) the multi-donor Clean Energy Fund 
(CEF) supported by Australia, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom; (2) the Asian Clean Energy 
Fund (ACEF), funded by Japan; (3) the Carbon Cap-
ture and Storage Fund (CCSF), supported by the 
United Kingdom and Global Carbon Capture and 
Storage Institute; and (4) the Canadian Climate Fund 
for the Private Sector in Asia (CFPS) . These are all 
stand-alone TFs, with their own respective implemen-
tation guidelines . And yet, being under an umbrella 
structure, the TFs share the same clean energy targets 
detailed in a unified Design and Monitoring Frame-
work, which outlines the planned performance of the 
CEFPF . It defines the objectives and targets, guides 
management in reviewing applications, and helps 
monitor facility performance . 
The CEFPF is an interesting case because it fundamen-
tally differs from the umbrella concept developed at 
the WBG . Whereas umbrellas seek to become the sole 
recipient of donor contributions in a given sector – 
 replacing the TFs that belong to them – the facility 
concept preserves the autonomy of such TFs and com-
plements them through a loose coordination mecha-
nism to monitor activities and review performance . 
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There is no expectation that donors can only contrib-
ute to the CEFPF . And yet, as with umbrellas, CEFPF 
hosts an annual consultation meeting with its donors 
to enable them to discuss the annual work program .
To support activities beyond mitigation, the ADB cre-
ated the Climate Change Fund (CCF) in 2008, sup-
porting technical assistance activities, grant compo-
nents of investment projects, and any other activities 
agreed between donors and ADB . The CCF was estab-
lished by ADB as a special fund, with an initial alloca-
tion of USD 40 million from ADB’s ordinary capital 
resources (OCR) . The CCF complements the CEFPF 
and “expands the resources available to address climate 
change in a more holistic program that provides 
 financing for activities in mitigation and adaptation .” 
It also complements the CIFs, designed to support 
low-carbon and climate-resilient development through 
scaled-up financing and jointly managed by the ADB, 
AfDB, EBRD, IADB, and the WBG . The CCF is a 
key mechanism to pool resources within ADB to ad-
dress climate change through technical assistance and 
grant components of investment projects (Volz et al . 
2015) . 
The CCF is guided by a steering committee which pro-
vides strategic direction, and approves policies, proce-
dures, and membership of the working groups, for the 
operation of CCF . The two technical working groups 
(adaptation and land use, and clean energy) review and 
make recommendations on activities/projects for CCF 
support, as well as make policy and procedural recom-
mendations to the steering committee . CCF may ac-
cept and administer contributions from bilateral, mul-
tilateral, and individual sources to the CCF . External 
contributors will provide oversight and review fund 
progress, administrative matters, annual work pro-
grams, and strategic directions . The initial USD 40 
million allocated to the CCF had been fully allocated 
to 41 projects already by 2009 (Droesse 2011, 326) .
A glance at the ADB TFs portfolio confirms that ADB 
is active in several thematic clusters in relation to cli-
mate change (Figure 26) . CC_MIXED is the largest 
cluster, supported by eight TFs (seven programs) and 
accumulating USD 405 million over FY 2001-19 . 
MITIGATION_MULTIPLE, which includes the 
CEFPF, CCSF, and DREEERA (I/II) . follows with cu-
mulative contributions of USD 256 million in six TFs 
(four programs) . ADAPTATION_DISASTER has 
been receiving USD 223 million in four TFs (four pro-
grams) . The CARBON_A6 cluster, supported by three 
TFs, has mobilized USD 181 million, followed by 
CARBON_1, which currently does not have any ac-
tive TFs but received historical contributions of USD 
151 million through the Asia Pacific Carbon Fund .












All TFs under CARBON_1 are no longer active and the respective contributions need to be excluded for a snapshot  
view of currently active topic clusters at ADB. The figure also excludes any co-financing contributions from FIFs.
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According to the interviewees, ADB TFs may be tailor-
made depending on donor preferences . While ADB 
has TF procedures in place that are standardized, each 
TF has implementation guidelines, so there is room for 
accommodating donor preferences . For example, in 
ACliFF Germany currently is the only donor and 
therefore has a strong influence, for instance with re-
gard to project selection . When setting up a new TF, 
ADB checks that there is no similar fund in order to 
ensure that there is no duplication or unnecessary 
competition for similar projects .
The service fee usually is 5 % of the amount disbursed 
for TA . For grant components of loan projects, the ser-
vice fee is 5 % for grants up to USD 5 million, or 2 % 
with a minimum of USD 250,000 (whichever is high-
er) for grants above USD 5 million .
3.4. African Development Bank
The AfDB has six climate-related TFs of which three 
are active (see Table 27) . The Africa Climate Change 
Fund (ACCF) is supported by Germany (AfDB 2019) 
although the data on TFs received from the AfDB 
shows no German contributions to AfDB TFs .
Table 27. Climate-related AfDB TFs (since 2008, based on data made available)
TF name Start 
year








Adaptation Benefit Mechanism (ABM) N. d. 0 N. d. N. d. ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE
Africa Carbon Support Program (ACSP) N. d. 0 N. d. N. d. CARBON_1
African Climate Change Fund (ACCF) 2014 1 1 12.7 CC_MIXED
Clim-dev Africa Fund (CDSF) 2010 1 1 27.1 ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE
Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) 2008 0 1 170.0 MITIGATION_
FOREST
Sustainable Energy for Africa (SEFA) 2011 1 1 106.0 MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
In the theme CARBON_1, the AfDB launched the 
African Carbon Support Program (ACSP) in 2010 
with the aim of assisting its regional member countries 
to access carbon finance . More specifically its objec-
tives were to assist in the development of appropriate 
project preparation documentations under the CDM, 
to support the development of regional grid emission 
factor(s), and to support project owners to successfully 
commercialize the carbon potential of projects . The 
ACSP successfully contributed to increase awareness 
and know-how on the CDM on a number of stake-
holders such as AfDB staff, national agencies and 
 private project owners . This goal has been achieved 
through the delivery of TA, training and capacity 
building activities for member countries . For example, 
the ACSP provided capacity building for Designated 
National Authorities (DNAs) officials in member 
countries, with workshops held in Mali, Botswana and 
Burkina Faso . The TF was closed following the pro-
longed crisis on the CDM market (AfDB n .d .) .
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In MITIGATION_MULTIPLE, AfDB established the 
Sustainable Energy for Africa (SEFA) initiative in 
2011 . This Pan-African program mainly supports the 
renewable energy sector . It has three financing win-
dows: project preparation, equity investments – 
through the Africa Renewable Energy Fund (AREF) 
– and enabling environment support . The average pro-
ject size is about USD 1 million, taking at least 3 years 
for project preparation and at least one year for fund 
structuring . Initiated as a SDTF in 2011, SEFA even-
tually became a MDTF in 2013, with Denmark, the 
United Kingdom, Norway, and the United States 
(“Power Africa”) as participating donors . Of the USD 
106 million paid-in contributions to date, SEFA dis-
bursed USD 45 million . SEFA is now in the process of 
being converted into a special fund to launch its next 
phase (SEFA 2 .0) .
In the area of ADAPTATION_MULTIPLE, AfDB 
operates the Clim-dev Africa Fund (CDSF) and has 
developed the Adaptation Benefit Mechanism 
(ABM). The CDSF was established in 2010 as a 
MDTF and attracted total contributions of USD 27 
million . The fund supports operations in the following 
three main areas:
• Generation and wide dissemination of reliable and 
high-quality climate information in Africa;
• Capacity enhancement of policy makers and policy 
support institutions to integrate climate change 
 information into development programs; and
• Implementation of pilot adaptation practices that 
demonstrate the value of mainstreaming climate 
 information into development .
The ABM has not become operational yet but was 
 developed theoretically by the AfDB in collaboration 
with governments from several African countries and 
various stakeholders . In the intergovernmental climate 
change negotiations under the UNFCCC, ABM is 
part of the discussions on Article 6 .8 of the PA on 
non-market-based approaches . ABM is considered a 
non-market-based approach, because no international 
transfer of mitigation outcomes is envisaged .
The African Climate Change Fund (ACCF) launched 
in 2014 is the youngest AfDB TF and contributes to 
the CC_MIXED theme . It is a multi-donor trust fund 
whose governance structure comprises a Technical 
Committee made up of relevant Bank departments, 
and an Oversight Committee which includes the 
AfDB and the donors . The contributions come from 
Germany (€ 4 .7 million), Italy (€ 4 .7 million) and 
Flanders, Belgium (€ 2 million) (AfDB, 2019) . The TF 
is administered by a Secretariat, hosted by the AfDB’s 
department of Climate Change and Green Growth . 
The key objectives of the ACCF are:
• Assist African countries to access larger amounts of 
climate finance and use funds provided more effec-
tively;
• Help African countries to account for climate 
change in their growth strategies and policies, by 
means of upstream diagnostics and providing tech-
nical assistance;
• Provide capacity-building on topics of climate 
change and green growth for African countries and 
stakeholders at national and regional levels .
Finally, the Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) which 
is the AfDB TF associated with MIGITATION_FOR-
EST, was active until 2015 . It was set up in 2008 and 
benefitted from initial contributions of Norway and 
the UK in the magnitude of USD 175 million as well 
as from Canada with USD 19 million in 2013 (IDEV 
2018) . 
While the forestry theme historically occupied a large 
share in the AfDB’s TF activities (Figure 28), it appears 
that new themes are now becoming more prominent 
after the closure of the CBFF, notably mitigation not 
focused on specific sectors and adaptation . Building on 
previous experiences with the carbon markets and 
CDM project development, the AfDB foresees its role 
as evolving towards expansion of the carbon finance 
operations beyond the CDM, to explore opportunities 
under the new market mechanism that will eventually 
supersede the CDM . The AfDB is also very active in 
developing new mechanisms to attract private invest-
ments in adaptation, such as the Adaptation Benefit 
Mechanism . The experience of the AfDB demonstrates 
how TFs can be used for pioneering such innovative 
approaches . 
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AfDB has different reporting structures for different 
funds . AfDB aims at standardizing the reporting pro-
cess in the future to align individual TFs . Donors often 
ask for more information than contracted to provide, 
which may lead to capacity issues . Fees are negotiated 
for each TF and depend very much on the size of the 
fund . 
Historically, AfDB charged a minimum 5 % fee to 
 defray the costs of administering its TFs . According  
to the AfDB’s Operations Evaluations Department 
(OED) (2013) review, this flat fee often did not cover 
actual expenses in administering technical co-opera-
tion funds . AfDB management therefore agreed for a 
need to review cost structures and a dedicated task 
force recommended establishing a new fee structure 
consisting of a one-off setup fee of USD 35,000 (for 
MDTFs) and a 5 % administrative fee on funds under 
management . An AfDB staff member confirmed that 
current policy was a minimum of 5 % administration 
fee . 
3.5. Inter-American Development Bank 
The IADB operates 15 climate-related TFs of which 14 
are active (see Table 29) . Germany contributes to only 
one IADB TF – the Sustainable Energy and Climate 
Change Initiative (SECCI) . Differently from other 
MDBs, all TFs at the IADB are managed by a single 
group . Team leaders are not allowed to submit propos-
als to individual TFs, unlike in the other MDBs . In-
stead they submit proposals to a single window . There 
is a pre-screening filter that defines the focus topic (cli-
mate, poverty, etc .) . The proposal is then reviewed by a 
committee that consists of all TF managers and the 
most appropriate TF is selected . An eligibility commit-
tee consisting of general sustainable development man-
agers reviews the proposal’s alignment with the 
country priorities and needs . This system allows to 
identify synergies and avoid duplication . Proposals are 
thus vetted against the IADB strategy, country priori-
ties and funding sources . The interviewees confirmed 
that this approach allows to create the right incentives 
and reduce potential conflicts of interest . Moreover, 
the relationship is not exclusive: in cases when it makes 
sense several TFs may fund one activity . Sometimes 
similar proposals come up and the system allows to 
identify duplicates and sometimes put them together . 
The minutes of the review meetings are available on 
the IADB’s Intranet, so it is a very transparent system .
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Table 29. Climate-related IADB TFs (1998-2019)

















2018 1 1 25 MITIGATION_ 
FOREST
Canadian Climate 
Fund for the Private 
Sector in the 
 Americas (C2F)
2012 1 0 249.5 1 CC_MIXED
Colombia Sostenible 2016 1 1 21.7 3 CC_MIXED
Emerging and 
 Sustainable Cities
2011 1 1 14.3 3 CC_MIXED
European Commis-
sion’s LAIF Grant to 
Climate Change and 
Water & Sanitation
2013 1  0 16.4 1 CC_MIXED
French Climate Fund 
for Latin America  
and the Caribbean
2018 1 0 5.5 1 CC_MIXED
Mangroves  
Habitat Fund









2017 1 1 17.1 2 CC_MIXED
Ordinary Capital – 
Strategic 
 Development  
Program (OC-SDP) 
for Sustainability
2016 1 – 207.7 IADB CC_MIXED
Portuguese Technical 
Cooperation Fund
1998 1 0 2.8 1 CC-MIXED
Sustainable Energy 
and Climate Change 
Initiative (SECCI)
2007 1 1 55.3 20.07 8 MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
UK Low Carbon 
 Agriculture to Avoid 
Deforestation Fund





2017 1 0 68.9 1 CC_MIXED
United Kingdom  
Blue Carbon Fund
2019 1 0 2.4 1 CARBON_1
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Overall, IADB TFs cover five thematic clusters (Figure 
30) . The largest cluster is CC_MIXED, which includes 
nine TFs (nine programs) . The largest one is the Cana-
dian Climate Fund for the Private Sector in the 
Americas (C2F), which is a long-standing partnership 
between Canada and the IADB to mobilize private 
 finance for climate change (USD 250 million since 
2012) . Of comparable size in CC_MIXED is the 
 Ordinary Capital – Strategic Development Program 
(OC-SDP) for Sustainability program (USD 208 
million), an umbrella fund established in 2016 to sup-
port various dimensions of sustainability, including 
disaster prevention, emergency assistance, food secu-
rity, biodiversity and ecosystem services, sustainable 
cities program, and sustainable energy and climate 
change . It is financed wholly from IADB’s net income 
and not open to external donor contributions . Another 
sizeable program in CC_MIXED is the UK Sustain-
able Infrastructure Program (USD 69 million), 
whose role is to accelerate the implementation of the 
NDCs in LAC countries by catalyzing and mobilizing 
strategic private sector investments in sustainable low-
carbon infrastructure . The remaining TFs in CC_
MIXED are relatively minor in terms of contribution 
size (below USD 25 million), including Colombia 
Sostenible, NDC Pipeline Accelerator, the EC’s 
 Latin America Investment Facility (LAIF) grant to 
Water and Sanitation, Emerging and Sustainable 
Cities, the French Climate Fund for LAC, and the 
Portuguese TC Fund. 
Underlying the second-ranked MITIGATION_MUL-
TIPLE cluster is the SECCI . Established in 2007, it 
provides grant funding for multiple mitigation-related 
areas . These include Sustainable Infrastructure (public-
private partnerships that mobilize domestic capital 
markets and green infrastructure); Sustainable Energy 
Markets and Innovation (large-scale deployment of re-
newable sources of power, near-market-ready entry of 
power generation technologies, and efforts to reduce 
barriers for related private-sector investment); Sustain-
able Transport (low-carbon transportation systems and 
related technologies and energy efficiency of transport 
technologies); carbon sinks (reduce emissions associ-
ated with land-use change, such as forestation but also 
land regeneration and agriculture emission reduction) . 
There is also an adaptation component, focusing on 
climate risks and the testing of adaptation measures in 
water supply, coastal zones, marine areas, agriculture, 
and forests . SECCI is the most inclusive of all active 
IADB TFs, with support from 8 donors (including 
Germany, whose contribution share is about 36 %) . 
SECCI allows for national experts to be seconded to 
the program . 
MITIGATION_FOREST is another important theme 
in the IADB TF portfolio . In addition to the now-
closed Mangroves Habitat Fund (for which no infor-
mation was available), this theme is supported by two 
active recent TFs: the Biodiversity/Natural Capital 
Lab (USD 25 million) and the UK Low Carbon Ag-
riculture to Avoid Deforestation Fund (USD 22 mil-
lion) . 
The topic cluster ADAPTATION_DISASTER is 
 supported by the Multi-Donor Disaster Prevention 
Fund (MDRTF). Established in 2007, it attracted 
 cumulative contributions of USD 17 million from 
four donors, notably Canada, Japan, Korea, and Spain, 
while having disbursed USD 15 .5 million thus far . All 
LAC countries are eligible to apply, but project sup-
port is capped at USD 1 million . In addition to grant 
funding, the MDRTF can also finance investment 
 projects . 
Finally, IADB hosts one genuine TF in the CAR-
BON_1 cluster: the UK Blue Carbon Fund, estab-
lished in 2019, to mobilize strategic public and private 
sector investments in thematic areas such as sustainable 
fisheries, sustainable aquaculture, coastal zone manage-
ment, coastal protection solutions, payment for ecosys-
tem services, eco-tourism, and marine protected areas . 
The TF seeks to promote the sustainable management 
of mangrove forests and accelerate sustainable develop-
ment in LAC countries with key mangrove ecosystems .
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In terms of TF reporting the IADB interviewees high-
lighted three key levels of reporting:
• Annual report by April 30 for every TF is a stand-
ardized report with the narrative, success stories 
and financials .
• Web-based platform where the status, financials, 
projects, etc . can be seen almost in real time .
• TF-specific evaluation/reporting requirements that 
are donor-driven . Different donors require different 
reporting frequencies . Some request more quantita-
tive result frameworks, while others prefer narra-
tives . Expectations and requirements of donors are 
very different which changes the nature of report-
ing . IADB tries to keep it as standardized as possi-
ble since it is resource-intensive . 
Overall, reporting should be focused on monitoring 
and evaluation rather than on communication in order 
to maximize learning . The reporting workload must be 
covered by the TF administrative fee . IADB TFs oper-
ate various fee models . The modal administrative fee is 
5 % on contributions (13 out of 32 TFs) . Some TFs 
charge “9 % – 9 .5 %” (3 out of 32), while the remaining 
TFs have adopted fully customized fee structures (with 
fee percentages between 1 .75 % and 11 %, or fixed 
USD amounts, staggered fees, and one special (confi-





  Potential for reform and consolidation
This section looks at the potential for TF reform and 
consolidation . Focusing primarily on the WBG, the 
section starts with a general appraisal of challenges and 
opportunities for TF reform, based on our interviews 
with key TF stakeholders . We identify two general 
 dimensions of TF reforms . The first refers to “good 
practices” in managing individual TFs with the aim to 
increase the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of 
climate change-related TFs (see also Herrmann et al . 
2014) . The second takes a portfolio perspective to 
identify potential overlaps in the climate finance archi-
tecture . While our mapping exercise (Section 2) and 
review of TFs in MDBs (Section 3) provide a general 
idea of areas which are addressed through several TFs 
versus areas which lack such support, we now draw on 
detailed case studies of three sample groups of TFs, 
which provide insights into non-quantifiable informa-
tion relating to the strategic position of a TF in the 
 climate finance architecture, the underlying procedures 
for internal management and collaboration with exter-
nal partners (including donor countries but also other 
implementing MDBs), and forward-looking policy 
discussions around TF priorities . 
4.1. Good practices in individual TF management
4.1.1. Success criteria for climate change-related TFs
The success of climate-related TFs can be measured 
along multiple dimensions . Stakeholders agreed that 
first and foremost, success should be linked to the cli-
mate change-related outcome of TF activities . Where 
this is not possible, measuring climate change-related 
policy output is a second-best alternative . Another 
 dimension relates to inputs, specifically financial goals . 
The cost-effectiveness of the TF instrument is a final 
criterion . 
(1) Climate change-related outcomes (mitigation / 
adaptation): Outcome metrics are not widespread but 
if they are adopted, the most commonly used is re-
duced GHG emissions . For example, carbon funds are 
directly linked to GHG emissions reductions through 
carbon credits . Stakeholders said that more work 
would be necessary to operationalize climate change-
related outcomes . A key challenge is to attribute the 
causal impact of the TF on climate outcomes, which 
ultimately involves a counterfactual analysis (given that 
alternative mechanisms could have been available that 
might have produced similar outcomes) . Considering 
these challenges, stakeholders have turned to output 
metrics as a second-best alternative .
(2) Climate policy outputs: Climate-related TFs can 
help advance climate policy at two levels . First, cli-
mate-related TFs have mainstreamed climate issues 
into WBG operations – essentially re-orienting WBG 
activities toward climate change . While many have 
contributed to this goal, the CIFs are most widely 
 recognized as having transformed the MDB business . 
 Second, these TFs also support the development of cli-
mate policies at the country level . A case in point are 
the NDC Support Facility and the PMR at the WBG, 
the NDC Pipeline Accelerator at IADB, and the 
CBIT .
(3) Financial goals reflect the input side of success. 
In this regard, the FIFs are a cornerstone in achieving 
the collective financing goal of USD 100 billion for 
climate change until 2020 . Another financial goal is to 
mobilize private-sector funding for climate-related 
 activities . For example, discussions within the GCF 
about including private-sector co-financing as a success 
criterion are pending . 
(4) Management costs of TFs: Fee models for climate 
change-related TFs have become increasingly similar 
across MDBs . A quantitative comparison of average 
fees nonetheless is difficult as the fee modalities are 
qualitatively different across institutions . For example, 
recipient-executed WBG TFs under the new standard-
ized rules charge a 5 % fee on disbursements . The same 
holds for most ADB TFs, and to some extent to IADB 
TFs, although we found higher fees in several custom-
ized arrangements . AfDB charges 5 % but on assets 
under management, which means that effective fees are 
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likely higher than those on contributions . From a do-
nor perspective, TFs may thus appear to be an efficient 
mechanism for outsourcing delivery of development 
projects . However, a large unknown are the shadow 
costs at home, which no donor currently measures . 
More research would be necessary to assess the full 
economic cost of TF instruments compared to relevant 
alternatives . 
4.1.2. Success factors and challenges along the TF lifecycle
In this section, we identify good practices regarding 
the setup, governance, and implementation of climate 
change-related TFs with a view to contribute to the 
success of such funds . Given the relatively small num-
ber of TFs at the RDBs, our conclusions are based on 
stakeholder experiences with WBG TFs .
Setup of TFs  
Given the increased sensitivity to portfolio fragmenta-
tion and stricter requirements to create new funds, 
 creating new WBG TFs has become more difficult . If 
 after a joint review of existing options stakeholders 
conclude that there is a need for a new climate-related 
TF, there are several key lessons to consider in order to 
avoid the creation of additional administrative bur-
dens .
(1) Channeling through existing structures: New 
TFs have increasingly been established as so-called 
“windows” under the umbrella of existing TFs . An ex-
ample is the GESP program on battery storage, estab-
lished as a fourth phase of the DPSP under the CTF . 
The use of a well-established vehicle had advantages 
over creating an entirely new structure . These examples 
show that demands for new TFs can be ever more eas-
ily accommodated with the existing ecosystem of cli-
mate-related TFs because this system has become more 
diversified while developing well-established govern-
ance mechanisms . The constraint is to educate deci-
sion-makers about what is available and what are the 
legal options for further developing existing structures .
(2) Finding the niche: New TFs need to avoid dupli-
cation of existing TFs and have a clear mission . TF 
 objectives, TF result metrics, and relevance to country 
needs must be apparent . In the context of climate- 
related TFs, TFs that focus on mitigation impacts seem 
most relevant, for example the PAF, which uses a 
 results-based payment mechanism for future carbon 
credits, competitively allocated via auctions . Another 
positive example is the PMR, which has a clear capaci-
ty-building mandate, helping countries to introduce 
CO
2
 markets . Its effectiveness is measured by the num-
ber of countries that have accomplished this goal . The 
PMR has been evaluated and found to have achieved 
good results in its nine years of existence (Ipsos MORI 
and SQ Consult, 2018) . The PMR also catered to 
country needs, not least by giving countries a say in 
the choice of projects, though projects are initially 
 approved by the donors . In moving forward, given the 
growing membership of the PMR, this participative 
approach will no longer be practicable . Moreover, 
 donors will de-emphasize market readiness and em-
phasize emission reductions in the results framework, 
thereby seeking stronger links to the NDCs . This also 
shows that governance structures must be sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate (endogenously) evolving pri-
orities in order to be effective . 
(3) Providing incentives to overcome “siloization”: 
A final aspect is the extent to which the TF incentiv-
izes inter-organizational cooperation and coordination 
with other funds . In this regard, FIFs are the role mod-
el, as they were designed to promote inter-MDB col-
laboration . Conversely, mechanisms for promoting in-
tra-MDB coordination across different units are 
insufficient . For example, the 2018 PMR evaluation 
criticized the lack of integration of the work of the car-
bon TFs into the general work of the WBG . It further 
suggested improving cooperation in two ways . First, 
country management units should be better informed 
which TFs provide money for analysis that IDA does 
not cover . Second, internal knowledge management 
would need to be improved so that WBG staff were 
more aware of the importance of climate change for 
achieving other SDGs . The WBG should learn from 
successful cases of cross-unit collaboration . A case in 
point is the PMR in Chile, which effectively used the 
excellent contacts of the country unit for Chile to raise 
awareness for PMR .
(4) Ensuring buy-in at all fronts: TFs will be success-
ful if there is political buy-in at three levels . First, 
 senior management within both donor and MDB 
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administrations must support TF initiatives and make 
a long-term commitment, as did the WBG president 
in the case of the Carbon Finance Unit . Donors can do 
their part by making it attractive for the MDBs to be 
engaged in climate-related TFs . This is the case par-
ticularly in the CIFs (where only MDBs are eligible 
implementers), but less so in the GCF (whose set of 
implementers is broader and related administrative 
burdens are much higher for the WBG trustee) . Sec-
ond, TFs are also more successful if they are connected 
to a political process that can create the critical mo-
mentum for change (while also increasing the visibility 
for the donor) . A case in point is the GFDRR . The 
GFDRR has become the focal platform for disaster re-
duction efforts . It is linked to the Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030), a policy 
framework developed at the UN Office for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNDRR) with seven targets and four 
priorities of action . UNDRR has observer status in the 
GFDRR that is the principal funding mechanisms for 
these priorities . Third, donors leading a new initiative 
must secure buy-in from other donors . Although do-
nors legally establish MDTFs, they sometimes remain 
the only actual donors . There are many ways to draw 
in other contributors . Some climate TFs, like the 
NDC Support Facility, are attached to a broader 
 partnership, which provides a forum to mobilize new 
 supporters . Other options to mobilize donors may 
 include informal discussions at key events (such as the 
Annual Meetings, the WBG Trust Fund Forum, and 
UN climate summits) and in the Steering Committees 
of other TFs . 
Governance  
(1) Ensuring adequate resourcing: Two types of 
 resources can contribute to success with respect to 
steering TFs toward desirable outcomes and thus their 
overall success . First, financial resources – the scale of 
operations – are less important for the overall success 
of a TF but increase the weight of a donor . Second, 
human resources – the amount of time that staff de-
vote to the TF partnership – are positively related to 
TF success . WBG staff also welcome active donor in-
volvement, in terms of both financial resources, intel-
lectual leadership, and technical capacity (for instance 
in the review of project proposals) . Examples of active 
donor involvement mentioned by WBG staff include 
PMR, CTF, GFDRR, and some carbon funds . Where 
donors mobilized the human resources needed to 
 actively supervise and steer the TF, they could achieve 
tangible results even with limited financial contribu-
tions . However, this would require a human resource 
commitment on the donor side, which may clash with 
other objectives such as the desire to reduce domestic 
administrative capacities .
(2) Promoting stakeholder coordination: Donors are 
advised to be actively engaged in donor coordination, 
for example in the GCF where it is essential – given 
the more politicized nature of the fund – that OECD/
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors 
speak with a united voice . In the CCRIF, for example, 
donors meet more often than the scheduled two an-
nual meetings, depending on need . While this is time-
consuming for stakeholders, it also is an opportunity 
to learn about priorities of other donors and enhance 
mutual understanding . Donors also need to be en-
gaged with TF secretariats . Effectiveness was low where 
response time was long, for instance because the issue 
was not a priority for the TF manager who also man-
aged a bigger TF at the same time, or where donor 
staff was unable to even identify counterparts in the 
WBG . Active engagement with TF secretariats also 
holds promise to allow for better integrating TF sup-
port with bilateral assistance, especially for recipient-
executed activities . A WBG official said that the part-
nerships with some donors were successful but capacity 
was an issue . In the AF, an area for improvement men-
tioned was the better interlocking between AF and 
 bilateral implementing agencies . Finally, coordination 
with other TFs is increasingly important in an expand-
ing ecosystem of climate-related TFs . It is deemed par-
ticularly relevant where duplication risks to undermine 
effectiveness, for example for technical assistance . Do-
nors can do their part to manage duplication informal-
ly through overlapping membership in relevant TF 
Steering Committees, where they can work to ensure 
that TFs carve out their respective niche, without du-
plicating tasks; a more formal strategy – especially used 
for FIFs – is through cooperation agreements among 
the biggest four FIFs – AF, CIFs, GCF, and the GEF, 
in all of which most G7 donors are involved . A final 
strategy is to exploit opportunities emerging from past 
work in related TFs . In the new NDC Support Facil-
ity, established alongside the PA, beneficiary countries 
articulate a demand for NDC policy support vis-à-vis 
Country Management Units (CMUs) . 
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(3) Using micro-management wisely: In general, do-
nors are not involved in the choice of TF-supported 
activities . Exceptions are the PMR and other carbon 
funds (i . e . CPF, Ci-Dev, TCAF) where donors are in-
volved operationally through the collective approval  
of country proposals . WBG interviewees consistently 
(and independently) highlighted the added value of in-
puts from some donors that are on top of technical is-
sues . Donors can ensure meaningful input by adequate 
staffing, as the volume of documents to review for 
meetings can be large so that sharing the burden of 
work among a team of donor staff is essential . The 
WBG also welcomes donor leadership in politically 
sensitive contexts . For example, the Global Risk Fi-
nancing Facility (GRiF) (see Section 4 .3 .2 .) is consid-
ered to be politically sensitive by WBG interviewees  
as it can involve subsidies for insurance premia on a 
 recipient country level, and thus there is a grant by 
grant review by Germany and the UK . 
IFC interviewees stressed high levels of trust from 
 donors but also reported certain challenges, such as 
achieving a balance between high granularity of infor-
mation in donor reporting and high efficiency in TF 
operations . In some cases, IFC donors may want de-
tailed and narrowly defined work plans, to be followed 
meticulously, while IFC needs maneuvering space, 
such as the possibility to shift funds to other countries, 
given the particularity of working with the private sec-
tor that can be unpredictable . IFC also strives at maxi-
mizing climate mitigation impact by working in the 
middle-income countries, with some donors focusing 
increasingly on low-income countries . There may thus 
be a trade-off between harmonizing climate mitigation 
outcomes and geographical coverage of development 
aid .15
Implementation and results  
(1) Co-implementation of TF activities: The WBG 
does not allow donor agencies to engage in TFs as im-
plementing agencies . The only exception to this rule is 
the GCF, governed outside WBG rules, in which bilat-
eral aid institutions are official implementing agencies . 
Ultimately, whether or not implementers other than 
the WBG are allowed under WBG TFs must be nego-
tiated . For example, in the case of the PMR, the TF 
allows non-WBG implementing agencies, as requested 
by the partner country . In a country with strong 
UNDP presence, it might make sense to delegate pro-
ject implementation to UNDP, whereas in others – as 
the case of Cote d’Ivoire illustrates – bringing in the 
WBG might catalyze follow-up investments . In this 
case, the WBG invested USD 0 .5 million through the 
PMR but ultimately mobilized USD 200 million .
(2) Exploring the benefits of secondments: Some 
thematic contexts may benefit from donor second-
ments, especially where donor staff have unique exper-
tise that may benefit the host MDB . The secondee may 
also serve as pivot between donor administration and 
MDB administration, thereby helping improve the 
flow of information . Secondment is more likely to oc-
cur in smaller TFs that fly under the radar of political 
attention, at the WBG for instance the Climate Resil-
ient and Low-Carbon Development MDTF and 
CCRIF, and at IADB the SECCI . Overall, second-
ments provide a good example of a more general lesson 
that additional degrees of flexibility in TF agreements 
may bring effectiveness advantages, but these must be 
balanced against efficiency losses implied by customi-
zation . 
(3) Monitoring, results, and evaluation: Stakeholders 
wished for further improvements on how MDBs mon-
itor and report on results, despite a general satisfaction 
with reporting in climate-related TFs . One official sug-
gested better differentiation between inputs, outputs, 
and outcomes, stating that WBG reporting was fo-
cused too much on inputs . The official was also critical 
about the anecdotal nature of results reporting and its 
high level of aggregation . Similarly, officials perceived a 
lack of evidence on the degree to which TF support 
helped reducing emissions . This “attribution gap” was 
particularly salient for awareness-raising activities, rais-
ing questions about value for money . In contrast, the 
PMR is a climate-related TF whose climate impact  
was understood clearly . Beyond impacts, stakeholders 
found it even more difficult to understand the incre-
mental costs of TFs and whether such costs would be 
acceptable given ultimate impacts .
In sum, we now know which engagement practices are 
likely to foster more successful climate change-related 
TFs . Evidence suggests that clear objectives, political 
buy-in, stakeholder coordination, and adequate 
15  This issue was also raised by some IBRD and IADB interviewees .
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resources are crucial in this regard . WBG staff also pre-
fer less prescriptive approaches by donors . Donors 
should set clear expectations but otherwise not tightly 
earmark their contributions – or ask for customized re-
porting . Through extending its operational rules on 
TFs, the WBG has sought to institutionalize some of 
the good practices in TF management . However, there 
are still idiosyncratic factors such as the quality of the 
relationships between stakeholders at both ends which 
can affect the success of TFs . Therefore, it is important 
that stakeholders work together to further improve the 
institutional environment in which sustainable TF 
partnerships can thrive, for instance by reducing staff 
turnover and promoting intra-institutional learning .
4.2.  Key considerations for reducing portfolio 
fragmentation
Fragmentation refers to the multiplicity of climate-re-
lated TFs in the aid architecture as well as within indi-
vidual MDBs (specifically the WBG), each with their 
own governance structures, decision-making processes, 
and results reporting . This multiplicity increases the 
risk of duplication as well as coordination costs . There 
is therefore an a priori belief that curbing fragmenta-
tion is beneficial for the effectiveness and efficiency of 
climate action through TFs . This section first explains 
these considerations in greater detail before discussing 
arguments against curbing fragmentation and associ-
ated challenges of implementing portfolio reforms . 
4.2.1. Why fragmentation is harmful
Most interviewees at the WBG attested that the TF 
portfolio is too fragmented, with potential inefficien-
cies and unexploited synergies as a result . The top 
decile of the IBRD/IDA TFs (not only climate) hold 
75 % of the total money allocated to all TFs (WB 
2018a) – i . e . there is a long tail in the fund size distri-
bution . The main issue is thus the multiplicity of small 
funds . According to WBG staff, even the WBG Execu-
tive Board was not fully aware of the size of the TF 
portfolio and the number of climate-related TFs . 
The fragmentation of the WBG TF portfolio poses 
problems for efficiency . Each small TF requires dedi-
cated administration and needs to produce regular re-
ports, generating substantial costs . The web portal for 
donors of the WBG contains spreadsheets for each TF 
and there is a risk of mistakes and confusion in enter-
ing data . Currently there is only the Development 
Partner Center (DPC) where donors can check what 
TFs they are paying to, but the data presented there is 
often incomplete and may contain errors . 
From an effectiveness standpoint, one key consequence 
of TF portfolio fragmentation is its negative impact on 
beneficiaries . Anecdotal evidence corroborated by 
some interviews strongly suggests that the multitude  
of TFs is a problem for countries – in order to under-
stand the widely differing rules of access to all these 
funds, they need massive human capacity . Thus, recipi-
ents may have difficulties identifying appropriate TFs 
and also having sufficient capacity to follow all the 
rules to access the funds . If an overarching TF was set 
up, all communication between recipients and TFs 
could be undertaken in a centralized fashion and recip-
ients would have to follow only one set of proposal 
submission rules .
In sum, according to views expressed mostly by WBG 
staff, current levels of fragmentation appear to be un-
justified even considering the diversity of climate-relat-
ed issues . Proponents of curbing fragmentation argue 
that too many TFs exist primarily because donors are 
concerned with loss of control, loss of visibility, and 
costs of coordination . Especially the recent growth in 
the number of FIFs would give rise to concern, given 
the permanence of these funds and their different busi-
ness processes which increased transaction costs for the 
WBG (WB 2019a) .
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4.2.2. Challenges to curbing fragmentation 
The challenges to curbing fragmentation are twofold: 
one is that there are theoretical arguments against 
 reducing fragmentation that are hard to disprove; the 
other is that while stakeholders agree that fragmenta-
tion may undermine TF success, it is extremely hard  
to come by and efforts to stem it may be too costly to 
 follow through . We discuss each of these challenges in 
 detail below .
The theoretical case against curbing fragmentation
Diverse goals require diverse instruments . As climate 
change is a complex issue, a variety of instruments is 
necessary to address it . Many climate-related TFs at 
the time of their creation responded to clear gaps in 
the climate finance architecture . For example, in the 
absence of alternative instruments, donors created the 
FCPF to pilot a new instrument to support REDD 
 activities . While the AF successfully piloted adaptation 
issues (projects below USD 10 million), the GCF goes 
beyond that by scaling up support (projects of around 
USD 50 million), by allowing “direct access” for recip-
ient countries, and by supporting transformational 
change in developing countries . In the area of miti-
gation more specifically, some TFs like the Carbon 
 Initiative for Development (CiDev) and TCAF only 
pilot new initiatives while others mainstream them . In 
the area of climate risk insurance, despite a number of 
existing initiatives, there was a gap in terms of enabling 
countries to use climate risk insurance which led to the 
InsuResilience initiative . More generally, donors may 
cultivate several similar TFs as a political hedging strat-
egy . A single large TF might become stalled due to a 
political conflict on its governance, whereas a set of 
different TFs is more resilient to attempts of one coun-
try to stall their operations .
The debate about having an adequate set of instru-
ments at hand touches upon the broader point of the 
role of TFs in the business model of MDBs . While 
MDB’s core business is investment lending, they often 
use TFs to complement it . Climate change-related TFs 
at MDBs are used to (1) pilot activities in new areas 
that lending cannot address, mobilize knowledge and 
push the international agenda; (2) provide the required 
technical assistance to countries; and (3) catalyze 
private capital through a new emerging generation of 
TFs that deploy concessional finance and that connect 
to regular lending operations . This provides incentives 
for countries to deploy more resources in climate 
 finance since they gain access to lower-cost capital . 
TFs are thus often seen as complementary tools to 
standard bi- and multilateral public climate finance to 
explore new topics or fields of activity that do not re-
ceive priority or enough attention from the perspective 
of certain donors . Hence, they are typically driven by 
donors that are interested in specific thematic activities 
at a given point in time . Donors have an interest in 
setting up a TF if they think that an MDB is better 
suited than themselves to achieve related aims, e . g . cat-
alyzing carbon finance or blending various sources of 
finance such as core MDB funding directed at devel-
opment with climate finance directed at mitigation/
adaptation . Moreover, MDBs often propose TFs to 
their donors as a means to pilot innovations that do 
not have a space in the classical operations, like Ci-Dev 
and TCAF . 
In the context of MDB projects, concessional funding 
is scarce and often used in combination with other 
funding to target specific barriers impeding project 
 viability . This is the case for instance for technical assis-
tance, pilot activities, and activities with broad-based 
benefits (such as global analytical work) . Grant fund-
ing is also indispensable where capital costs are high 
due to the high-risk nature of a project and where rates 
of return on investments are low . 
Most climate change-related TFs use grant funding, 
but some also use loans . Our data do not allow us to 
quantify the relative importance of these funding 
 modalities, but we can categorize funds according to 
whether they primarily use grants or loans . It is key to 
note that funding modalities are inherently linked to 
the level of project risk (Figure 31) – while grant fund-
ing allows for greater risks, loans must manage risks 
more carefully, which may create tensions between 
 several donors supporting different funding modalities 
under a common governance framework, as in the case 
of the CTF . Importantly for the fragmentation debate, 
the implication is that the proliferation of new funds is 
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partly the result of limitations with existing TFs; for 
example, a donor wishing to provide loans cannot use 
the SCF where such funding instrument is not avail-
able at present, but also not the CTF, which accepts 
loans but does not offer full flexibility in the direc-
tion of new programs (i . e . the GESP is a recent 
 exception) . 
Figure 31. Classification of TFs according to the use of the grants and level of risk
Ci-Dev Readiness Fund, FCPF Readiness 
Fund, GEF project preparation grants, 
GFDRR, IFC Advisory Services, PMR
Technical assistance – 100% grant for  
climate and development benefits
AF, GCF, LDCF, Pilot Program for  
Climate  Resilience (CIFs), SCCF
Investment – 100% grants for global  
benefits
Initiative for Sustainable Forest Landscapes 
(BioCF), Ci-Dev, Carbon Partnership Facility – 
Prepaid Trust Fund (CPF), FCPF, PAF, TCAF
Results-based payments – 100% grant  
concessional element
CTF (IBRD/IDA terms), Forest Investment 
Program (SCF/CIFs), GEF non-grant window
Investment – pre-blended with  
fixed terms known
IFC use of GEF Tailored targeting of concessional element,  



















Adapted from WB (2016) 
In sum, the theoretical argument against curbing frag-
mentation is that limitations in existing TFs prevent 
stakeholders from addressing burgeoning climate-relat-
ed challenges comprehensively, which creates a need 
for a new TF to fill the niche . Once there is a signifi-
cant number of TFs, there is also value in cultivating 
an ecosystem of funds which can mitigate risks of 
 political deadlock and whose competitive interactions 
could enhance efficiency (rather than reduce it – as 
skeptics fear) .
The challenge of feasibility  
TF portfolio consolidation is a good idea in theory but 
requires a lot of discipline in practice . Donor officials 
said it was not their task to control fragmentation by 
exercising self-restraint but for donors collectively to 
 alter the rules to prevent it . However, this is difficult, 
as donors face a collective action dilemma . There are 
also vested interests on the MDB staff side, as well as 
legal hurdles and cost considerations that may reduce 
the appetite to vigorously address fragmentation . 
(1) Political economy challenges in donor countries: 
Donor countries face challenges at three levels . At the 
highest political level, the “announcement logic” – the 
need for policy-makers to underpin their commitment 
with a new fund – can lead to fragmentation . At the 
level of development policy-making, every donor has 
different demands in terms of specific sectors, themes, 
and geographies . WBG interviewees highlighted that 
the high level of TF portfolio fragmentation in the 
WBG is due to diverse donor interests . Donor agencies 
see TFs as vehicles to foster support and additional 
budgets from political institutions like parliaments 
compared to traditional Official Development Assis-
tance (ODA) . Whether such political attention re-
quires over 100 different climate TFs – as opposed to a 
more manageable number – appears to be questionable 
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though . Another reason for TF engagement is related 
to pressure by the OECD’s DAC and the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness requiring donors to 
reduce the number of bilateral recipient countries . This 
leads these donors to use TFs as an opportunity to in-
directly continue the cooperation with recipients that 
are “lost” in this concentration process . At the opera-
tional level, donors need to report to their taxpayers on 
how TF money has been used . Donors sometimes 
complained about lack of transparency in WBG TFs . 
Some donors, like Germany in the NDC SF, address 
this challenge through close cooperation with the 
WBG, notably through secondment . Such operational 
arrangements may indeed help donors reduce levels of 
procedural earmarking while continuing to be able to 
report back to domestic constituencies . 
(2) Political economy challenges in MDB bureau-
cracies: Especially at the WBG, senior management 
has adopted several efficiency-enhancing measures 
through its TF reform process (further described be-
low) to incentivize larger contributions with fewer ear-
marks, including minimum contribution thresholds, 
minimum number of donors, sunset clauses, and win-
dow options . An important aspect also is the advice of 
WBG staff (primarily through DFI) guiding donors to 
existing options before contemplating new funds . In 
reality, however, some of these measures are blunt and 
may be subverted . For instance, minimum thresholds 
– while disadvantaging small donors – may set incen-
tives for MDB staff to use (yet) unregulated instru-
ments for similar operational purposes, such as reim-
bursable advisory services (RAS), thus merely shifting 
the locus of the problem of too many isolated activi-
ties . MDB staff also opposes consolidation of TFs 
when this is in the interest of recipient countries, 
which may prefer facilities tailored to country 
circumstances, even though efficiency would dictate a 
global facility .
(3) Legal hurdles: TFs may not be merged as their 
 activities are not compatible with each other . For 
 example, CIFs and carbon funds differ in their generic 
funding approach – the former provide upfront finance 
whereas the latter only result-based finance . This could 
however be resolved by setting up two windows under 
one TF . Another example of a legal obstacle is that 
most climate-related FIFs have their own governing 
bodies underpinned by provisions of the UNFCCC 
and thus could only be consolidated if there is consen-
sus among Parties to the Convention . 
(4) Consolidation itself is (too) costly: The recent 
“spring cleaning” of Sweden shows that consolidation 
is possible . Sweden managed to reduce its number of 
TFs from 127 to 82 in 2019, foremost by closing dor-
mant accounts and merging sub-accounts . What gets 
neglected though is the staff time on both sides that 
went into this exercise . It is questionable if actual cost 
savings warranted this effort, although there are some 
benefits that are only symbolic . 
In sum, these considerations suggest that attempts to 
reduce the fragmentation of TF portfolios is fraught 
with challenges . There is a fundamental difference of 
interests between donors and the MDBs, with the lat-
ter seeing TFs as vehicles to support its core business, 
and the former looking for distinct activities outside 
MDB core activities . Ultimately, the question of how 
much aggregation is desirable and possible needs to be 
determined within close consultation between both 
sides, ideally with additional input from ultimate ben-
eficiaries . As is evident from our analysis of the WBG 
TF reform process (see Section 4 .4), these discussions 
are ongoing .
4.3.  In-depth analysis of fragmentation and  
potential for consolidation 
To understand the relevance of the different arguments 
listed above and explore possibilities for TF consolida-
tion, we examined a selection of TFs in some more de-
tail drawing on document analysis and interviews with 
stakeholders in the German government and the 
MDBs with a focus on the WBG .
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4.3.1. Selection of the sample TFs for analysis 
This section describes our methodology to identify the 
sample of TFs for these specific case studies . To choose 
our cases from our “universe” of 216 TFs at the differ-
ent MDBs (Annex 1), we applied a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative criteria . As we had detailed 
disbursement data available for a subset of climate TFs 
at the WBG, we could leverage a quantitative criterion 
to help inform the case selection for WBG TFs . This 
was important because the qualitative criteria alone 
would not be enough to choose from the > 150 WBG 
TFs in an objective way . We thus developed a quanti-
tative measure – a so-called “similarity score” – which 
was designed particularly to identify similar WBG TFs 
based on their disbursement profiles . Our presumption 
was that the efficiency gain from consolidation of 
highly similar TFs would be greater than that from 
consolidating less similar ones . Box 1 outlines the 
methodology for calculating the similarity scores .
Box 1. Similarity score methodology
We considered three dimensions of similarity. The first captures 19 broadly defined sectors of interven-
tion (Annex 7) that are part of a broader list of sectors defined by the WBG whose funding shares in 
any given project add up to 100 %. The second captures another 21 action types (Annex 7) which again 
are part of a list of themes that add up to another 100 %. We took these directly from the WBG’s clas-
sification system of TF activities. The third dimension covers all 120 countries that ever received funding 
from WBG climate change-related TFs. 
For any climate change-related TF, we calculated similarity scores with all other climate change-relat-
ed TFs by drawing on the complete lists of projects that each TF supported and calculating similarity 
scores on all three dimensions. A pair of TFs was considered most similar if it disbursed the same 
share of its funds on the same sets of sectors, action types and recipients. Conversely, they were con-
sidered as very different when the shares diverged strongly on all three dimensions. Let us consider on-
ly the country  dimension for a simple example. Then if TF A disbursed USD 100 million in Bangladesh 
and USD 100  million in Vietnam, but TF B only spent USD 40 million in Vietnam, then the similarity over 
recipients of these two funds would be the cosine similarity of the two following vectors: A=(50 %, 
50 %), B=(0 %, 100 %), Similarity(A, B)=0.71.16 When considering all three dimensions, we obtain three 
similarity scores, for which we calculated the simple average to obtain the final similarity score: 
Similarity(A, B)=1/3*[Similarity1(A, B)+Similarity2(A, B)+Similarity3(A, B)].17
If the database did not include any projects for a given fund, its similarity measures are missing. In 
fact, we could only perform 1235 pairwise comparisons18, given the available data on disbursements 
that needed to be matched onto the TF information. Specifically, we were unable to obtain disbursement 
information for the carbon funds – a relatively large set of TFs; these TFs required a qualitative ap-
proach to case selection drawing on our expert knowledge.
16  The cosine similarity is a standard measure to calculate the similarity of two vectors in the n-dimensional space and is defined as (A’ B) / 
(||A||*||B||), where A and B are column vectors, and ||  || is the norm of a vector . The dimensionality of the vector is given by the number of 
 non-zero disbursement shares in the combined portfolio of both funds . 
17  Dimensionality of the vector is given by the number of non-zero disbursement shares in the combined portfolio of both funds . If no 
 information was available on a specific dimension, we did not include it in the overall average similarity score .
18  In principle, there are 44,521 pairwise comparisons . Missing observations therefore are a limitation of our quantitative approach . However,  
not all comparisons are a priori relevant, for instance because the funds are in different clusters . Nonetheless, we address the lack of data by 
making the similarity score only one criterion to guide our case selection .
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Having calculated similarity scores for all feasible com-
binations of WBG climate change-related TFs, we 
scrutinized more closely the pairs of funds with ex-
tremely high similarity scores, as we would expect the 
highest potential for consolidation among those TFs . 
Hence, TFs with higher similarity scores (typically to 
be found within the same thematic cluster) would be 
given a higher priority in our overall case selection .
Given the central purpose of our study being the iden-
tification of potential overlaps in climate-related sup-
port (primarily within MDBs but also across them), a 
necessary condition was a sufficient number of pro-
grams /TFs in a dedicated thematic cluster . In a similar 
vein, we considered the dynamic evolution of the TF 
portfolio within a given thematic cluster, focusing on 
those areas which can reasonably be expected to grow 
further in the near future (such as for example ADAP-
TATION_DISASTER), rather than those where TFs 
would naturally come to their end of life under a busi-
ness-as-usual scenario (e . g . MITIGATION_FOREST 
where many TFs have already closed) . While these 
were important considerations, we also sought to cover 
a broad range of TFs to ensure that our recommenda-
tions would not only apply to a small subset of climate 
change-related TFs . Finally, we also considered wheth-
er Germany participated in the TF (which was not a 
necessary condition for case selection but we wanted to 
ensure that Germany indeed participated in most 
TFs), and whether there were potential issues in the 
“division of labor” with respect to TF management on 
the German side .
Based on the qualitative and quantitative criteria dis-
cussed above, we selected sub-sets of TFs for case stud-
ies . A total of ten TFs from clusters ADAPTATION_
DISASTER and CARBON_A6 were chosen for 
deeper analysis . In addition, we selected the cluster 
CARBON_2 for a general qualitative analysis to better 
understand the proliferation of carbon funds for Kyoto 
credit purchase . The following sections provide the 
analysis of the above sets of climate change-related 
TFs . 
4.3.2. First sample: adaptation/disaster TFs 
This sub-section analyzes the six selected TFs within 
the cluster ADAPTATION_DISASTER:
• Multi Donor Trust Fund for Mainstreaming Disas-
ter and Climate Risk Management in Developing 
Countries
• EU – African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) Re-
gion Disaster Reduction Partnership Trust Fund
• Japan-WB Program for Mainstreaming Disaster 
Risk Management in Developing Countries
• InsuResilience Climate Risk Financing and Insur-
ance Program MDTF (under GRiF)
• Global Partnership on Disaster Risk Financing 
(DRF) Analytics
• Disaster Protection Program 
Except for the Disaster Protection Program, the TFs in 
this cluster are all under the GFDRR, which is a pro-
gram and a secretariat that was established in 2006 by 
multiple countries including Germany, Japan and the 
US and other organisations such as the UNDRR and 
the WB . Its mission is to “facilitate implementation of 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
and to contribute to the achievement of the Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agree-
ment, by ensuring that all development policies, plans, 
and investments – including post-disaster reconstruc-
tion – are designed to minimize disaster risks and build 
the resilience of people and economies to climate 
change” (GFDRR 2018, p . xv) .
The GFDRR has managed so far a total funding of 
USD 730 million from a set of 17 individual TFs in-
cluding eight MDTFs and nine SDTFs, of which six 
are active, respectively (Table 32) . GFDRR grants re-
ceive funding from development partners, contribute 
to the main GFDRR MDTF with SDTFs Japan, US-
AID, and Australia that operate closely aligned with 
the MDTF, plus a set of single donor trust funds 
 financed by the European Union, and an associated 
number of special programs, which include the GRiF, 
the City Resilience Program, and the Canada Carib-
bean Resilience Program . The CREWS Initiative is  
a FIF which has the WB and the GFDRR as 
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implementing partners . The total portfolio of GFDRR’s 
activities includes nearly 400 active grants supporting 
136 countries . The largest share of active financing is 
determined for global activities (26 %) followed by 
projects in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (23 %), East Asia 
and Pacific (15 %), Europe and Central Asia (12 %), 
South Asia (11 %), Latin America and Caribbean 
(10 %) and the Middle East and North Africa (3 %) 
(GFDRR 2018) . 
Table 32. TFs that have been or are under the GFDRR umbrella (since 2006, including active and not active TFs)












Australian Trust Fund for Mainstreaming 
Disaster Reduction of the GFDRR
TF070807 SDTF 2007 2016 0 10.8
Callable Funds for the Standby Recovery 
 Financing Facility of the GFDRR
TF070868 MDTF 2007 2017 0 35.8
EU – ACP Region Disaster Reduction 
Partnership Trust Fund
TF071630 SDTF 2011 2020 1 98.6
GFDRR Trust Fund for Mainstreaming 
Disaster Risk Management in  Developing 
Countries
TF072622 MDTF 2016 2021 1 42.7
GFDRR Trust Fund for Mainstreaming 
Disaster Risk Management in  Developing 
Countries
TF072896 SDTF 2017 2021 1 3.0
GFDRR Trust Fund for Mainstreaming 
Disaster Risk Management in the  
Indo – Pacific Region
TF072835 SDTF 2017 2021 1 9.2
Global Partnership on DRF Analytics TF072535 SDTF 2015 2020 1 6.7
Global Risk Financing  Facility (GRiF) TF072858 MDTF 2017 2022 1 31.2
Japan Trust Fund for  Mainstreaming Dis-
aster Reduction Initiative of the GFDRR
TF070809 SDTF 2007 2016 0 6.0
Japan-WB Program for Mainstreaming 
Disaster Risk Management in  Developing 
Countries
TF072129 SDTF 2013 2013 1 95.0
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
 Mainstreaming Disaster and Climate Risk 
 Management in Developing  Countries
TF072236 MDTF 2014 2020 1 81.5
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
 Mainstreaming Disaster and Climate Risk 
 Management inDeveloping  Countries
TF072584 MDTF 2016 2020 1 44.1
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
 Mainstreaming Disaster Reduction 
 Initiative of the GFDRR
TF070611 MDTF 2006 2017 1 199.2
Serbia National Disaster Risk 
 Management Program SDTF
TF072528 SDTF 2015 2020 1 6.8
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South-South Cooperation for 
 Mainstreaming Disaster Reduction Multi 
Donor Trust Fund under the GFDRR
TF070952 MDTF 2007 2016 0 1.5
Spanish Trust Fund for Mainstreaming 
Disaster Reduction Initiative of the 
GFDRR
TF070806 SDTF 2007 2016 0 5.1
Standby Recovery Financing Facility  
of the GFDRR
TF070948 MDTF 2007 2017 1 24.7
GFDRR supports the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction and the UNDRR in advocating for 
policy change to achieve these objectives . 
A lot of work has been done to improve monitoring 
and evaluation processes of the GFDRR . In the annual 
report there is monitoring against specific indicators 
such as: how many hazard exposure and risk data sets 
are developed, how many people are trained on the 
topic, how many cities and national policymakers have 
designed investments informed by knowledge pro-
duced by GFDRR, number of beneficiaries to the 
shock response system . One interviewee highlighted 
that the multiplicity of TFs under the GFDRR um-
brella actually helps in terms of reporting, because it 
allows to get more granular information reflecting the 
focus of each TF, and that the GFDRR is also aiming 
at the alignment with commitments made through 
IDA on crisis risk and response . For example, the 
GFDRR uses a matrix on how many countries imple-
mented DRR policies . Moreover, IDA and IBRD 
commitments become priorities for country directors 
in terms of the lending portfolio and there is therefore 
a good level of alignment . 
GFDRR handles well the multiplicity of TFs which 
are not driven by the WBG but by donors’ priorities . 
Certain donors may need to have a SDTF that sits 
next to the main GFDRR MDTF due to their special 
funding priorities or administrative requirements . 
GFDRR SDTFs are usually less flexible than the 
GFDRR MDTF . 
According to the interviews the main GFDRR MDTF 
allows to:
• Be demand-driven and respond to country needs 
quickly as the MDTF is the most flexible among 
the TFs in that cluster .
• Fund analytical work, which over the years drives 
major policy shifts . Examples of the analytical work 
include the “Unbreakable” report on the resilience 
to natural disasters, the “Shock Waves” report on 
impacts of climate change on poverty and the 
“Lifelines” report on resilient infrastructure .
• Have partnerships with actors outside the tradition-
al development actors: universities, private compa-
nies, technology providers, etc .
• Allows rapid response and provides grants very 
quickly, particularly for rapid assessment of impact 
following disasters, and to help mobilize WBG 
teams to respond quickly to government requests 
for assistance following an event .
The GFDRR’s MDTF objective is manifold . First, it 
aims at supporting developing countries in main-
streaming disaster and climate risk management into 
national development priorities, supporting a vision of 
a world where resilient societies manage and adapt to 
ever-changing disaster and climate risk, and where the 
human and economic cost of disasters is reduced . Last 
year’s activities supported or initiated by GFDRR 
 included grants to support governments working in i) 
using science and innovation in disaster risk manage-
ment, ii) promoting resilient infrastructure, iii) scaling 
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up engagements for city resilience, iv) strengthening 
hydromet services and early warning systems, v) deep-
ening financial protection through disaster risk financ-
ing and insurance, vi) building social resilience, vii) 
deepening engagements in resilience to climate change 
and viii) enabling resilient recovery . 
Two of the selected TFs are SDTFs by the EU and Ja-
pan respectively . The ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk 
Reduction Program was launched in 2011 by the EU 
and the ACP Group of States . The program helps with 
the prevention and mitigation of disasters, resilience 
building and recovery support by supporting govern-
ments and stakeholders “in integrating multi-sectoral 
and multi-hazard risk management approaches into 
national/regional development planning” (GFDRR 
2018, 38) . In total, the program has implemented over 
100 projects in more than 40 countries and committed 
USD 5 .5 million in 13 grants last year, supporting 
over 30 countries in resilience-building activities . One 
example is the ACP–EU Building Disaster Resilience 
in SSA Program, which “helps build the resilience of 
countries and communities against the impacts of nat-
ural disasters by strengthening the Disaster Risk Man-
agement (DRM) capacity of Regional Economic Com-
munities and supporting the development of multi-risk 
financing strategies” (GFDRR 2018, 38) . Other exam-
ples build on the expanded collaboration with the EU 
and include Serbia National Disaster Risk Manage-
ment Program (USD 6 .5 million), the DRF Analytics 
(USD 6 .4 million) (see below) and the European Un-
ion–South Asia Capacity Building for Disaster Risk 
Management Program (USD 11 million) (GFDRR 
2018) .
Another SDTF managed by GFDRR is the Japan-WB 
Program for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Manage-
ment in Developing Countries, which was launched 
in 2014 . It is funded by a USD 100 million contribu-
tion from Japan and “supports developing countries in 
integrating DRM into national development planning 
and investment programs through WB country strate-
gies and operations, and in connecting Japanese and 
global expertise in DRM with developing country 
counterparts” (GFDRR 2018, 40) . In total, the pro-
gram comprises 54 projects in 55 countries and 
examples include projects on i . a . flood forecasting in 
Ghana, seismic resilience enhancement for subway 
 developments in Peru and Ecuador or workshops on, 
e .  g . enhancing dam safety and hydromet services in 
Afghanistan . Last year’s new grants valued over USD 
15 million, enabled projects in 14 countries with ac-
tivities addressing various natural hazards (GFDRR 
2018) .
The GRiF has its roots in the InsuResilience Partner-
ship which was established in 2015 when Germany 
chaired the G7 . Chancellor Merkel set up the “Climate 
Risk Insurance Initiative” in order to bring an addi-
tional 400 million people under climate risk insurance . 
Germany got engaged due to a high priority of the ad-
aptation theme and the high visibility due to the G7 
summit and subsequent UNFCCC COP21 in Paris . 
The InsuResilience Global Partnership, which was offi-
cially launched at the UNFCCC COP23 in Bonn in 
2017 and is hosted by GIZ, brings together G20 coun-
tries in partnership with the V20 (vulnerable) nations, 
as well as civil society, IOs, the private sector, and aca-
demia (InsuResilience 2019a) . Since the launch, more 
than 40 diverse partners have signed the Joint State-
ment and become members and more than 70 diverse 
partners have expressed their support for the Global 
Partnership (InsuResilience 2019c) . “The Partnership 
seeks to amplify the impact of ongoing initiatives, de-
velop new climate and disaster risk finance and insur-
ance solutions to help meet growing needs in devel-
oping countries, and ensure risk financing is well 
integrated within a broader dialogue on disaster risk 
management and humanitarian financing – including 
in-country systems” (InsuResilience 2019a) .
The InsuResilience Climate Risk Financing and In-
surance Program MDTF was established in 2017 by 
BMZ at the WBG as one vehicle to implement the ini-
tiative . In 2018, Germany (BMZ), the UK (DFID) 
and the WBG launched the GRiF MDTF to scale up 
financing for pre-arranged financial solutions, and the 
funds in the aforementioned InsuResilience MDTF 
were transferred into the GRiF MDTF, which is joint-
ly managed by the WBG’s Finance, Competitiveness 
and Innovation Global Practice and GFDRR . GRiF’s 
goal is to increase the financial resilience of poor and 
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vulnerable people in developing countries against nat-
ural disasters and boost their capacity to meet post-dis-
aster funding needs sustainably . It aims to achieve this 
objective by developing and implementing insurance 
solutions to increase the financial response capacity of 
governments and strengthen the domestic catastrophe 
insurance markets . The GRiF MDTF finances four 
types of activities: analytical work, technical assistance, 
cost-sharing of market-based risk transfer solutions, 
monitoring and evaluation activities (InsuResilience 
2019d) .
The Global Partnership on DRF Analytics was estab-
lished by a USD 6 .4 million contribution from the EU 
in 2015 and has been managed by the GFDRR and 
implemented by the WBG’s Finance, Competitiveness 
and Innovation Global Practice, specifically the Disas-
ter Risk Financing and Insurance Program (GFDRR 
2018) . It aims at enabling (sub-)national governments 
and development partners to have access to improved 
tools and well-communicated technical information to 
support them with risk-informed decisions in disaster 
risk finance and increase the financial resilience of 
countries against natural disasters (GFDRR 2019) . 
The project expects to catalyze the uptake of innovative 
risk identification, assessment, and financing tools 
within the development policy frameworks and agenda 
of several middle-income and low-income countries 
(DRFIP n . d .) . Example of co-financed activities in-
clude the development of tools for informed DRF pol-
icy decision for agriculture insurance programs and 
support of the DRF for Resilient Livelihoods program 
(InsuResilience 2019b) .
The secretariat function of the GFDRR manages the 
resources of the associated trust funds in a coherent 
way, including the process of establishing work plans, 
allocating resources, and managing grants to opera-
tional teams . The secretariat aims at balancing the sup-
ply of funding and donors’ priorities with demands 
coming from client countries, as voiced through opera-
tional teams working in those countries . The secretari-
at is staffed with technical experts who provide quality 
control and review of grants and financing decisions, 
while also contributing to global partnerships and 
leading analytical work and the production of knowl-
edge products . The secretariat thus looks at grant ap-
plications and matches them with the most suitable 
TF, which works well . This approach is somewhat 
 similar to that of the IADB (see Section 3 .5) . In sum, 
GFDRR thus already operates as an umbrella and  
the WBG TF reform therefore looks very closely at 
GFDRR as a best practice model for umbrellas to 
achieve efficiency .
The Disaster Protection Program, a USD 14 .5 mil-
lion SDTF that started in 2017, seems to have only a 
very limited degree of activity to date, as no specific re-
ports are available . The only publicly available mention 
of its action is that it has co-funded a Centre for Disas-
ter Protection in London in 2017 and has a co-located 
office there (InsuResilience 2018, 23) . The Disaster 
Protection Program is part of the Disaster Risk Financ-
ing and Insurance Program (DRFIP), a joint initiative 
by the WBG’s Finance, Competitiveness and Innova-
tion Global Practice and the GFDRR, established in 
2010 to improve the financial resilience of govern-
ments, businesses, and households against natural dis-
asters . It would be an excellent candidate for merging 
into the GFDRR .
4.3.3. Second sample: TFs relevant for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
This sub-section analyzes the four selected TFs within 
the cluster CARBON_A6:
• Pilot Auction Facility for Methane and Climate 
Change Mitigation (PAF)
• Transformative Carbon Asset Facility (TCAF)
• Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR)
• ADB Article 6 Support Facility (A6SF)
The PAF was launched in 2013, thus well before the 
PA . It is a results-based payment mechanism which 
sets a floor price for future carbon credits in the form 
of a tradeable put option, competitively allocated via 
auctions, in order to target CDM methane projects, 
which were at the risk of discontinuation . The PAF 
implemented three auctions between July 2015 and 
January 2017 allocating contracts to twelve, nine and 
five bidders for a total of 20 .6 million tons of carbon 
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dioxide equivalent (tCO
2
e) . PAF reports its results in  
a highly transparent manner . Due to the universally 
 acclaimed success of PAF, a new Nitric Acid Climate 
Auctions Program (NACAP) has been set up in 2019 
on the same model . However, it is integrated into the 
PAF umbrella, thus not furthering portfolio fragmen-
tation .
In 2015, the WBG set up the TCAF that has the aim 
to develop pilot activities for up-scaled crediting under 
the Paris Mechanisms . This facility wants to credit pol-
icy measures, such as removal of fossil fuel subsidies 
and energy efficiency standards . It aims to acquire car-
bon credits worth USD 50 million per pilot activity; 
in contrast to past carbon funds of the WBG the activ-
ities must be linked to a larger WBG loan . However, 
the WBG has not been able to mobilize the initially 
desired USD 500 million of funding and thus had to 
start the initiative with less than half of this budget, 
funded by Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK . It also took the WBG more than two 
years to agree on the first pilot activity, an energy effi-
ciency program for household appliances in Indian cit-
ies, out of originally nine (Climate Cent Foundation 
2018) . 
In contrast to the carbon funds of the early 2000s,  
we conceive TCAF operations as extremely opaque – 
TCAF has a public website (https://tcaf .worldbank .
org/) but neither an annual report nor a publicly avail-
able activity pipeline . TCAF’s methodological work to 
date has also been carried out behind closed doors . A 
single discussion paper on methodological principles 
has been published recently (WB 2018b), but it is 
much less detailed than the methodologies  developed 
by WBG TFs under the CDM .
The PMR was created already in 2010 . It is currently 
the only international initiative explicitly aiming at 
fostering the development of domestic market mecha-
nisms . These markets also generate demand for credits 
from international market mechanisms . The PMR tar-
gets 19 middle-income countries, while low-income 
countries are not covered by the program . The PMR 
brings together policymakers and public and private 
entities to share information on design of domestic 
carbon pricing such as a carbon tax or emission trading 
scheme and enhance readiness for introduction of such 
instruments . Results of the PMR have been mixed to 
date, with only a few of the covered countries actually 
introducing market instruments . For example, in Chile 
the PMR played a crucial role in creating space for the 
discussion on carbon pricing, capacity building of local 
actors and establishing a stakeholder consultation pro-
cess that eventually led to the introduction of the car-
bon tax . At the same time, many country programs 
under PMR have been seriously delayed or been ori-
ented towards side issues such as monitoring systems . 
While PMR will end in December 2020, there will be 
a successor program (Partnership for Market Imple-
mentation, PMI) with three windows: customized sup-
port, additional readiness work and implementation .
ADB launched its A6SF in 2018 to identify, develop, 
and pilot mitigation actions under Article 6 in ADB 
member countries and provide capacity building, tech-
nical and policy development support for the govern-
ment institutions that are to administer Article 6 activ-
ities . The facility is supported by Germany and Sweden . 
So far, the facility has just started its activities and its 
results cannot be assessed .
In sum, two of the four TFs assessed cover a specific 
thematic niche in the context of the development of 
new market mechanisms; the PAF and the TCAF are 
unique in the international landscape of Article 6 pi-
loting . The upcoming PMI could nicely be combined 
with the mitigation components of the NDC Support 
Facility which was set up as an MDTF in 2016 but so 
far is only funded by Germany, as both pursue the aim 
to mobilize mitigation in the context of national strat-
egies . The ADB TF has a broad remit and could easily 
be combined with other broad bilateral Article 6 sup-
port activities, e . g . from Sweden and Japan . The scale 
of the initiatives varies widely which has an impact on 
their effectiveness . The small size of the ADB initiative 
means that it will face high fixed transaction costs .
In terms of the future role of TFs in carbon markets,  
it was highlighted by one of the interviewees that 
 because of how Article 6 is designed, there seems to  
be less multilateral dynamic and more bilateral focus . 
Back in the Kyoto days, donors went to the WBG 
 because it would have access to projects . However, in 
the new context a lot of engagement is required with 
host countries’ governments . Project approval becomes 
more important and will probably be more complicat-
ed than under the CDM . In this light, TFs may not be 
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needed for bilateral transactions, but may be useful to 
facilitate host country government engagement, as the 
WBG often has stronger relations with these govern-
ments than single donor governments, and also to sup-
port capacity building in host countries’ governments . 
Another interviewee highlighted that the WBG is an 
“extremely expensive intermediary” and that donors 
are now better positioned to engage directly in Article 
6 activities as they have accumulated experience com-
pared to the early Kyoto days .
4.3.4. Third sample: carbon funds aimed at bulk purchase of credits
This sub-section provides a general qualitative analysis 
of the cluster CARBON_2 . The cluster includes the 
following programs undertaken by the WBG:
• Carbon Partnership Facility
• Danish Carbon Fund (DCF)
• Italian Carbon Fund (ICF)
• IFC-Netherlands CDM Facility
• Netherlands CDM Facility
• Netherlands European Carbon Facility
• Spanish Carbon Fund (SpCF)
• Umbrella Carbon Facility (UCF)
• WB/EIB Carbon Fund
Five of these TFs were SDTFs set up by governments 
(Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Spain) in 2002 to 2005 
to rapidly buy CDM credits as cheaply as possible, and 
partly to support the private sector in the development 
and origination of carbon projects . All of them were 
quite large, e . g . SpCF (USD 194 million), Italian 
 Carbon Fund (USD 163 million) and DCF (USD 91 
 million) . In contrast to the TFs under CARBON_1 
(see Section 2 .3), information on these SDTFs was not 
published, arguably as it was a highly competitive mar-
ket that also included private sector companies . As 
each country wanted to ensure its own compliance 
with the Kyoto emissions targets and did not want to 
depend on other countries regarding the selection of 
projects, it had no interest to collaborate with other 
countries, even if content-wise, all these funds were 
very similar and could have been easily combined .
The UCF Tranche 1, the largest carbon market TF 
(888 million USD), was set up specifically to reap the 
financial benefits from Hydrofluorocarbons (HFC)-23 
reduction projects . These projects were financially ex-
tremely attractive because very small financial invest-
ments could trigger huge emission reductions . An early 
mover in South Korea in 2003 triggered a frantic 
search for such opportunities, most of which were 
 located in China and India . The WBG pushed away a 
number of governments and private companies trying 
to buy HFC-23 credits from Chinese projects and rap-
idly set up the UCF in order to collect funding from 
private CDM credit buyers to engage in a massive 
HFC-23 CDM credit purchase contract (WB 2006); 
private carbon credit brokers like Natsource scrambled 
to become members of the UCF (Rosenzweig 2016, 
74) . In August 2006, the UCF spent USD 737 .6 mil-
lion to buy 129 .3 million credits from two Chinese 
HFC-23 projects (WB 2011) . Even if a second pur-
pose of the UCF was to support China to set up the 
CDM Funds, so that part of the windfall to these com-
panies could be directed to sustainable development in 
China, the UCF was an approach akin to carbon funds 
operated by private banks, and it is debatable if it 
should ever have been sent as a TF using public fund-
ing .
The Carbon Partnership Facility set up in 2009 sup-
ported programmatic approaches in sectors and tech-
nologies so far sidelined by the Kyoto Mechanisms . 
This specific purpose made it unique among WBG 
TFs, even if later it could have been combined with 
the Ci-Dev TF which also focused on programmatic 
activities . The WB explored this possibility but aban-
doned it, because this would have implied a complete 
overhaul of CPF’s complex governance structure .
The other, multilateral funds all pursued specific topics 
and thus their consolidation would not have generated 
relevant benefits .
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4.4. Ongoing WBG TF reform and umbrella TFs
4.4.1. TF reform
The WBG’s current round of the TF reform aims to 
“strengthen the link between funding and strategic pri-
orities and to improve efficiencies” . The main idea 
 behind the WBG TF reform is to structure the future 
WBG TF portfolio under fewer and larger “umbrellas” 
(Figure 33) . It is expected that all Global Practices and 
Regions would have a limited number of programs to 
support their highest priorities to channel most TF re-
sources . Activities not fitting into these large programs 
can still be supported through individual TFs that 
would however be highly standardized (WB 2018d) .
The TF reform aims at having a clear alignment of ob-
jectives of all stakeholders from the beginning of um-
brellas . For example, this may be achieved through a 
system where business units send fundraising initiative 
notes to DFI and then there is an internal mechanism 
on how WBG and donor teams align the TF with their 
objectives . Fundraising plans would then be shared 
with all business units, which creates visibility of all 
fundraising initiatives and gives an opportunity to see 
duplicates/similar activities and avoid creation of simi-
lar TFs . Sometimes it is not just multiple business 
units in the WBG trying to do similar things but also 
different donors trying to do the same with different 
units, which will also be addressed . Internal and exter-
nal screening is thus important not to create dupli-
cates . DFI has a role in strategic fundraising and also 
signing off new TFs but cannot take over the coordina-
tion completely and probably cannot become a “clear-
ing focal point” . The “optimal level of TF aggregation” 
question still remains to be answered by business units . 
The conversation must take place at top management 
level, e . g . Vice Presidencies will be more and more 
 accountable of the TF portfolio .
Figure 33. Vision of the WBG TF reform
Current State Future State
A large number of trust 
funds are small and 
highly customized
Only around 10 % 
of trust funds are 
large and strategy-driven
The bulk of TF business is 
organized in large programs
Other TFs are fully 
standardized
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The WBG TF reform is being implemented as an itera-
tive process . The pilot phase of rolling out new instru-
ments began in the second half of 2018 in order to test 
the designs of umbrella programs . The final decisions 
on the design of umbrellas and the beginning of their 
rollout were scheduled for mid-2019 (WB 2018c) .
Overall, there is a commitment to curb proliferation of 
TFs in the WBG, although there are no quantitative 
objectives with regards to the number of TFs . As an il-
lustration to this commitment, interviewees indicated 
that there were nine proposals for new FIFs in the past 
two years and they were all redirected into other in-
struments . At the IFC the reform also aims to have 
fewer TFs in the future, larger and more flexible ones .
4.4.2. TF umbrellas
WBG staff suggested that the WBG as an institution 
should expedite its efforts toward implementing um-
brellas because proliferation of TFs would continue if 
the current bottom-up approaches were to be main-
tained . There should thus be a top-down strategic ele-
ment in the climate finance architecture . According to 
the WBG interviewees, new TF umbrellas would strike 
a “sweet spot” in the level of TF aggregation – between 
being theme-specific but not too fragmented . One 
non-WBG interviewee agreed that granularity of TFs 
can stop at big topics, such as mitigation, adaptation 
and technology transfer and not go into more specific 
areas, which is happening in the existing TFs .
However, there must be a differentiation between the 
existing TFs and future TFs . Some of the existing TFs 
can be “retro-fitted”, e . g . GFDRR or the NDC Part-
nership . There is no one size fits all umbrella structure, 
however, there will be more synergies and alignment if 
there is a convening structure . For example, it was sug-
gested that in adaptation and resilience, TFs were com-
petitive and bringing them into a single structure 
would therefore be counter-productive . 
The WBG has already created two TFs under the new 
umbrella 2 .0 model in the area of environment: 
PROBLUE (water and oceans) and PROGREEN (for-
ests and landscapes) . A third one, PROCLEAN (air 
quality) is under development . The bank thus attempts 
to find a common denominator for different TFs, so 
donors would contribute to these and not create their 
own TFs in order to generate synergies . 
At the origin of PROBLUE there was a conscious de-
cision by the management of the Environment Prac-
tice to better structure the TF portfolio . There is a 
growing interest in oceans, so if no action is taken now 
tomorrow there would be multiple TFs addressing dif-
ferent ocean issues . By putting together several like-
minded donors and making a global proposal that 
would include all related topics the WBG was able to 
attract their attention . Some donors still want to have 
special rules (non-binding earmarking preferences) and 
there are ways of doing it without creating new TFs . 
However, more recently some important donors decid-
ed not to demand such special rules and let the WBG 
allocate funds where it makes more sense given the 
 demand . PROBLUE focuses on four key areas:
• The management of sustainable fisheries and aqua-
culture
• Addressing threats posed to ocean health by marine 
pollution, including litter and plastics, from marine 
or land-based sources
• The sustainable development of key oceanic sectors 
such as tourism, maritime transport and off-shore 
renewable energy
• Building government capacity to manage marine 
resources, including nature-based infrastructure 
such as mangroves, in an integrated way to deliver 
more and long-lasting benefits to countries and 
communities
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PROGREEN, the Global Partnership for Sustainable 
and Resilient Landscapes, is set up as a WBG MDTF 
aimed at tackling biodiversity, forestry and land issues . 
PROGREEN has three priority areas:
• Management of forests and land-based ecosystems
• Management of land-use changes from agriculture
• Management of landscapes 
In the climate change area, umbrellas are in the stage 
of development . According to WBG staff, a new um-
brella on innovative climate finance will probably host 
carbon funds . One of the challenges for result-based 
funds was that they were driven by donors (prolifera-
tion of carbon funds, see Section 4 .3 .4 . above) . This 
may have made sense in the beginning of carbon mar-
kets under the Kyoto Protocol, but based on accumu-
lated experience there could be several buckets: nature-
based solutions, programmatic approach19 (out of 
Ci-Dev), policy approach (TCAF), new innovation 
 approaches (with smaller amounts of liquidity) . Pro-
grammatic, policy and nature-based approaches will  
be priority, increasingly moving away from a project-
by-project approach . 
19  Program of Activities (PoAs), a framework that allows implementing an unlimited number of usually small single Component Project Activi-
ties (CPAs) under one registered PoA . This framework aims at reducing the transaction costs – particularly for small-scale distributed emissions 




  Discussion and recommendations 
This section draws together the various strands of our 
analysis while integrating further evidence from our 
stakeholder interviews and our expert knowledge that 
has not been presented in detail in previous sections . 
We first identify the key issues regarding the potential 
for consolidation in the portfolio of climate-related 
TFs and the possibilities for managing such TFs more 
efficiently . We then formulate actionable recommenda-
tions for both the MDBs and bilateral donors, notably 
Germany . 
5.1.  Key issues regarding trust fund consolidation,  
costs and benefits 
TFs have become an important vehicle for anchoring 
climate-related activities in the work of MDBs . Most 
stakeholders would agree that the sheer number of cli-
mate-related TFs is significant . But what is the right 
number of TFs? Under which conditions does it make 
sense to have different TFs? Is it simply the number of 
TFs which drives the effectiveness of climate finance 
and resource efficiency or which other factors need to 
be considered in this context? In the debate about the 
optimal design of the climate finance architecture, 
there is a tendency to focus on the number of TFs as 
the primary target of reform . Yet, our quantitative 
analysis of similarities along with the different stake-
holder interviews clearly shows that this is not the 
right way to pose the question . Much depends upon 
the specific conditions under which TFs have been set 
up . Hence differentiation is required, just as in the 
broader context of development aid where donor frag-
mentation was also shown to be a much less generaliz-
able problem than often believed (Gehring et al . 
2017) . 
Looking at the three clusters within which we carried 
out our in-depth analysis we found that despite their 
strong similarities, the adaptation/disaster TFs seem to 
be structured in an efficient way given their set up un-
der the umbrella of the GFDRR . This structure seems 
to provide an adequate balance between flexibility, and 
the common structures that facilitate synergies and 
 reduce transaction cost . In contrast, among the carbon 
funds, we identified a number of TFs whose independ-
ent co-existence appears rather questionable . Such 
doubts come up even for some funds with considerable 
financial volumes, notably the carbon funds oriented 
towards the bulk purchase of credits that proliferated 
in the 2000s . For these TFs, from the very beginning 
even the intent for collaboration between donors does 
not seem to have existed, as they were set up to reap 
financial benefits for individual donors thereby fueling 
the parallel development of a number of similar 
SDTFs . Yet other problems became visible in the con-
text of the Bank-driven set-up of the UCF in which 
the individual donor interests were well-bundled, but 
only because the WBG made use of its preferred access 
to the relevant host governments to impose itself as a 
broker of the HFC-23 reduction projects that could 
provide large volumes of emission credits at relatively 
low prices . 
Leaving aside the rather special case of the UCF, in 
which the costs for the WBG were primarily reputa-
tional and overall costs were related to the WBG 
crowding out private sector providers and thus inhibit-
ing market competition, the main type of costs driven 
by the multiplicity of TFs are transaction costs . As the 
above examples show, these costs can be significantly 
reduced through appropriate structures like umbrella 
TFs or even a different setting in which individual TFs 
are replaced by funding windows within a single TF 
for a given topic . While the latter certainly carries the 
smallest administrative burden for the MDBs, it only 
accommodates individual donors’ specific wishes for 
thematic specialization within a fund but cannot ac-
commodate different procedural requirements . In this 
context, the individual donors’ administrative cost to 
change procedural requirements must also be taken 
into account . For certain donors, such as the EU, they 
may be prohibitively high, so that the decision whether 
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or not to accept an additional SDTF for this donor 
should depend on how important it is for the overall 
goal of the existing cluster of funds to include this do-
nor . One argument in this context is certainly the size 
of the financial contribution this donor will provide 
for the common cause . Finally, transaction costs also 
need to be considered at the level of the recipient . In 
this context, it appears plausible to us that a function-
ing umbrella structure may serve the purpose of mini-
mizing transaction costs at the recipient level just as 
well as a single TF .
Efficiency has to consider not just the costs, but also 
the benefits . One of the major benefits of TFs arises 
from networking and shared experience among the 
participating donors of the TF as well as between the 
individual donors and the MDB . At first glance, it 
seems that the benefits of shared experience among TF 
donors can be reaped only by MDTFs, but some suc-
cessful cases suggest that a well-functioning umbrella 
structure may also encourage communication and co-
operation among members of individual sub-funds, in-
cluding aligned SDTFs . Hence umbrella TFs may be 
useful, both in terms of reducing cost and in terms of 
ensuring some relevant benefits of the TF model .
As our interviews reveal, bilateral donors also consider 
their increase in influence as another potential benefit 
of TFs . This increase in influence can occur at various 
levels . First, donors may seek leadership (or at least a 
strong weight) within a TF, so that they can ensure 
that the TFs follow their preferences in which case the 
input of other donors can be considered as leverage for 
their agenda . This can be reached by focusing on a lim-
ited number of TFs and by not spreading one’s fund-
ing too thinly . Obviously, this model only works if not 
all donors have the same ambition . If there is aligned 
commitment among donors, this may yield TFs in-
tended to become MDTFs but eventually ending as 
independent and unconnected (de-facto) SDTFs, i . e . 
the worst case in terms of the criteria discussed previ-
ously .
Through TFs, bilateral donors also seek influence over 
the MDB, either jointly or individually . Through vol-
untary funding of specific thematic areas, the focus of 
MDB operations can be affected . Clearly, the whole 
climate change agenda would have much less weight in 
the WBG’s list of priorities if it were not for the instru-
ment of climate change-related TFs . Of course, the 
backside of this is that, in the long run, such influence 
may undermine the legitimacy of the MDBs and their 
official decision-making bodies – unless these bodies 
themselves take a more active role and request from 
the donor community which kinds of TFs they would 
like to see to complement operational activities . The 
situation is similar when individual donors use TFs as 
a means to gain privileged access to the MDB through 
secondments . As a means of exchange of experience 
and mutual learning, this may well be beneficial for 
both the MDB and the individual donor concerned, 
but MDBs need to be careful to avoid the impression 
of favoritism which can lead to reputational damage .
Donor effort coordinated through an MDTF may 
 increase donor influence on recipients and foster pro-
gram implementation in the desired way . This is an 
 argument that is typically advanced as well for donor 
coordination and against aid fragmentation more gen-
erally . However, there are also similar trade-offs . While 
a unified approach gives more power to the donors, it 
takes away the power from the beneficiaries . Consider-
ing the paradigm of empowerment, true partnership, 
and also recipient government ownership, this may be 
problematic . Finally, some competition generally spurs 
innovative ideas, which should be beneficial for devel-
opment overall . 
What this discussion emphasizes is that the optimiza-
tion of the institutional setting is a complex endeavor 
that requires more than a simple reduction in the 
number of TFs . Furthermore, the assessment of what 
is optimal clearly depends on the individual perspec-
tive . It is thus not surprising that we encountered dif-
ferent views on what is desirable . Our interviews show 
that particularly MDB stakeholders are concerned 
about fragmentation while views among donor repre-
sentatives were more diverse . Some believe an “ecosys-
tem of funds” can address specific activities along the 
project cycle and can foster innovation through 
healthy competition where there is no best approach 
yet . The other side contends that there are too many 
funds that make it impossible for recipients to navigate 
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the range of options and for senior management to 
 exercise effective oversight . Activity implementers 
 expressed mixed views in that respect and in most cases 
were not aware of such level of TF proliferation .
Some additional factors limit the possibility to draw 
unambiguous conclusions from our analysis . Notably, 
while there is a lot of discussion about costs, we have 
had no access to concrete estimations of transaction 
costs or other administrative costs for either the 
MDBs, the bilateral donors, or the recipients . Hence, 
we have to base our assessment on general perceptions 
and anecdotal evidence about where they are high, 
 intermediate or low . 
Against this background, the recommendations we de-
rive from our work will focus on cases were such as-
sessments by our interview partners have been relative-
ly consensual or where they can be directly deduced 
from the limited qualitative and quantitative evidence . 
5.2. Recommendations for MDBs, especially the WBG
As clarified above, despite the extremely high number 
of TFs, notably at the WBG, our recommendation for 
MDBs is not to reduce the number of funds at all cost, 
or not to create any new ones . Rather, we focus on A)
how to organize existing TFs in an efficient way by cre-
ating a coherent system of climate change-related TFs, 
and on B) how to improve the selection and integra-
tion of new ones into this system . 
A) Organizing existing funds in an efficient way and 
thus keeping administration costs as low as possible 
while reaping the benefits of donor cooperation is a 
key issue also discussed in the WBG’s TF reform . In 
many ways, the results of our study confirm the direc-
tions already taken in this respect, notably regarding 
the benefits of an umbrella structure . In addition, the 
model of a central responsible unit as practiced at the 
IADB could be usefully adopted – possibly in a some-
what adjusted form – by other MDBs .
Recommendation 1: Entrust responsibility  
for all TFs to a central group of staff/unit within  
the MDB 
At the IADB all TFs are managed by a single group of 
staff . At the AfDB the relatively small number of TFs 
does not require such a dedicated unit at the moment, 
but the Bank is considering establishing it should the 
number of TFs increase in the future . While for the 
huge number of TFs such as in the case of the WBG, 
full management by one unit will not be possible, a 
single unit could still be entrusted with the overall 
 responsibility for coordinating all TFs . This would 
 ensure the consistency of the goals of the TFs with the 
MDB’s overall strategies, be responsible for internal 
 resource allocation to the funds and for stronger coor-
dination among units and ensure internal and external 
transparency about the TFs within the organization . In 
this role it could also make propositions about closures 
and mergers of TFs and about the creation of umbrella 
funds . Such a central responsible unit can help miti-
gate the risk that TFs fly under the radar of central 
management and simply duplicate activities of other 
TFs or follow practices that may be harmful to the 
 reputation of the MDB as a whole . 
Recommendation 2: Find appropriate umbrella 
 solutions  
Umbrellas strike a balance between donors’ demand 
for control and MDB management’s demand for 
standardization . All TFs under an umbrella are gov-
erned by the same overarching strategy and their ad-
ministrative schedules for donor meetings, results re-
porting, and related processes are aligned . In addition, 
umbrella TF secretariats play a coordinating role in re-
source allocation (regarding both, demand by potential 
beneficiaries and supply by individual donors) . If a re-
sponsible central unit exists, the umbrella TFs could 
take a subsidiary role in a two-level structure . Albeit 
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often focusing on global themes, umbrella TFs seek 
close alignment with country assistance strategies . A 
best-practice example of an established umbrella is the 
GFDRR . It is a family of TFs with an important 
MDTF at its core, and with an active secretariat that 
contributes to aligning the fund with beneficiary pri-
orities and MDB country strategies . We would recom-
mend to integrate all disaster protection TFs into the 
GFDRR . Overall, umbrellas seem to accommodate in-
terests from all sides . As the key funds in their respec-
tive sectors, they ensure scale of operations and visibil-
ity to donors, while not eliminating the possibility for 
additional TFs in concession to the need for flexibility 
and experimentation on emergent issues . 
Most stakeholders agree that the current system in-
volves too many small TFs and that some aggregation 
is generally a good idea . However, the debate about the 
right “level of aggregation” and the optimal size of the 
umbrella structures is still ongoing . In the climate area, 
the ten clusters suggested in this study can serve as the 
first basis for considering potential umbrella structures, 
as this level of aggregation seem to be comparable to 
that of the new umbrellas PROBLUE and PRO-
GREEN . Concretely, based on our analysis the follow-
ing four thematic clusters can be considered for future 
umbrellas:
• Carbon funds aimed at operationalizing and 
 supporting markets under the PA
• Disaster and adaptation funds
• Mitigation funds focused on the energy sector, 
 including industry and transport
• Mitigation funds focused on forestry and land use
Recommendation 3: Consider separate  
windows within TFs 
While the necessity to establish SDTFs as a comple-
ment to existing MDTFs may arise in some cases to 
accommodate procedural needs of individual donors, 
in other cases simply opening a specific window within 
an existing TF may suffice . This is notably the case 
when donors require earmarking that goes beyond the 
specific goals of the fund . While such a narrow ear-
marking is generally not allowed in TFs there may be 
reasons to accommodate the donor anyway, e . g . to 
 allow reporting to the Parliament . In such cases, the 
window-option seems to generate a lesser administra-
tive burden than a separate SDTF . Furthermore, the 
donor can be fully integrated in the exchange within 
the TF . Adopting separate windows within TFs along 
with umbrella funds and a central unit would generate 
a three-level organizational structure that should facili-
tate the overview of the full system of TFs even in an 
organization with a large number of TFs like the 
WBG .
Recommendation 4: Generate financial  
incentives for cooperation within MDTFs 
To induce donors to select TFs that generate little ad-
ministrative cost and high benefits, MDBs could use 
fee structures that incentivize contributions to MDTFs 
rather than setting up SDTFs, and hence more flex-
ible, i . e . less-earmarked funding . Elements of an 
 incentive-compatible fee structure for donors include 
differentiated fees depending on the strictness of ear-
marking, contribution size, and number of donors . To 
set the right incentives for MDB staff, fees should not 
be deduced from contributions, but rather from dis-
bursements, with possible differentiation by the level 
of results achieved (Reinsberg 2017a) . MDBs could 
also incentivize TFs in specific areas in which they see 
high complementarity to existing activities or strong 
need to develop and pioneer innovative approaches, 
such as for the new market mechanisms under Article 
6 of the Paris Agreement, encouraging initiatives like 
previously, the successful work of the PCF, or new 
 approaches such as the ABM of the AfDB . 
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B) Improving the selection and integration of new 
TFs is similarly important as the organization of exist-
ing funds . We again recommend some institutional 
measures that may help to ensure that TFs are selected 
were the benefits of cooperation are highest, while the 
costs are relatively low . Some of the structures suggest-
ed above will also be helpful in this context . 
Recommendation 5: Generate greater  
transparency about already existing funds and  
funds under  consideration 
Knowledge about existing funds is notoriously bad, 
even within the MDBs, but also among donors as well 
as activity implementers, as our interviews demonstrat-
ed . As we saw in this study, data on financial flows and 
contributors is not made public and handed out upon 
request even to MDB shareholders only reluctantly 
and in an incomplete form . Even the most basic infor-
mation like a simple list of all active TFs and their ba-
sic activities is not available for all MDBs, and notably 
not for the WBG where the need for transparency is 
greatest given the large number of funds . We believe 
that this goes against the WBG’s own transparency 
paradigm and may affect its legitimacy and reputation . 
For potential donors a well-structured website present-
ing the different funds, ideally augmented by a search 
function for different fields of activity, could be a use-
ful entry point and might avoid proposals that dupli-
cate already existing activities . If, in addition, planned 
initiatives could also be presented, this may even 
 become a platform on which groups of like-minded 
donors (including possible non-state donors) could 
form to jointly support certain goals . 
Recommendation 6: Increase the efficiency  
of fundraising 
Beyond further transparency that can improve the pro-
posals received in the first place, the MDBs’ internal 
rules and incentive structures need to be adjusted . 
Currently, incentives to create new TFs rather than 
considering existing options exist on both the donor 
and the MDB side . On the donor side, new TFs often 
come about from a well-identified sector need, but 
without much effort to identify existing options or to 
consult with central departments at MDBs that should 
have the overview . On the MDB side, individual de-
partments may also happily endorse new opportunities 
without further consultation . To avoid such uncoordi-
nated processes, the central unit suggested under rec-
ommendation 1 should also have the responsibility to 
formally accept or reject all new TF proposals . Ensur-
ing that all proposals go through a single unit would 
guarantee that suitable existing funds could be identi-
fied if they exist, or at least suitable umbrella funds to 
which a new TF could possibly be attached . More gen-
erally, MDBs could introduce regulation requiring op-
erational teams to share their fundraising plans, so that 
MDB management could mitigate uncoordinated fun-
draising – a rule that the WBG is already implement-
ing as a result of its most recent TF reform phase . 
MDBs can also develop further their internal rules re-
garding requirements for minimum financial volumes, 
minimum numbers of contributing donors, and 
 default “sunset clauses” .
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5.3. Recommendations for bilateral donors
Many of the recommendations for bilateral donors 
simply mirror the recommendations for MDBs and 
therefore do not require much further discussion . In 
their role as MDB shareholder, donors can simply 
push for the relevant reforms within the MDBs . At  
the same time, in their role as TF contributors, they 
should themselves abide by some general rules that  
will facilitate the consolidation of TFs in the future .  
Recommendation 7: Use available information 
about existing TFs and consult higher-level MDB 
management 
When contemplating new TFs, donors should take a 
“portfolio approach” that assesses the value-added of a 
TF against existing initiatives . Efforts must be made to 
inquire about existing options; discussions with a sin-
gle sector or country unit is not sufficient, even if this 
unit shows high interest as a possible manager of the 
fund . 
Recommendation 8: Avoid complex procedural  
and thematic preferences whenever possible 
Bilateral donors should show the highest possible level 
of flexibility to facilitate the task of MDBs to build ap-
propriate donor clusters in the form of MDTFs or at 
least under umbrella structures . If narrow geographi-
cal, sectoral or activity type preferences cannot be 
avoided, consider a new window rather than a new 
fund . 
Recommendation 9: Support coordination  
among donors 
TFs at MDBs should not be misused by donors to 
serve their own vested interests through the backdoor 
of the multilateral system . Rather, donors should 
actively seek to use them as an instrument for further 
cooperation and exchange, and thus coordinate on 
common-interest topics and joint MDTFs, rather than 
SDTFs .
Recommendation 10: Support coordination  
among TFs 
For an ecosystem of TFs to effectively address complex 
climate change-related challenges, all relevant TFs 
must work together . Coordination becomes more im-
portant as the number of TFs increases . But most TFs 
do not formally coordinate their activities, and if they 
do, this is based on informal stakeholder coordination . 
Donors can further enhance coordination by using 
 replenishments, Steering Committee meetings, and 
 informal channels to promote coordination and to re-
duce overlap in the mandates of climate change-related 
TFs . 
Recommendation 11: Conduct regular “spring 
cleaning” exercises 
Individual donors can unilaterally consolidate their TF 
portfolios on the basis of periodic portfolio reviews to 
identify – jointly with MDBs – “low-hanging fruits” 
by closing dormant accounts, merging TFs within the 
portfolio, and transferring TFs into existing umbrellas . 
For example, Sweden has recently undertaken a 
“spring-cleaning” exercise which helped reduce the 
number of TFs in its portfolio, with the benefit that 
information about ongoing relevant TF support has 
become more accessible to decision-makers . Given that 
portfolio consolidation eats up administrative resourc-
es, it is only to be recommended for donors with high-
ly fragmented TF portfolios . 
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Recommendation 12: Increase transparency  
about MDB TFs  
Not only MDBs but also donors need to collect sys-
tematic data on climate-related TFs and share it widely 
within their own agencies and with the general public 
and ensure that it is not lost over time due to staff 
turnover . The lack of transparency around existing 
 climate-related TFs also impairs the accountability of 
MDBs toward general public . Specifically, obtaining 
reliable data on TFs that is comparable across institu-
tions remains a formidable challenge and has also 
 affected the present study . 
Recommendation 13: Monitor the development of 
TFs at the MDBs 
Based on the request for increased MDB transparency 
about existing and planned TFs, donors as MDB 
shareholders should also monitor the overall develop-
ment of these funds to prevent reputational risks for 
the institution . These can arise notably when individu-
al units push their own agendas in areas where their 
mandate may be questionable (as in the case of the 
UCF where the WBG essentially blocked market 
 access for players not willing to channel their funds 
through this TF) . This should be avoided in the future . 




  Conclusion 
Trust funds have become an increasingly popular in-
strument for channeling climate finance to multilateral 
institutions, whether through FIFs or MDB TFs . 
From a donor perspective, FIFs emanate from global 
political processes and allow to address climate chal-
lenges at a scale, while including relevant stakeholders 
in their governance structures and fostering collabora-
tion among implementing agencies . Furthermore, do-
nors use MDB TFs to target specific sub-issues with-
out a commitment for long-term funding and thus 
they are an opportunity to respond to changing politi-
cal needs in the donor country and emergent needs in 
the partner countries . 
For the MDBs, TFs provide a mechanism to collect ex-
tra-budgetary grant resources, outside their core lend-
ing business, to grow their operations and improve the 
effectiveness of lending projects, for instance by financ-
ing project preparation, project supervision, and tech-
nical assistance . TF grants can also reduce the effective 
interest to be paid on loans, thus making it more at-
tractive for countries to take up new loans, especially 
for interventions in climate change that produce global 
public goods . Finally, the TF instrument also is ideally-
suited to channel non-lending assistance, such as 
grants, guarantees, equity, and insurance – all of which 
are relevant in the climate sector . 
Furthered by institutional incentives on all sides to ini-
tiate new TFs, the number of climate change-related 
TFs has grown tremendously over the past decade . 
Consequently, concerns have grown, particularly 
among senior MDB management, about there being 
too many TFs, with potential adverse effects on effi-
ciency and effectiveness . Our report shows, however, 
that the TF growth is not tantamount to detrimental 
fragmentation, which is the result of poor practice 
rather than sheer numbers alone, although a larger 
number of TFs amplifies it . Indeed, a large number of 
TFs may be desirable as it may create an ecosystem of 
funds to fill gaps and provide wholesale support along 
the project cycle, provided that proper coordination 
takes place across funds . Coordination between MDB 
departments – specifically global thematic units and 
country managing units – is key to success . However, 
we do find areas where strong overlaps and fragmenta-
tion exist such as carbon funds, due to competing 
 donor interests to access carbon credits rapidly and 
cheaply . In the context of the new carbon markets un-
der the Paris Agreement, a repetition of this experience 
should not take place .
Curbing fragmentation is also about finding the right 
balance between legitimate demand by donors to steer 
MDB activities and the quest for efficiency through 
standardization in TF instruments . In general, there is 
a difference between SDTFs, small MDTFs, and large 
MDTFs: SDTFs maximize control for the donor but 
defy efficiency gains as SDTFs imply tailored adminis-
trative arrangements . As MDBs recognize the need for 
some donors to at times use SDTFs, they nonetheless 
attempt to rein in their centrifugal effects, for instance 
by bringing them under an umbrella structure . Taking 
a program-based approach that covers sets of TFs is the 
most promising way to reorganize the ever-expanding 
universe of TFs . Stakeholders should therefore support 
efforts to establish umbrella facilities at MDBs . In 
 addition, establishing responsible central units within 
each MDB (such as it already exists at the IADB) 
could achieve great benefits in terms of coordination 
and transparency within and beyond the organization .
While this study confirms that the current climate 
change-related TF portfolio is fragmented and requires 
consolidation, further in-depth analysis into costs and 
benefits of different umbrella structures and different 
“levels of aggregation” is required for proposing an 
“ideal” TF landscape . Our study identified four clus-
ters which can serve as the first basis for considering 
potential umbrella structures . The level of aggregation 
in these clusters is similar to what existing pilots such 
as the new WBG umbrellas PROBLUE and PRO-
GREEN have already envisaged . 
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8.1. Annex 1: Climate change-related trust funds in MDBs  
(based on data provided by MDBs)
FIFs
TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














ADAPTATION FUND AF Green Adaptation UNFCCC Multiple ADAPTATION_ 
MULTIPLE
538,3 MDTF 2009 2020 Active
CAPACITY-BUILDING  INITIATIVE 
FOR  TRANSPARENCY FUND
CBIT Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Policy 
 support
CC_MIXED 55,6 MDTF 2016 2024 Active
CLEAN TECHNOLOGY  
FUND
CTF Green Mitigation CIF Multiple MITIGATION_ 
MULTIPLE
5 712,9 MDTF 2009 2049 Active
CLIMATE RISK AND EARLY 
WARNING SYSTEMS  
INITIATIVE




28,0 MDTF 2016 2026 Active
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 
 FACILITY
GEF Green CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 15 804,0 MDTF 1991  Active
GREEN CLIMATE FUND GCF Green CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 6 718,3 MDTF 2012 2019 Active
GUYANA REDUCING  EMISSIONS 
FROM  DEFORESTATION AND 
 FOREST DEGRADATION (REDD+)
GRIF Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry CARBON_1 206,6 MDTF 2010 2021 Active
LEAST DEVELOPED  COUNTRIES 
FUND
LDCF Green Adaptation UNFCCC Multiple ADAPTATION_ 
MULTIPLE
1 314,2 MDTF 2005  Active
NAGOYA PROTOCOL 
 IMPLEMENTATION FUND
NPIF Green CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 16,1 MDTF 2011  Active
PILOT AUCTION FACILITY  
FOR METHANE AND  CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION
PAF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance











TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














SPECIAL CLIMATE  
CHANGE FUND
SCCF Green Adaptation UNFCCC Multiple ADAPTATION  
MULTIPLE
351,2 MDTF 2004  Active
STRATEGIC CLIMATE FUND SCF Green CC general CIF Multiple CC_MIXED 2 954,4 MDTF 2009 2049 Active
ADB TFs
TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Article 6 Support Facility A6SF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_A6 4.0 MDTF 2018 2021 Active
Asia Pacific Carbon Fund APCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 152.8 MDTF 2006 2014 Closed
Asia Pacific Disaster  
Response Fund 




80,0 SDTF 2009  Active




55.7 SDTF 2008  Active
Asia-Pacific Climate  
Finance Fund 
ACliFF Green CC general BI/MULTI Derisking CC_MIXED 33.3 MDTF 2017  Active
Canadian Climate Fund for  
the Private Sector in Asia 
CFPS Green CC general BI/MULTI Derisking CC_MIXED 80.7 SDTF 2013 2037 Active
Canadian Climate Fund for  
the Private Sector in Asia 
CFPS2 Green CC general BI/MULTI Derisking CC_MIXED 149.5 SDTF 2017 2023 Active
Canadian Cooperation Fund  
for Climate Change
CCC Green CC general BI/MULTI Policy 
 support
CC_MIXED 3.5 SDTF 2001 2020 Active
Carbon Capture and Storage 
Fund 
CCSF Green Mitigation BI/MULTI CCS MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
70.9 MDTF 2009 2021 Active
Cities Development Initiative 
for Asia Trust Fund
CDIA TF Green CC general BI/MULTI Policy 
 support




TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Clean Energy Financing 
 Partnership Facility




 MDTF 2007  Active




131.0 MDTF 2007  Active
Climate Change Fund CCF-ADB Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 74.0 MDTF 2008  Active
Danish Cooperation Fund for 
Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency in Rural Areas 
DCREEEA Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
3.6 SDTF 2001 2020 Active
Second Danish Cooperation 
Fund for Renewable Energy 
and Energy Efficiency in Rural 
Areas 
DCREEEA2 Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
3.5 SDTF 2006 2020 Active
Future Carbon Fund FCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_A6 115.0 MDTF 2008 2021 Active
High Level Technology Fund HLTF Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 54.5 MDTF 2017  Active
Integrated Disaster Risk 
 Management Fund 




9.7 SDTF 2013  Active
Ireland Trust Fund for Build-
ing Climate Change and 
 Disaster Resilience in Small 
Island  Developing States




13.5 SDTF 2019 2024 Active
Japan Fund for the Joint 
 Crediting Mechanism
JFJCM Green Mitigation CF Carbon  
finance
CARBON_A6 71.1 SDTF 2014  Active
Urban Climate Change 
 Resilience Trust Fund 
UCCRTF Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Resilience ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
149.4 MDTF 2013 2013 Active
Urban Environmental 
 Infrastructure Fund 
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 N/A   in develop-
ment
Africa Carbon Support Program ACSP Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Carbon fi-
nance
CARBON_1  N/A   Closed
Africa Climate Change Fund ACCF Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 12.7 MDTF 2014  Active




27.1 MDTF 2010  Active
Congo Basin Forest Fund CBFF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
170.0 MDTF 2008 2015 Closed
Sustainable Energy for  
Africa
SEFA Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
106.0 MDTF 2011  Active
IADB TFs
TF name Program Relevance 
for CC
















NCL Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
25.0 MDTF 2018  Active
Canadian Climate Fund for  
the Private Sector in the 
Americas (C2F)
CCFPS Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 249.5 SDTF 2012  Active




TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Emerging and Sustainable 
 Cities
ESC Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 14.3 MDTF 2011  Active
European Commission’s LAIF 
Grant to Climate Change and 
Water & Sanitation
ECLAIF Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 16.4 SDTF 2013  Active
French Climate Fund for Latin 
America and the Caribbean
FCFLAC Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 5.5 SDTF 2018  Active
Mangroves Habitat Fund MHF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
 SDTF   Closed
Multi-Donor Disaster 
 Prevention Trust Fund




16.9 MDTF 2007  Active
NDC Pipeline Accelerator ACL Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Policy 
 support
CC_MIXED 17.1 MDTF 2017  Active
Ordinary Capital-Strategy 
 Development Program for 
 Sustainability 2
OC-SDP Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 207.7 N/A 2016  Active
Portuguese Technical 
 Cooperation Fund
PTCF Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 2.8 SDTF 1998  Active
Sustainable Energy and 
 Climate Change Initiative 
SECCI Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
55.3 MDTF 2007  Active
UK Low Carbon Agriculture  
to Avoid Deforestation Fund 
LCAADPR Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
22.3 SDTF 2019  Active
UK Sustainable  
Infrastructure Program 
UKSIP Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 68.9 SDTF 2017  Active
United Kingdom Blue Carbon 
Fund
UKBCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance












TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Advisory Services for the Clean 
Energy Access Program 
 relating to the Sustainability 
Business Innovator Facility
AS-CEAP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE Active
Africa Nordic Development 
Fund  Climate Change Program
ANDF Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 22.5 SDTF 2011 2022 Active
Africa Nordic Development 
Fund  Climate Change Program
ANDF Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 16.0 SDTF 2017 2025 Active
African Rural and Renewable 
Energy Initiative
AFFREI Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 0.2 SDTF 2000 Closed
Asia Sustainable and Alterna-
tive Energy  Program 
ASTAE Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 24.2 MDTF 2011 2017 Active
Australian Trust Fund for 
Mainstreaming  Disaster 
 Reduction of the Global 
 Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery 




10.8 SDTF 2007 2016 Closed
Balkans Renewable Energy 
Program




tion and  Renewable Energy 
 Development II
RERED Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 6.4 SDTF 2012 2019 Active
Bangladesh Rural Electrifica-
tion and Renewable Energy 
 Development II
RERED Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 1.1 SDTF 2016 2019 Active
BioCarbon Fund BioCF Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 53.8 MDTF 2003 2020 Active
BioCarbon Technical Assistance 
Trust Fund 
BioCF Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 86.9 MDTF 2003 2020 Active




TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














BioCFplus Initiative for Sus-
tainable Forest Landscapes – 
BMUB Single-Donor Trust Fund
BioCF+ Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 41.3 SDTF 2015 2030 Active
BioCFplus Initiative for Sus-
tainable Forest Landscapes – 
Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy Trust Fund
BioCF+ Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 12.6 SDTF 2017 2030 Active
BioCFplus Initiative for Sus-
tainable Forest Landscapes – 
Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs Trust 
Fund
BioCF+ Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 18.1 SDTF 2017 2030 Active
BioCFplus Initiative for Sus-
tainable Forest Landscapes – 
Ministry of Climate and 
 Environment Single-Donor 
Trust Fund
BioCF+ Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 18.0 SDTF 2015 2030 Active
BioCFplus Initiative for Sus-
tainable Forest Landscapes – 
USDOS Single-Donor Trust 
Fund
BioCF+ Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 36.5 SDTF 2015 2030 Active
BioCFplus Reduce Carbon 
Emissions from Deforestation 
and Degradation (REDD+) 
Readiness Support Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund
BioCF+ Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 9.8 MDTF 2015 2020 Active
BioCFplus Technical Assistance 
and Capacity Building Fund
BioCF+ Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 2.6 MDTF 2015 2020 Active
Brazil Cerrado Climate Change 
Mitigation Single-Donor Trust
BCCC Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
15.6 SDTF 2011 2018 Active
Brazilian Rain Forest –  
Canadian Grant
BRF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST











TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Brazilian Rain Forest –  
Canadian Grant II
BRF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
0.3 SDTF 1992 1993 Closed
Brazilian Rain Forest Trust 
Fund
BRF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
7.3 2009
Brazilian Rain Forest Trust 
Fund
BRF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
69.1 MDTF 1992 Closed
Callable Funds for the Standby 
Recovery Financing Facility of 
the Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery




35.8 MDTF 2007 2017 Closed
Carbon Asset Development 
Fund (CADF) Multi Donor  
Trust Fund
CADF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 13.4 MDTF 2008 2024 Active
Carbon Capture and Storage 
Trust Fund
CCS-TF Green Mitigation BI/MULTI CCS MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
47.1 MDTF 2009 2023 Active
Carbon Finance Assist  
Trust Fund
CFATF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 38.5 MDTF 2005 2019 Active
Carbon Finance Assist  
Trust Fund
CFATF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 7.1 MDTF 2016 2019 Active
Carbon Fund of the Carbon 
Partnership Facility
CPF-CF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 109.2 MDTF 2008 2024 Active
Carbon Fund of the Forest 
 Carbon Partnership Facility
FCPF-CF Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 593.0 MDTF 2008 2026 Active
Carbon Fund of the Forest 
 Carbon Partnership Facility
FCPF-CF Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 200.5 MDTF 2016 2026 Active
Carbon Initiative for Develop-
ment Carbon Fund
Ci-Dev Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 85.5 MDTF 2013 2025 Active
Carbon Initiative for Develop-
ment Readiness Fund
Ci-Dev Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 24.2 MDTF 2013 2025 Active
Central African Forest Initia-
tive Implementation Trust Fund
CAFI Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST




TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Central American and 
 Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
 Insurance Program




23.9 MDTF 2014 2020 Active
Central American and 
 Caribbean Catastrophe Risk 
 Insurance Program




27.4 MDTF 2016 2020 Active
China Utility-Based Energy 
 Efficiency Finance Program
UBEEFP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE Closed
China Utility-Based Energy 
 Efficiency Finance Program 
Trust Fund
UBEEFP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE Closed
Climate Change Advisory 
 Services relating to the 
 Facility for Sustainable Busi-
ness Advisory Services (SBAS)
CCAS Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED Closed
Climate Change Partnership 
Program
CCPP Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED Active
Climate Change Technology 
 Investment Index 




0.3 SDTF 2009 2014 Closed
Climate Innovation Multi Donor 
Trust Fund
CIMDTF Green CC general BI/MULTI Policy 
 support
CC_MIXED 1.2 MDTF 2018 2020 Active
Climate Innovation Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund
CIMDTF Green CC general BI/MULTI Institutional 
support
MITIGATION_RE 68.0 MDTF 2011 2020 Active
Climate Investment Funds 
Partnership Forum
CIF Green Mitigation CIF Multiple CC_MIXED 0.3 MDTF 2012 2049 Active
Climate Resilient and Low-
Carbon Development MDTF
CRLD Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 4.2 MDTF 2014 2019 Active
Co-financing Kiribati Adapta-
tion Project Implementation 
Phase II
KAP Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE











TF name Program Relevance 
for CC















tion Project Phase II
KAP Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE
2.8 SDTF 2005 2011 Closed
Communication for Climate 
Change
CCC Green CC general BI/MULTI Awareness 
raising
CC_MIXED 16.7 MDTF 2008 2020 Active
Community Development 
 Carbon Fund
CDCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 93.0 MDTF 2003 2020 Active
Community Development 
 Carbon Fund Technical 
 Assistance
CDCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 0.9 MDTF 2003 2020 Active
Danish Carbon Fund DCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 90.5 MDTF 2004 2020 Active




3.8 MDTF 2012 2018 Active




14.5 SDTF 2017 2021 Active
Disaster Risk Financing and 
Insurance Multi Donor Trust 
Fund




6.8 MDTF 2011 2017 Closed
Energy Efficiency and Power 
Development Research
EEPDR Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE 0.1 SDTF 1993 1994 Closed
Energy Efficiency and 
 Renewable Energy Services
EEREA Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
0.3 SDTF 2003 2005 Closed
Energy Efficiency Support 
 Program for Ukraine – EE4U 
Multi Donor Trust Fund
EE4U Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE Active
Energy Sector Management 
 Assistance Program
ESMAP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
178.3 MDTF 2009 2020 Active
Energy Sector Management 
 Assistance Program Multi 
 Donor Fund
ESMAP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE




TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














ESMAP/Energy Efficiency TA 
Project
ESMAP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE 0.3 SDTF 1994 1998 Closed
EU/WB Access to Sustainable 
Energy Philippines
ASEP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 33.0 SDTF 2015 2019 Active
European Union (EU) – African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
Region Disaster Reduction 
Partnership Trust Fund




98.6 SDTF 2011 2020 Active
Financial Mechanisms for 
 Climate Change –  Canada TA
FMCC Green CC general BI/MULTI Derisking CC_MIXED Active
Financial Mechanisms for 
 Climate Change Facility
FMCC Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED Active
First Tranche of the Umbrella 
Carbon Facility
UCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 833.7 MDTF 2005 2018 Active
Geothermal Development in 
 Indonesia: Technical Assistance 
for Capacity Building Trust 
Fund
GDI Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 7.4 SDTF 2011 2017 Closed
Geothermal Power Support 
Program
GPSP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 2.7 SDTF 2008 2012 Closed
Global Environment Facility – 
Norwegian Co-financing 
 Arrangement
GEF Yellow CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 4.3 SDTF 1993 Closed
Global Environment Facility 
Secretariat Budget Trust Fund
GEF Yellow CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 0.6 MDTF 2002 Active
Global Environment Facility 
Voluntary Fund
GEF Yellow CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 1.8 MDTF 1995 Active
Global Environmental Facility 
Public-Private Sector Partner-
ship Fund
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for CC














Global Facility for Disaster 
 Reduction and Recovery 




42.7 MDTF 2016 2021 Active
Global Facility for Disaster 
 Reduction and Recovery Trust 
Fund for Mainstreaming 
 Disaster Risk Management  
in Developing Countries




3.0 SDTF 2017 2021 Active
Global Facility for Disaster 
 Reduction and Recovery Trust 
Fund for Mainstreaming Disas-
ter Risk Management in the 
Indo-Pacific Region




9.2 SDTF 2017 2021 Active
Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Partnership
GGFRP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE 7.1 MDTF 2015 2019 Active




11.9 MDTF 2017 2021 Active
Global Partnership on Disaster 
Risk Financing Analytics




6.7 SDTF 2015 2020 Active
Green Bond Technical Assis-
tance Program (Supporting 
Emerging Green One- Amundi 
Planet SICAV-SIF)
GBTA Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
Active
Ho Chi Minh City Green 
 Transport Development
HCM Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Transport MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
12.0 SDTF 2015 2021 Active
IBRD/Netherlands Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism  Facility – 
Euro Trust Fund
NL-CDM Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 153.8 SDTF 2002 2017 Closed
IBRD/Netherlands Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism Facility – 
U.S. Dollar Trust Fund
NL-CDM Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 15.5 SDTF 2002 2016 Closed
IBRD/Netherlands European 
Carbon Facility 






TF name Program Relevance 
for CC















Carbon Facility – Euro Trust 
Fund
NL-ECF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 17.2 SDTF 2004 2014 Closed
IBRD/Netherlands European 
Carbon Facility – U.S. Dollar 
Trust Fund
NL-ECF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 4.0 SDTF 2004 2014 Closed
IFC/Netherlands European Car-
bon Facility Trust – Euro Trust
NL-ECF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 Closed
Indian Renewable Resources 
Development Project
IREDA Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 0.0 SDTF 1988 1996 Closed
Indonesia REDD Support Facility ID-RSF Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry CARBON_1 3.1 MDTF 2013 2017 Closed
Indonesia Sustainable Land-
scape Management (IDSLM) 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund
ID-SLM Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
32.5 MDTF 2016 2022 Active
Indonesia Sustainable 
 Urbanization
ID-SUN Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 13.4 MDTF 2016 2019 Active
InsuResilience MDTF/ Global 
Risk Financing Facility (GRiF)




31.2 MDTF 2017 2022 Active
Integrated Land and Water 
Management for Adaptation  
to Climate Variability and 
Change (ILWAC)
ILWM Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE
10.0 SDTF 2009 2018 Active
Italian Carbon Fund ICF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 162.5 MDTF 2003 2020 Active
Japan Trust Fund for Main-
streaming Disaster Reduction 
Initiative of the Global Facility 
for Disaster Reduction and 
 Recovery















TF name Program Relevance 
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Japan-World Bank Program for 
Mainstreaming Disaster Risk 
Management in Developing 
Countries




95.0 SDTF 2013 2020 Active
Korea Green Growth Single- 
Donor Trust Fund
GG-KOR Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
39.5 SDTF 2012 2021 Active
Korea Green Growth Trust Fund GG-KOR Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
48.0 SDTF 2015 2021 Active
Liberia Forest Landscape 
 Single-Donor Trust Fund
LFL Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
55.8 SDTF 2016 2020 Active
Lighting India – Clean Energy 
Access Program




Economic Zones Program under 
the Facility for Investment 
 Climate Advisory Services
FIAS Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
Closed
Maldives Climate Change 
 Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MCC Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 14.7 MDTF 2009 2018 Active
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
 Addressing Climate Change  
in the Middle East and North 
 Africa (MENA) Region
CC-ME-
NA
Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 3.9 MDTF 2008 2015 Closed
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Bangladesh Climate Change 
Resilience Fund
BCCRF Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
130.3 MDTF 2008 2017 Closed
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Clean Energy Investment 
Framework
CEIF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 40.2 MDTF 2007 2014 Closed
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Communication for Climate 
Change
CCC Green CC general BI/MULTI Awareness 
raising




TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
 Financing of the Global Gas 
Flaring Reduction Partnership
GGFRP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE 25.7 MDTF 2002 2016 Closed
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Mainstreaming Disaster and 
Climate Risk Management in 
Developing Countries




81.5 MDTF 2014 2020 Active
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Mainstreaming Disaster and 
Climate Risk Management  
in Developing Countries




44.1 MDTF 2016 2020 Active
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Mainstreaming Disaster Reduc-
tion Initiative of the Global 
 Facility for Disaster Reduction 
and Recovery 




199.2 MDTF 2006 2017 Active
Multi Donor Trust Fund for 
Program for Forests
PROFOR Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
51.0 MDTF 2002 2020 Active
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for 
Economics of Adaptation to 
Climate Change




1.8 MDTF 2009 2010 Closed
Multi-donor Trust Fund for the 
Africa Climate Change Program
ACCP Green CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 9.3 MDTF 2012 2018 Active
National Adaptation Project in 
Vanuatu
NAP-VT Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
MULTIPLE
2.4 SDTF 2012 2016 Closed
Nationally Determined Contri-
butions Support Facility
NDC-SF Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Policy 
 support
CC_MIXED 22.1 MDTF 2016 2019 Active
Netherlands IFC Partnership 
Program – Renewable Energy 
Program
NL-REP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE Active
Nigeria Off Grid Solar Market 
Development and Finance 
 Program













TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Pacific Disaster Risk Financing 
and Insurance Multi Donor 
Trust Fund




5.7 MDTF 2011 2016 Closed
Partnership for Market Readi-
ness Multi Donor Trust Fund
PMR Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Policy 
 support
CARBON_A6 103.4 MDTF 2011 2021 Active
Pilot Program to Conserve Rain 
Forest
PPCRF Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry MITIGATION_
FOREST
1.8 SDTF 1992 1995 Closed
Promoting Africa’s Green and 
Climate Resilient Development 
Trust Fund
GCRD Yellow CC general BI/MULTI Multiple CC_MIXED 14.0 SDTF 2017 2022 Active
Prototype Carbon Fund PCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 206.1 MDTF 2000 2024 Active
Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility Integrating 
Climate Change Agenda with 




Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
2.9 MDTF 2017 2022 Active
Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility (PPIAF) Inte-
grating Climate Change Agenda 




Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
9.3 MDTF 2008 2022 Active
Readiness Fund of the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility
FCPF-RF Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 315.5 MDTF 2008 2021 Active
Readiness Fund of the Forest 
Carbon Partnership Facility
FCPF-RF Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 28.0 MDTF 2017 2021 Active
Reduce Carbon Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation 
Plus (REDD+) Support Facility
REDD+ Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Forestry CARBON_1 0.3 MDTF 2016 2017 Closed
Renewable Energy Advisory 
Services Program for Africa
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for CC














Renewable Energy and Rural 
Electricity Access Project
REREA Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 6.0 SDTF 2007 2012 Closed
Renewable Energy Support – 
WB/GEF Strategic Partnership 
Development
RES Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 0.5 SDTF 1999 2002 Closed
Renewable Resource and Re-
gional Development Project
RRRD Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 0.1 SDTF 1996 2000 Closed
Renewable Resource and Re-
gional Development Project
RRRD Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 0.3 SDTF 1996 1999 Closed
Saint Lucia Disaster Vulnera-
bility Reduction Project – 
 European Development Fund 
Trust Fund
EDF-LC Yellow Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
7.0 SDTF 2016 2020 Active
Saint Vincent and the Gren-
adines Regional Disaster Vul-
nerability Reduction Project – 
European Development Fund 
Trust Fund
EDF-SV Yellow Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
7.3 SDTF 2016 2019 Active
Scaling Up Greenhouse Gas 
Mitigation in Asia: Support  
to ASI
ASI Green Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
3.0 SDTF 2002 2006 Closed
Scaling Utility Scale Solar 
Photovoltaics (PV) in  
Sub-Saharan Africa
PVSSA Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE Active
Second Tranche of the  
BioCarbon Fund
BioCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_1 30.1 MDTF 2007 2020 Active
Second Tranche of the  
Spanish Carbon Fund
SpCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 81.0 MDTF 2008 2021 Active
Second Tranche of the 
 Umbrella Carbon Facility
UCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
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Serbia National Disaster Risk 
Management Program SDTF




6.8 SDTF 2015 2020 Active
South Asia Clean Energy  
Austria – World Bank Partner-
ship
SACE Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_RE 3.9 SDTF 2011 2017 Closed
Southeast Asia Disaster Risk 
Insurance Facility




2.7 MDTF 2017 2022 Active
South-South Cooperation for 
Mainstreaming Disaster Reduc-
tion Multi Donor Trust Fund 
under the Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction




1.5 MDTF 2007 2016 Closed
Spanish Carbon Fund SpCF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 193.9 MDTF 2004 2020 Active
Spanish Trust Fund for Main-
streaming Disaster Reduction 
Initiative of the Global Facili-
tyor Disaster Reduction and 
Recovery




5.1 SDTF 2007 2016 Closed
Special Initiative of the Global 
Environment Facility
GEF Yellow CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 0.4 MDTF 2016 2020 Active
Special Initiative of the Global 
Environment Facility Evaluation 
Office
GEF Yellow CC general UNFCCC Multiple CC_MIXED 1.6 MDTF 2006 2020 Active
Standby Recovery Financing 
Facility of the Global Facility 
for Disaster Reduction and 
 Recovery




24.7 MDTF 2007 2017 Active
Supporting Low Carbon Energy 
Sector Transition in Srilanka
SLCEST Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Multiple MITIGATION_RE Active
Sustainable Energy Manage-
ment Project – Burkina Faso
SEMP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy




TF name Program Relevance 
for CC














Sustainable Logistics (SUSLOG) SUSLOG Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Transport MITIGATION_
MULTIPLE
6.1 MDTF 2013 2018 Active
Tanzania Urban Resilience 
 Program
TURP Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Resilience ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
38.2 SDTF 2016 2021 Active
The Development of a National 
Green Building Code (GBC) in 
Colombia
GBC Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE Closed
The World Bank/European In-
vestment Bank (EIB) Carbon 
Fund
EIB-CF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
 finance
CARBON_2 29.7 MDTF 2006 2018 Active
Third Tranche of the BioCarbon 
Fund (BioCFT3)
BioCF Green Mitigation CF Forestry CARBON_1 204.6 MDTF 2012 2030 Active
Transformative Carbon Asset 
Facility
TCAF Green Mitigation CF Carbon 
fi nance
CARBON_A6 212.2 MDTF 2016 2029 Active
Trust Fund for Asia Sustainable 
and Alternative Energy
ASAE Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 2.0 SDTF 2006 2011 Closed
Trust Fund for Energy Efficien-
cy and Youth Corps Program
EEYCP Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE 48.8 SDTF 2012 2021 Active
Trust Fund for Europe and 
 Central Asia (ECA) Climate 




Green Adaptation BI/MULTI Multiple ADAPTATION_
DISASTER
0.3 SDTF 2004 2009 Closed
Ukraine Energy Efficiency 
 Program
EE4U Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Energy 
 efficiency
MITIGATION_EE Active
Vietnam Climate Change 
 Partnership Trust Fund
VN-FS Green CC general BI/MULTI Policy 
 support
CC_MIXED 4.2 SDTF 2011 2014 Closed
Vietnam Natural Disaster  
Risk Management Project




6.5 SDTF 2006 2011 Closed
Vietnam Renewable Energy 
 Development Project
VN-FS Yellow Mitigation BI/MULTI Renewable 
Energy
MITIGATION_RE 2.4 SDTF 2010 2017 Closed
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8.2. Annex 2: Approach to expert interviews 
Donors MDBs TF activity implementer  
in recipient countries
Common questions/topics
•  General opinion on the coordination and management of the specific TF. 
•  Deficiencies observed throughout the implementation of TF activities.
•  Areas of improvement/preliminary recommendations.
•  Appropriateness of communication channels (reaction time, consistency of feedback etc.).
•  Overlapping areas with other TFs.
•  Administrative process, what is working and what is not.
•  Key performance indicators (KPI) of the project for each specific stakeholder, are they aligned?
•  Importance/relevance of the TF’s business model.
•  Which indicators are preferred to assess effectiveness of TFs?
Specific questions/Topics
Involvement of the donors in  
the implementation of the funds.
Alignment with TF management 
 regarding donor country’s goals.
Coordination between donors/ 
MDBs and activity implementers.
Donors’ visibility in the activities.
Governance of the activities. 
Identification of challenges  
and speed of remediation.
Overall effectiveness of the TF.
Specific questions/Topics
Coordination practices between  
the different “Programme”  
teams inside the MDB.
The vision of the Fund is  
aligned to the MDB’s mission.
Coordination between the 
 administrative processes of  
the TF.
Challenges in the specific  regions 
where the TF is active. 
Overall performance of the TF.
Specific questions/Topics
Support given by the MDBs  
on the implementation of the 
 activities.
How many activities are being 
 developed by the same TF and  
MDB in your country/is there any 
coordination of those  activities.
Efficiency in the administrative 
process.
Pressure from the MDBs to 
 disburse the funds.
Performance of the activities 
 compared to the targets.
8.3. Annex 3: List of interviewees
WBG interviewees:
• Chizuru Aoki – WB GEF Secretariat
• Filippo Berardi – WB GEF Secretariat
• Nadja Bleiber – Advisor to the German Executive 
Director
• Ana Elisa Bucher – NDC Support Facility
• Julie Dana – Adaptation/Disaster TFs
• Mafalda Duarte – Manager, CIFs 
• Marius Kaiser – NDC support facility
• Julia Lessina – Head, IFC Trust Funds
• Patrick Luternauer – IFC Partnerships & Multilat-
eral Engagement
• Olivier Mahul – Practice Manager, Crisis and 
 Disaster Risk Finance
• Mikko Ollikainen – WB AF Secretariat
• Neeraj Prasad – PMR
• Brice Quesnel – Trust Funds and Partner  
Relations, Development Finance
• Dirk Reinermann – Trust Funds and Partner 
 Relations, Development Finance
• Marc Sadler – Practice Manager, Climate  
Funds Management
• Hugh Searight – Operations Officer, CIFs
• Zhihong Zhang – WB CIF Secretariat
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RDB interviewees:
• Virender Kumar Duggal – ADB 
• Daniel Hincapie-Salazar – IADB
• Esmyra Javier – ADB 
• Vitoria Lima de Moraes – IADB
• Gareth Phillips – AfDB 
Activity implementers in recipient countries:
• Jorund Buen – Differ, Norway
• Sandra Greiner – Climate Focus, Netherlands  
(former WB)
• Ken Newcombe – C Quest Capital, US (and for-
mer head of Prototype Carbon Fund, World Bank)
• Randall Spalding-Fecher – Carbon Limits, Norway
• Massamba Thioye – UNFCCC CDM 
• Nicolas Westenenk – Ministry of Environment, 
Chile 
German interviewees:
• Malin Ahlberg – BMU
• Frank Fass-Metz – BMZ
• Sebastian Forsch – BMZ
• Thomas Forth – BMU
• Simon Hagemann – BMZ
• Nicolas von Kalm – BMZ
• Claudia Keller – BMU
• Martin Kipping – BMZ
• Orsola Lussignoli – BMZ
• Achim Neumann – KfW
• Lydia Ondraczek – BMU
• Claudia Schütt – BMZ
• Ursula Stiegler – GIZ
• Sebastian Wienges – GIZ
• Arndt Wierheim – KfW
8.4. Annex 4: Top 5 FIF contributors (2009–18)
GEF GCF CTF SCF LDCF AF
JPN 1276.6 JPN 1366.6 GBR 1740.0 GBR 1435.7 DEU 284.2 DEU 283.1
USA 1155.7 USA 1000.0 USA 1492.0 USA 507.6 GBR 176.2 SWE 108.5
DEU 1001.7 DEU 883.1 JPN 1128.9 NOR 280.3 USA 158.2 ESP 57.1
GBR 712.9 FRA 826.8 DEU 615.0 JPN 229.3 BEL 115.0 BEL 24.8
FRA 630.8 GBR 790.2 FRA 266.1 CAN 83.9 SWE 111.4 ITA 16.4
SCCF PAF GRIF CBIT CREWS NPIF
DEU 115.0 DEU 42.8 NOR 69.8 GBR 14.0 FRA 16.7 JPN 12.2
USA 50.0 USA 15.0 GBR 0.0 DEU 10.6 DEU 3.1 FRA 1.2
BEL 41.2 SWE 11.8 USA 0.0 USA 9.9 AUS 3.0 CHE 1.1
NOR 25.9 CHE 2.5 JPN 0.0 JPN 5.0 NLD 2.3 NOR 1.0
FIN 14.9 GBR 0.0 DEU 0.0 ITA 4.3 LUX 1.1 GBR 0.5
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8.5. Annex 5: Climate Change TFs at the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
The EBRD was one of the early movers in carbon fi-
nance and started managing a USD 35 million carbon 
fund from the government of the Netherlands in 
2003 . The fund aimed at purchasing credits generated 
by JI activities in Central and Eastern Europe . The 
fund aimed at contracting between 0 .25 and 1 .5 mil-
lion tCO
2
 per project or portfolio of projects . The 
Fund could provide up to 50% of the contract value as 
upfront finance, while the remaining 50% would be 
paid at delivery of credits . Eligible projects activities 
included: renewable energy projects (e .g . solar, bio-
mass, wind, geothermal) energy efficiency projects – 
either on the supply or demand side – that reduce con-
sumption of fossil fuels, recovery and utilization of 
methane from, for example, waste landfills and waste-
water treatment, and switching to fuels with lesser 
GHG intensity (e .g . from coal to natural gas) . 
In 2006, jointly with the European Investment Bank 
(EIB), the EBRD launched the Multilateral Carbon 
Credit Fund (MCCF) bringing together sovereign par-
ticipants and also the private sector, to purchase emis-
sion reduction credits from JI activities located from 
Central Europe to Central Asia . The fund totaled USD 
208 .5 million in commitments from the participants 
(EBRD 2010) . It explored transactions under of As-
signed Amount Units (AAUs) under Article 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol through the Green Investment 
Scheme, under which selling countries use the reve-
nues from the transaction of AAUs to support other 
climate-friendly investments . These activities resulted 
in transactions in Poland (with Spain for USD 25 mil-
lion and Ireland for USD 15 million) and Slovakia 
(with Spain, generating USD 40 million revenues used 
under the Slovakian Sustainable Energy Financing Fa-
cility) . The EBRD also supported the development of 
the Green Investment Scheme, providing capacity 
building to countries, and, with support from the 
Netherlands, it financed the preparation of the Manual 
for Sale and Purchase of AAUs under a Green Invest-
ment Scheme with the goal of helping countries in 
contract negotiation and structuring transactions of 
AAUs . 
In 2006, the EBRD launched the Sustainable Energy 
Initiative (SEI) focusing on energy efficiency and sus-
tainable energy investments, together with adaptation 
activities . Among the focus areas identified, SEI in-
cluded also “Carbon Market development” to mobilize 
investments in mitigation projects . The SEI continued 
its operations until 2015 and the main goals were to 
scale up investments in sustainable energy and also to 
improve the business environment and remove existing 
barriers to market development . The MCCF has also 
operated within the SEI . In 2013 the Sustainable Re-
source Initiative (SRI) was introduced, and sustainable 
energy investments were still financed through the SEI . 
Since 2015, SEI/SRI have been superseded by the 
Green Energy Transition (GET) initiative which ex-
panded the scope of the SEI/SRI including also tech-
nology transfer . Until 2015, the SEI supported 1,080 
projects for EUR 19 .5 billion of EBRD financing and 
EUR 106 .9 billion of cumulative total project value . 
In 2015, investments under SEI/SRI reached 30% of 
the total EBRD business (Afanasenko 2016) . The SEI 
included, besides investments in projects, also two oth-
er components: technical assistance (i .e . project assess-
ments, feasibility studies, energy audits, risk assess-
ments) and policy dialogues (working with 
governments to address market failures and create an 
enabling environment to scale up green investments) . 
One of the most important elements of the SEI is the 
creation of the so-called Sustainable Energy Financing 
Facilities (SEFFs): these facilities provide credit lines to 
the local banks, together with technical support, which 
then provide lending to small and medium enterprises 
for the implementation of EE and small renewable en-
ergy projects . Although not necessarily connected to 
the carbon markets, the SEFFs created a network of 
over 100 financial institutions, about USD 500 mil-
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annually . The SEFFs, also under the SRI, served to 
support the Policy Dialogue components between 
EBRD and national governments on the enhancement 
of the required regulatory and institutional framework, 
as well as identification of barriers to scaling up climate 
investments, including also carbon markets . The 
SEFFs provided support to project owners on the iden-
tification of opportunities for mitigation projects, sup-
port in project development and related documenta-
tion, baseline identification, and training on 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) re-
quirements . In addition, EBRD also provided carbon 
finance support on a broader level (i .e . at national lev-
el) to regulators and law-makers to identify and imple-
ment appropriate regulatory frameworks that can ef-
fectively stimulate and support mitigation investments . 
While the main topics under the policy dialogue are 
very close and at times overlapping, activities are not 
necessarily targeting carbon markets development (e .g . 
legislation on energy efficiency in public building in 
the Russian Federation) . In June 2012, the EBRD es-
tablished the Regional Energy Efficiency Programme 
(REEP), one of the successors of SEFF .
The EBRD’s program “Carbon Crediting Approach in 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SE-
MED)” comprises a series of market-based programs 
to reduce carbon emissions . These programs are 
comprehensive packages that include policy dialogue, 
technical assistance, carbon pricing for GHG emission 
reduction projects and associated results-based pay-
ments . More specifically the EBRD’s SEMED includes:
• Developing, implementing and purchasing carbon 
credits from a carbon credit up-scaled CDM based 
approach in the renewable energy sector .
• Contributing to and supporting the carbon market 
development by reviewing the carbon market op-
tions, including domestic use of carbon credits and 
development of local capacity, in particular in the 
area of MRV and in the management of large emis-
sion reduction mechanisms .
• Contributing to a further development of up-scaled 
CDM based carbon credit instruments, such as 
PoAs or new mechanisms according to the latest in-
ternational climate policy developments .
The EBRD thus provided a comprehensive package of 
carbon finance and carbon finance-related support 
measures, including financing, capacity building and 
policy dialogue . Moreover, over time the EBRD devel-
oped a broader strategy to support the low-carbon en-
ergy transition in its region of operation integrating its 
carbon finance activities and other support mecha-
nisms .
8.6 Annex 6: Climate Change TFs at the European 
Investment Bank
The EIB puts a strong emphasis on climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in its activities . The EIB’s 
current climate strategy was launched in 2015 and 
committed the EIB to mobilize finance for projects to 
keep global warming well below 2 °C . In this light, the 
EIB is committed to lending at least 25 % annually to 
climate action activities . For developing countries, the 
Bank aims to increase its lending for climate action to 
35 % by 2020 (EIB 2018) .
The EIB operates multiple TFs some of which are fo-
cused on climate change, for example FEMIP Trust 
Fund and Luxembourg-EIB Climate Finance Platform 
(EIB 2019) . 
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Launched in 2005, the FEMIP Trust Fund (FTF) has 
received over EUR 66 million in contributions for ca-
pacity building, upstream studies, technical assistance, 
and risk capital operations in the southern Mediterra-
nean partner countries . This includes a GBP 15 mil-
lion grant from the United Kingdom for CAMENA 
– a separate, climate action-focused window . The FTF 
supports sustainable projects in the following sectors: 
finance and MSMEs, infrastructure, the environment 
and human capital, and research, development and in-
novation .
The Luxembourg Climate Finance Platform was un-
veiled in late 2016 at the COP23 climate summit in 
Bonn . The Luxembourg government is allocating EUR 
30 million, which will be used to catalyze private sec-
tor investment in climate action projects around the 
world .
8.7. Annex 7: Sectors and themes used for similarity 
analysis
CC sectors among WBG-pre defined sectors  
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